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I. INTRODUCTION
The effect of unplanned and ill-conceived land use development
on the coastal ecology has been well documented in recent years.'
Recognizing the need for more effective governmental control in this
area, a number of state legislatures have enacted statutes to protect the
coastal environment and encourage the orderly development of coastal
resources.- These efforts have received the support of the federal
government as well,'
Determination of coastal boundaries is essential to the develop-
ment of an effective coastal zone management program.4 In general
such boundaries represent the intersection of the shore with a particular
tidal elevation.5 However, the demarcation of coastal boundaries is
complicated by legal uncertainties. Moreover, the unavailability of ac-
curate tidal data or the use of improper survey methods make the ac-
curate location of the physical boundary line a difficult -task in many
cases.
6
This article will examine a number of physical and legal problems
1. See generally B. KET CHcM, Tim WATER'S EDGE: C~rnCAL PROBLEMS OF Tim
COASTAL ZONE (1972); U.S. COMM'N ON MARINE SCmNCE, ENUINEEiUNG AND RE-
soURCES, OuR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL AcTON (1969).
2. E.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 113A-100 to -128 (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3); R.I. GN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 46-23-1 to -16 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.58.010-.930
(Supp. 1972).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. If, 1972).
4. W. HULL, COASTAL BOUNDARY MAPPiNo 1 (1973).
5. 1 A. SHALOWrrz, SnoRE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 89 (1962).
6. Guth, Will the Real Mean High 'Water Line Please Stand Up, 1974 PRoCEED.
INGS OF THE Am. SOC'Y OF PHOTOGRAMMETRY 33-44 (Fall Convention).
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associated with coastal boundary determinations and offer some solu-
tions within the framework of the legislative proposal which accom-
panies this discussion.
I1. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE COASTAL ZONE
A. Littoral Rights
Landowners, whose property borders on the ocean or a navigable
watercourse, 7 commonly possess certain riparian or littoral rights.8
These rights9 depend upon contact with the water and not upon owner-
ship of the submerged lands beneath it.'0 For example, littoral owners
usually have a right of access to the water," which cannot be impaired
by the state without just compensation, 12 and they sometimes have
rights to objects cast upon the shore.'3 Moreover, littoral owners share
with other members of the public -the right to navigate,' 4 fish,' 5 and
7. Strictly speaking, riparian or littoral rights properly attach only to land which
abuts on navigable waters. However, landowners whose property borders on nonnavi-
gable waters are often treated as riparian or littoral owners. See F. MALONEY, S.
PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMNISTRATIoN- kE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE
§ 22.1(a), at 35-36 (1968).
8. The term "riparian" is applied to fresh water streams, while the term "littoral"
is used in connection with lakes and the seashore. 1 H. FARNHAM, TiE LAW OF WATms
AM WATER RIGHTS § 63 (1904).
9. Riparian and littoral rights also include the right to make consumptive uses,
at least where fresh waters are concerned. See generally 5 R. POWELL, THE LAw op
REAL PROPERTY §§ 710-18 (1971); 1 WATERs AND WATER RIGTs §§ 15-16 (R. Clark
ed. 1967).
10. 56 AM. JuR. Waters § 216 (1947).
11. McCloskey v. Pacific Coast Co., 160 F. 794 (9th Cir. 1908); San Francisco
Say. Union v. R.G.R. Petroleum & Mining Co., 144 Cal. 134, 135, 77 P. 823, 824
(1904); Board of Trustees v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973); McCarthy v. Coos Head Timber Co., 208 Ore. 371, 387-88, 302
P.2d 238, 246 (1956); Hollan v. State, 308 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
Lyon v. Fishmonger's Co., 1 App. Cas. 662 (1876); Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1156 (1934).
12. Lewis v. Johnson, 76 F. 476, 477 (D. Alas. 1896) (dictum); Hayes v. Bow-
man, 91 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957); In re City of New York, 168 N.Y. 134, 61 N.E.
158 (1901); Duke of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Bd. of Works, L.R. 5 H.L. 418 (1872);
1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 8, § 66; F. MALONEY, S. PAGER & F. BAiDWIN, supra note
7, § 41.1, at 98-99. But see cases discussed in Annot., 21 A.L.R. 206 (1922).
13. For example, seaweed and other natural objects thrown up by the sea belong
to the landowner. Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524 (1845); Emans v. Turnbull, 2 Johns.
314 (N.Y. 1807). At common law the right to wreck was in the sovereign. Statute
of Westminster of 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 4; Constable's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 218, 223 (K.B.
1601); Note, Abandoned Property: Title to Treasure Recovered in Floridds Territorial
Waters, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 360, 361-62 (1969). In America, however, the littoral
owner may claim wreck. Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255 (1832); Annot., 41
A.L.R. 1015, 1018 (1926).
14. Maloney & Plager, Florida's Lakes: Problems in a Water Paradise, 13 U. FLA.
L. REv. 1, 26-31 (1960).
15. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Arlk. 436, 444, 283 S,W.2d 129, 134 (1955); Annot., 56
A,L.R,2d 790 (1957),
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swim or bathe' 6 in navigable waters, subject, however, to reasonable
regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power.17
Finally, littoral property is subject to the doctrine of accretion, re-
lition, avulsion, and erosion,' which will be thoroughly discussed
below.' 9
B. Public Trust Doctrine
No examination of property rights in the coastal zone would be
complete without a discussion of the origin and scope of the public trust
doctrine. In most jurisdictions -the state owns the tidelands and beds
under navigable waters; however, the character of this ownership dif-
fers in many respects from that of a private owner.20  According to one
commentator, "The public nature of state ownership is expressed in the
trust principle, which means that the public is entitled to use the tide-
lands for certain purposes. In theory, at least, the states cannot destroy
these public uses by devoting the tidelands to non-public uses." 2' In
its modem form, therefore, the public trust doctrine limits the power
of states -to dispose of lands under tidal waters. 22  The doctrine has tra-
ditionally been employed to protect public rights to navigation, com-
merce and fishing,28 but in some states it has also been utilized,24 along
16. Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 83, 80 N.E. 688, 689 (1907); People
v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 159, 91 N.W. 211, 212 (1902); Harrison County v. Guice,
244 Miss. 95, 107, 140 So. 2d 838, 842 (1962); State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 392, 80
A. 189, 191 (1911); In re Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wash. 2d 284, 287, 218 P.2d 309,
312 (1950).
17. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968); Carmazi v. Board of County Comm'rs, 108 So, 2d
318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Note, Colberg, Inc. v. State: Riparian Landowner's
Right to Eminent Domain Relief for State Impairment of Access to a Navigable Water-
way, 72 DICK. L. REv. 375 (1968).
18. See generally 6 R. PowELL, supra note 9, §§ 983-86 (1973); SA G. THOMP-
SON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 2560-65 (J. Grimes
ed. 1957); 56 AM. Ju. Waters §§ 476-98 (1947); 65 CJ.S. Navigable Waters §§ 80-
87 (1966).
19. See Part JI1 B(3) infra.
20. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Ju-
dicial Intervention, 68 McH. L. REv. 471 (1970); Note, The Public Trust in Public
Waterways, 7 URBAN L. ANNuAL 219 (1974).
21. Teclaff, The Coastal Zone-Control over Encroachments into the Tidewaters,
1 J. MARnTME L. & CoMumRCE 241, 263 (1970).
22. See Comment, The Tideland Trust: Economic Currents in a Traditional Legal
Doctrine, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 826 (1974); Note, Conveyances of Sovereign Lands Un-
der the Public Trust Doctrine: When Are They in the Public Interest?, 24 U. FLA. L.
Rnv. 285 (1972).
23. See Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Tra.
ditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J 762 (1970).
24. To date all of these cases have involved municipalities restricting access to
188 [Vol. 53
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with other concepts,2 5 to protect the public's access to upland beach
areas for recreational purposes.
Although there were parallels in Roman law,2 6 the public trust
doctrine originated in the English common law.2" Lord Hale in his
treatise, De Jure Marls, distinguished between the proprietary interests
of ,the sovereign and the rights of the public in tidal waters. Hale re-
ferred to the former as jus privatum and the latter as jus publicum.2 8
The jus privatum was an aspect of the King's regalian rights and re-
ferred to ownership of the soil itself.29  Any unauthorized encroach-
ment on the foreshore or beds of tidal waters constituted an invasion
of the King's private right and was deemed a purpresture,3 ° and in the
case of a wharf or other structure, the King could bring proceedings
publically owned beaches to local residents. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of
Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.Y 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972) ('The public trust doctrine like all
common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded
and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to ben-
efit ... "); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup.
Ct. 1972). See also Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy on Public Use of Beaches,
24 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 967, 978-79 (1973); Note, Non-Resident Restrictions in Munici-
pally Owned Beaches: Approaches to the Problem, 10 COLUM. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 177
(1974); Note, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, 2
ECOL. L.Q. 571, 582-91 (1972); Note, Access to Public Municipal Beaches: The
Formulation of a Comprehensive Legal Approach, 7 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 936 (1973).
25. Theories based on immemorial custom, implied dedication and prescription
have also been used by some state courts to provide for public access to the sea across
privately owned beaches. Dietz v. King, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1970); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974); State
ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); Seaway Co. v. Attorney
General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Note, Public Access to Beaches: Com-
mon Law Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U.L. RPv. 369 (1973);
Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970); Commentary, Easements:
Judicial and Legislative Protection of the Public's Rights in Floridas Beaches, 25 U.
FLA. L. REv. 586 (1973).
26. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923); Di-
GEST 43.12.1.17; INsTrrTrrEs 2.1.1, .2, .5; Comment, 79 YALE L.Y, supra note 23, at 763-
64.
27. See generally Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of
Fact (pts. 1-2), 2 MwNN. L. Rv. 313, 429 (1918).
28. Hale, A Treatise Relative to the Maritime Law of England in Three Parts in
1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAw OF ENGLAND" (F. Hargrove ed.
1787), reprinted in S. MooRE, A HISTORY OF THE FoREsuoRE 393 (1888) [hereinafter
cited as S. MooRE]. Page references to Hale's work are taken from the Moore treatise.
A substantial portion of Hale's treatise is also reprinted at the end of Ex parte Jennings,
6 Cow. 518, 536 (N.Y. 1826).
29. Fraser, supra note 27, at 433. Until restricted by Parliament in the eighteenth
century, the King was free to alienate his fus privatum interest. Stat. 1 Anne, c. 7,
§ 5 (1701). See also Stat. 10 Geo. 4, c. 50 (1829), which placed royal property under
the management of the commissioners of woods, forests and land revenues. Tidelands
are now managed by the Crown Estate Commissioners. 39 HALSBuRy's LAws OF
ENGLAND, Waters & Watercourses § 775 (4th ed. 1962).
30. J. GouLD, A TEEAnsE ON THE LAW OF WATERS § 21 (3d ed. 1900).
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in the Exchequer to seize the property or compel its removal."1
This private right, however, was subject to the jus publicum, under
which public rights of fishing and navigation were protected.12 Accord-
ing to Lord Hale, waterways were "in the nature of common highwayes,
in which all the Kinges people have a liberty of passage,"88  Unlike
the jus privatum, which was limited to tidal waters, the jus publicum,
as it applied to navigation, extended to navigable fresh watercourses as
well, even where the beds were privately owned. 4
Although -the King could convey his private interest in the soil, 85
he could not thereby impair the public's right to navigation.80 Thus,
if the owner of the tidelands erected a wharf or other structure that ob-
structed navigation his conduct was actionable as a public nuisance, not-
withstanding the royal grant.37
The public right of fishing was less extensive than that of naviga-
tion." The owner of the soil normally possessed exclusive fishing
rights in nontidal waters, regardless of navigability. 0 However, in the
31. Gough v. Bell, 22 N.L. 441, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1850).
32. The right of the public to ports, which give it access to shore facilities for load-
ing and unloading, was related to its right of navigation. Attorney-General v. Burridge,
147 Eng. Rep. 335 (Ex. 1822); Attorney-General v. Parmeter, 147 Eng. Rep. 345 (Ex.
1811); Attorney-General v. Richards, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795); Comment, 79
YN L.., supra note 23, at 781-82.
33. S. MOORE, supra note 28, at 339.
34. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 313 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1805); S. MooRE, supra
note 28, at 374-76.
35. Duke of Beaufort v. Mayor of Swansea, 154 Eng. Rep. 905 (Ex. 1849); Attor.
ney-General v. Burridge, 147 Eng. Rep. 335 (Ex. 1822); Attorney-General v. Parmeter,
147 Eng. Rep. 345 (Ex. 1811); Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821).
36. Gann v. Free Fishers, 11 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1312 (H.L. 1864); Attorney-General
ex rel Moore v. Wright, [1897] 2 Q.B. 318 (C.A.).
37. 'The mode of proceeding at common law to authorize the erection of wharves
and other structures on the shores of the sea or of navigable rivers, where the property
remained in the Crown, was to sue out a writ of ad quod damnum, and upon the return
of an inquest by a jury, finding that no injury would result to the king or others from
the grant, the Crown licensed what would otherwise be a purpresture." J. GouLD, supra
note 30, § 21, at 46-47; see Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 82 (1851);
Clement v. Burns, 43 N.H. 609, 617 (1862); Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624, 661 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1852); Rex v. Russell, 108 Eng. Rep. 560 (K.B. 1827); Rex v. Montague,
107 Eng. Rep. 1183, 1184 (K.B. 1825); Note, The Right of Sovereignty in the Shore
of the Sea, 1 AM. L. MAG. 76, 82 (1843).
38. At common law the right of fishery could be several, free or common. A sev-
eral fishery was an exclusive right to fish in a particular watercourse; a free fishery was
a right to fish shared with other holders of the same franchise, while a common fishery
was that right possessed by all members of the public. See 7 M. BACON, ADRIDOEMENT
OF THE LAW 452 (J. Bouvier ed. 1876); 16 C. VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF
LAW AND EQtrrY 355 (2d ed. 1793).
39. J. GOULD, supra note 30, § 49, at 111-12; see Ewing v. Colquhoun, 2 App.
Cas. 839 (1877); Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q.B.D. 162 (1882); Tilbury v. Silva, 45 CbI,
P. 98 (1890); Murphy v. Ryan, 2 1Ir. R,C.L. 143 (1868).
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case of -tidal waters, the public right of fishing was vested in the King
as jus publicum.40
At first it appears that the King made grants of exclusive fishery
in tidal waters to individuals and thereby excluded the public. 41 In
Lord Fitzwalter's Case42 Lord Hale stated that such grants were valid,
but the right was prima facie in the public and the burden of proof was
placed on the grantee to establish his interest.4 3  Eventually in the
nineteenth century, the courts determined that no grant of exclusive
fishery in tidal waters was valid if made after the effective date of the
Magna Carta.4
A somewhat different rule evolved in America. Many of the early
colonial charters, granted at a time when the King could freely alienate
his private interest in tidal waters, purported -to grant havens, ports,
rivers, waters, fishing rights, and "singular other commodities, jurisdic-
tions, royalties, privileges, franchises, and pre-eminences, both within
the tract of land upon the main, and within the islands and seas ad-
joining."45  Moreover, no particular restriction was placed on the
colonial proprietors' conveyances, except that public navigation not be
impaired.46  Nevertheless, a dootrine emerged in nineteenth-century
America that imposed substantial restrictions on power of federal and
state governments to abridge public rights of navigation and fishing or
to alienate lands under navigable waters.4  This became known as the
40. "The sea, and the arms of the sea, and the navigable waters in which the tide
ebbs and flows, are the dominion of the king,. . . but that though the king is the owner
of these waters, and, as consequent of his property, hath the primary right of fishing
therein, yet the common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the
sea, and the creeks and arms thereof, as a public common piscary, and may not, without
injury to their right, be restrained thereof." S. MooRE, supra note 28, at 376-77.
41. 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 8, § 36.
42. 86 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1672).
43. "But in case of a river that flows and reflows, and is an arm of the sea, there,
prima facie, it is common to all: and if any will appropriate a privilege to himself, the
proof lieth on his side." Id. at 766-67.
44. Gann v. Free Fishers, 11 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1312 (H.L. 1865); Duke of Somerset
v. Fogwell, 108 Eng. Rep. 325, 328 (K.B. 1826); Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep.
1190 (K.B. 1821); Mayor of Carlisle v. Graham, L.R. 4 Ex. 36 (1869). See also
Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Har. & 1. 195, 203-07 (Md. 1821).
45. The grant of King James I in 1620 to the Council of Plymouth, after which
many of the later charters were modeled, included all "havens, ports, rivers, waters, fish-
ings, mines, etc., and all and singular other commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, priri-
leges, franchises, and preeminences, both within the tract of land upon the main, and
within the islands and seas adjoining." J. GouLD, supra note 30, § 31, at 70; see Barker
v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255, 259 (1832). See also Flaherty, Virginia and the Mar-
ginal Sea: An Example of History in the Law, 58 VA. L. Rav. 694, 696 (1972).
46. 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 8, § 42.
47. E.g., Mayor v. Eslava, 9 Port. 577, 590-92 (Ala. 1839), af- "d, 41 U.S. (16
?et.) 234 (1842); Kimball v, Macpherson. 46 Cal, 104 (1873); State v. Black R'vqr
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public trust doctrine. The development of this concept may be traced
in a series of federal cases beginning with Martin v. Waddell" decided
in 1842.
The Supreme Court held in Martin that the plaintiff had not ac-
quired an exclusive right of fishery through a grant from the colonial
proprietor; rather, the dominion and property in the tidal waters were
an aspect of the proprietor's governmental powers and were held in
trust in the same manner as they were by the Crown. According to
the Court, "When the revolution took place the people of each state
became themselves sovereign, and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters in the soils under them for their own
common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the consti-
tution to the general government." 49
Shortly thereafter, in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan ° the Court ruled
that new states must be admitted on an equal footing with existing
states and determined that title to tidelands in Mobile Bay were vested
in the state of Alabama upon its admission to the Union in 1819. Later,
in Shively v. Bowlby51 the Court declared that prior to statehood, the
federal government held the beds of tidal waters in trust for the citizens
of the future state and could not alienate these lands so as to impair
the trust.
The fullest exposition of the public trust doctrine appeared in
Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 106, 13 So. 640, 648 (1893); Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325,
336 (1859); Browne v. Kennedy, 5 Har. & J. 157 (Md. 1821); Commonwealth v. City
of Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 492-93 (1858); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 65 (1851); Commonwealth v. Charleston, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 180, 181
(1822); Clement v. Burns, 43 N.H. 609, 616-17 (1862); Gough v. Bell, 23 N.J.L. 624,
654 (Ct. App. 1852); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L., 67 (Ct. App. 1821); Coxe v. State,
144 N.Y. 396, 405, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895); Tatum v. Sawyer, 9 N.C. 226 (1822);
Allen v. Allen, 19 R.I. 114, 32 A. 166 (1895) (per curiam); City of Galveston v.
Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 393 (1859); Home v. Richards, 8 Va. (4 Call) 441 (1789).
Many American courts mistakenly believed that the Crown's title to tidal waters
was directly related to its duty to preserve the public's right to navigation; e.g., Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). This was partly due to a misunderstanding
of the English test for navigability. Hale's treatise declared that the King protected
public rights in nontidal waters that were navigable in fact. S. MOORE, supra note 28,
at 374-76. However, Chancellor Kent, in Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1805), introduced the tidal theory of navigability into American jurisprudence,
holding that only tidal waters were navigable. This error led him to suggest a relation-
ship between navigability and ownership of the soil which did not exist at common law,
1 H. FA NrAM, supra note 8, § 36a, but which provided a link between the English and
American theories of governmental ownership of tidelands.
48. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
49. Id. at 410; accord, Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74-75 (1855).
50. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
51. 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
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Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.5" The Illinois legislature in 1869
made a grant of submerged lands to the Illinois Central Railroad, in-
cluding all the land underlying Lake Michigan for one mile out from
shore and extending one mile in length along the central business dis-
trict of Chicago. However, in 1873 the state revoked the grant and
brought suit to have it declared invalid. The Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the State's claim and declared that such a convey-
ance of trust lands -to private parties was beyond the power of the State
legislature. The Court stated that the title under which Illinois held
the navigable waters of Lake Michigan was a "trust devolving upon
the State for the public. . which can only be discharged by the man-
agement and control of property in which the public has an interest,
[and] cannot be relinquished by a transfer of property."5 3
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court held that
the State, in the exercise of its management and control of such lands,
could dispose of them in certain instances:
[Tihe abdication of the general control of the State over lands
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea
or lake . . . is not consistent with the exercise of that trust
which requires the government of the State to preserve such waters
for the use of the public .... The control of the State for the pur-
poses of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as
are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can
be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining. 54
Thus, the states continue to have the primary responsibility for defining
the limits of the public trust doctrine and formulating a policy concern-
ing the disposition of sovereignty submerged lands within their respect-
ive boundaries. 55
C. Government Regulatory Authority
While all property is subject to some form of public control, the
unique physical and legal characteristics of coastal property invite a
greater degree of governmental regulation. In fact, agencies of
federal, state and local governments often impose substantial limitations
52. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
53. Id. at 453.
54. Id. at 452-53.
55. Many states have enacted legislative restrictions concerning the sale of sover-
eignty submerged lands. Teclaff, supra note 21, at 261-68. The Florida Constitution
prohibits such sales unless they are found to be in the public interest. FLA. CONsT. art.
X, § 11.
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on the utilization and development of coastal resources by private land-
owners.
The federal government has a prominant role in coastal areas.'
The National Ocean Survey (NOS) (formerly the Coast & Geodetic
Survey) has been mapping the coastline of the United States since
1835.57 The Corps of Engineers oversees dredge and fill operations
in navigable waters, including coastal waters.r8 In addition, environ-
mental legislation, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, 0 the
Clean Air Act,6" and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act6 ' have
a profound impact on the coastal zone. Finally, there is the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972,62 enacted to encourage the develop-
ment of comprehensive state management programs and the formula-
tion of a national coastal zone policy. Under this Act the Secretary of
Commerce may award annual grants to coastal states to assist them in
developing coastal management programs, while another provision re-
quires coordination among federal and state agencies on matters involv-
ing coastal areas.6 3
In many states responsibility for the coastal environment is frag-
mented among various units of state and local government.64 However,
California,65 North Carolina,"6 Rhode Island,67 and Washington"8 have
56. See Teclaff, supra note 21, at 246, 251; Ausness, Land Use Controls in Coastal
Areas, 9 CALm. W.L. REv. 391, 401-04 (1973).
57. W. HULL, supra note 4, at 1. The National Ocean Survey (NOS) is a main
line component of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an
agency of the United States Department of Commerce.
58. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970). Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Juris-
diction: Buttressing a Citadel Under Seige, 26 U. FLA. L. RaV. 19, 21 (1973); Kramon,
Section 10 of the Rivers and JIgarbors Act: The Emergence of a New Protection for
Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REv. 229, 233 (1973).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970).
61. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II, 1972).
62. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1972).
63. Ausness, supra note 56, at 403. Mandelker & Sherry, The National Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972, 7 URBAN L. ANNUAL 119 (1974).
64. See generally E. BRADLEY & J. ARMSTRONG, A DEscRn oN AND ANALYSIS OF
COASTAL ZONE AND SHORELINE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNTrED STATES (Sea
Grant Tech. Rep. No. 20, 1972).
65. California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§
27000-650 (West Supp. 1974). See also Douglas, Coastal Zone Management-A New
Approach in California, 1 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 1 (1973); Comment, Coastal
Controls in California: Wave of the Future?, 11 HiARv. J. LEGis. 463 (1974); Note,
Saving the Seashore: Management Planning for the Coastal Zone, 25 -IASINGs LJ. 191
(1973).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to -128 (1974 Advance Legislative Service,
pamphlet no. 3). Thi s tatute i disqvssed in S&choenb~um, The Management of Lqnd
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all enacted comprehensive coastal zone management legislation. The
Delaware Coastal Zone Act69 prohibits the further introduction of heavy
industry in coastal areas and closely regulates other manufacturing
operations.7" Other states have established coastal, construction-set-
back lines7- and have enacted legislation to protect sand dunes72 or the
ocean shore in general.73  Finally, most coastal states regulate con-
struction activities in navigable waters74 and estuarine areas.73
UT1. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SHORELINE BOUNDARES
A. Tides
Coastal boundaries are generally defined by vertical datums,
which are planes of reference for elevations based on the average rise
and fall of the tide. Mean high water and mean low water are
examples of such vertical datums. The coastal boundary is the inter-
section of this elevation with the shore and varies as the physical shape
of the shore changes. Since observations of the tide provide the infor-
mation necessary to establish these datums, an understanding of coastal
boundaries requires a knowledge of tides and the forces that produce
them.
The tide is defined, as: "The periodic rising and falling of the
water that results from -the gravitational attraction of the moon and sun
and Water Use in the Coastal Zone: A New Law is Enacted in North Carolina, 53
N.C.L. REv. 275 (1974). See also R. Bode & W. Farthing, Coastal Area Management
in North Carolina: Problems and Alternatives, Feb. 11, 1974 (N.C. Law Center publi-
cation).
67. Coastal Resources Management Act, R.L GEN. LAws ANN. § 46-23-1 to -16
(Supp. 1973).
68. Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.010-.930
(Supp. 1973); Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 423 (1974).
69. DEL. COim ANN. tit. 7, § 7001-13 (Supp. 1972).
70. Note, Legislation-The Delaware Coastal Zone Act, 21 BuFEAo L. Rlv. 481,
482 (1972).
71. E.g., F.A. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.052-.053 (1972); HAwAu RnV. STAT. H9 205-32;
-34 (Supp. 1973).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 104B-4 (1972). See also Note, Environmental Law-The
Public Trust Doctrine: A Useful Tool in the Preservation of Sand Dunes, 49 N.C.L.
REV. 973 (1971).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6801-09 (Supp. 1972); ORE. Rnv. STAT. H§ 390.635-
.690 (1973).
74. Teclaff, supra note 21, at 268-76; Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1422 (1972).
75. Ausness, A Survey of State Regulation of Dredge and Fill Operations in Non-
navigable Waters, 8 LAND & WATaER L. REV. 65, 72-89 (1973); Note, State and Local
Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without Just Compensation, 58 VA. L.
REv. 876 (1972).
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acting upon the rotating earth." '  This indicates the strong relation-
ship between the sun and the moon and the tides."7 The individual
tide-producing forces vary over the face of the earth in a regular man-
ner, but the different combinations of these forces produce totally dif-
ferent tides. Moreover, the response of various bodies of water to these
forces varies because of differing hydrographic features of each basin.78
The variations in the major tide-producing forces are a result of
changes in the moon's phases, declination to the earth, distance from
the earth and regression of the moon's nodes.19 The variations which
occur because of this latter factor will go through one complete cycle
in approximately 18.6 years. The other changes have cycles varying
from 27/ days (moon's declination) to 271V2 days (moon's distance)
to 29Y days (moon's phases).8 These cycles differ in magnitude, and
their effect on the tide varies from place to place around the earth. The
various combinations of all these changes also result in the daily varia-
tions in the tide at a given location.
The forces related to the changes in the moon's phases are strong-
est twice each month at new and full moon and the tides occuring at
approximately these times are known as spring tides. These forces are
weakest at the time of the first or third quarter of the moon and the
tides occuring then are called neap tides. However, at most places
there is a lag of a day or two between the occurrence of the appropriate
phase of the moon and corresponding spring or neap tide.8' The cycle
relating to the moon's declination is strongest twice each month when
the moon is at the tropics and it is weakest when the moon is over the
equator. The 'tides associated with these changes are called tropic and
equatorial tides when they are the strongest and weakest. The tides
occurring when the moon is nearest the earth are called perigean tides
and those occurring when the moon is farthest from the earth are called
apogean tides.82  A lag of a day or two is also found between the dec-
lination and the distance of the moon and the corresponding state of
76. P. SCnutEmAN, TmE & CuRmwN GLOSSARY 36 (U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey
Spec. Pub. No. 228, rev. ed. 1949).
77. The tide-producing power of the sun is somewhat less than one half of the
tide-producing power of the moon. H. MARMER, TIDAL DATuM PLANES 2 (U.S. Coast
& Geodetic Survey Spec. Pub. No. 135, rev. ed. 1951).
78. Id.
79. Roberts, The Luttes Case-Locating the Boundary of the Seashore, 12 BAY]OXt
L. REv. 141, 149 (1960).
80. H. MAmaM, supra note 77, at 6.
81. Roberts, supra note 79, at 149.
82. H. MARAmE, supra note 77, at 5.
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the tide. 3
There are three characteristic features of the tide at a given
place-the time, range, and type of tide. The time of the tide is re-
lated to, and can be specified by, the moon's meridian passage.8 4 The
range of the tide refers to the magnitude of the rise and fall of the tide,
and varies from day to day, at a given place depending on the relation
of the tide-producing forces. The type of tide denotes the characteris-
tic form of the daily rise and fall of the tide. The tide is semidiurnal
when two highs and 'two lows occur each day; it is diurnal when only
one high and one low occur each day; and it is mixed when two high
and two low waters occur in a day with marked differences between
the two high or the two low waters.8 5
These tidal characteristics vary from one location to another as a
result of variations in the tide-producing forces and in hydrographic
features.8 " While some generalizations about tidal characteristics can
be made, it must be recognized that tidal characteristics are a local
phenomenon and the description of the tide in one area may be inap-
plicable to another area.
The tide observations required for the determination of a tidal da-
tum must be as accurate as possible because the location of the boun-
dary determined from the datum may involve very valuable lands. After
the vertical elevation of a tidal datum is established it must be trans-
lated into a line on the ground-the intersection of the datum plane
with the shore. An error of only tenths of an inch in the tidal datum
may result in the line of intersection moving a considerable distance
landward or seaward if the shore has a flat slope. Therefore, the accu-
racy of coastal boundaries has a direct relation with the accuracy of the
original tide observations.
The specific tidal datums that define the coastal boundaries pro-
vide the elevation of a stage of the tide on an average basis. For in-
stance, mean high water is an average of the high waters. Because the
magnitude of the rise and fall of the tide varies from day to day, tidal
characteristics derived from daily observations may differ considerably
from the average or mean values over a long period of time. Therefore,
the average must be based on long-term observations before it can be
83. Id. at 5-6.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 4.
86. Roberts, supra note 79, at 150; Comment, Fluctuating Shorelines and Tidal
Boundaries: An Unresolved Problem, 6 SAN Dmo L. REv. 447, 450-51 (1969).
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considered an accurate value for the tidal datum. When only short-
term observations are available, they may be corrected to long-term
mean values by comparison with simultaneous observations taken at
some nearby location for which mean values have been determined
from long-term observations. This process is described in Part IV.
Observations over a period of nineteen years are generally used
to determine tidal datums because all the cycles related to the phases,
declinations and distance of the moon occur within this period. In
addition, the seasonal fluctuations of water level will be complete with-
in a year, and the effects of these non-tidal forces can be balanced.
When long-term observations are used to determine tidal datums, the
datums will be applicable in future years unless ,the factors producing
the tidal character have changed. The primary factor which might
change and cause a variance in the datum will be the hydrographic fea-
tures of the area.
B. The Limits of Private Ownership
(1) The Use of the Mean High Water Line to Delimit the
Extent of Private Ownership
(a) Common-law developments
The Roman jurists regarded the sea and the foreshores as res com-
munes, property which could be used by all, but which was incapable
of private ownership.8 7 At common law, however, the sovereign
owned the sea and the seabed, 8 as well as the foreshore, by right of
his prerogative as universal occupant,89 although much of the foreshore
was appropriated by private landowners prior to the sixteenth cen-
87. INsTrruTs 2.1.1; DIGEST 1.8.2; W. BucKLAND, A Tnxr-BooK oF RomAN LANW
184, 186 (1921). Several of the Medieval English commentators also adhered to this
view. 89 SELDEN SOcrETY, FLETA 2-3 (H. Richardson & G. Sayles ed. 1972).
88. England claimed "dominion over portions of the North Sea, the Bay of Biscay,
and the Atlantic from Cape Finisterre, Spain to Stadland, in Norway." E. BARTLEY,
THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY 8 (1953). See also The King v. Hampden, 3 How.
State Trials 825, 1023 (Ex. 1637); Constable's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 549 (K.B. 1578);
S. MOORE, supra note 28, at 376-83; J. SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM 363-75, 382-93 (1663);
7 SELDEN SOCIETY, MIRROR OF JUSTICES 8 (W. Whittaker ed. 1895). In the contro-
versy over freedom of the seas in the early seventeenth century, English legal commenta-
tors maintained that the Crown had property as well as jurisdictional rights to sea, in-
sisting that title to both the sea and the fundus maris or bed of the sea, tam aquae quami
sol, was in the King. See J. Gourp, supra note 30.
89. "The King by our law is universal occupant, and all property is presumed to
have been originally in the crown." 8 M. BACON, supra note 38, at 13; 2 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *51.
[Vol. 53
COASTAL BOUNDARIES
tury.90 Shortly after the accession of Queen Elizabeth I, however,
Thomas Digges, a lawyer, surveyor and engineer, advanced a new
theory of royal ownership of the foreshore in his book, Proofs of the
Queen's Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and the Salt Shores
Thereof. 1 According to Digges, lands beneath tidal waters as well as
the foreshore itself were a separate category of property which could
be acquired only through express grant from the sovereign.9 2  Appar-
ently the Crown's claims were not at first accepted by the courts. 3 In
the following century, Sir Matthew Hale, in his treatise, De Jure Mars,
revived the Digges theory.94
Lord Hale distinguished between fresh water streams, the seabed
and tidal waters."; According to Hale, the beds of fresh waters nor-
mally belonged to the riparian owner,9 6 while the seabed belonged to
the sovereign and was incapable of private ownership.9" Tidal waters
included arms and creeks of the sea as far as the ebb and flow of the
tide,"' as well as the foreshore "between the high-water mark and the
low-water mark."99  While Lord Hale admitted that the King could,
and often did, make grants in tidal waters to his subjects, 00 he main-
tained that both the foreshore and the soil beneath arms of the sea
90. See generally S. MooRa, supra note 28, at 1-168.
91. Fraser, supra note 27, at 317.
92. 1 H. FARNFHm, supra note 8, § 39a.
93. Viner's Abridgment mentions the unreported case of Digges v. Hammond in
which the Court of the Exchequer, around the year 1575, held that title in a salt marsh
around Sandwich was in the upland owner rather than in the Queen. 16 C. VNER,
supra note 38, at 575. See also Constable's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601);
Anonymous, 73 Eng. Rep. 737 (K.B. 1573).
94. The treatise was apparently written around 1666. It was discovered at Hale's
death in 1676 but was not published until 1787. Note, Lord Hale and Business Affected
with a Public Interest, 43 HARv. L. REV. 759 (1930).
95. The second part of Hale's treatise, entitled De Jure Portibus, dealt with public
and private rights with respect to harbors and ports. Comment. 79 YALE LJ., supra
note 23, at 782.
96. S. MooRE, supra note 28, at 370-72; see Carter v. Murcot, 98 Eng. Rep. 127
(K.B. 1786); The King v. Wharton, 88 Eng. Rep. 1483 (K.B. 1702); Murphy v. Ryan,
2 Ir. R.C.L. 143 (1868).
97. S. MooRE, supra note 28, at 376.
98. "For the second; that is called an arm of the sea where the sea flows and re-
flows; and so far only as the sea flows and reflows." Id. at 378.
99. Id.
100. Although the king hath prima facie this right in the arms and creeks
of the sea communi jure, and in common presumption, yet a subject may have
such a right. And this he may have two ways. 1st. By the king's charter or
grant; and this is without question.. . 2d. The second right is that which is
acquired or acquirable to a subject by custom or prescription; and I think it
very clear, that the subject may by custom and usage or prescription have the
true propriety and interest of many of these several maratime interests, which
we have before stated to be prima facie belonging to the king.
Id. at 384-85.
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"prima facie" belonged to the King.101 "It is admitted that de iure
communi between the high water mark doth prima facie belong to the
king. . .Although it is true, that such shore may be, and commonly
is parcel of the manor adjacent, and so may be belonging to a subject,
as shall be shown, yet prima facie it is in the king's."' 02
To support his theory of royal ownership, Lord Hale relied on
Philpott's Case,10 3 decided in 1632. This decision, however, was not
reported, and Johnson v. Barret,'-0 4 decided more than a decade later,
appeared to follow the older rule. The first reported case to reflect
Hale's position was BuIstrode v. Hall'05 in 1662. The new doctrine be-
came firmly established by the end of the seventeenth century'00 and,
since that ,time, the ordinary high water mark has been considered the
usual boundary between public and privately-owned property in Eng-
land. 0 7  At the present time, one who asserts a claim to land below
the high water mark has the burden of proof and must establish his title
by prescription or express grant from the King. 0 8
The English rule was accepted by most American jurisdictions and
is now followed in Alabama, 0 9 Alaska,"10 California,"' Conneticut,"12
101. Id. at 10-25.
102. Id. at 12-13.
103. 8 Car. 1, f. 66 (1632). The Philpott case was discussed in Attorney-General
V. Chamberlaine, 70 Eng. Rep. 122, 123 (V. Ch. 1858); Attorney-General v. Richards,
145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795). See also 16 C. ViNER, supra note 38, at 576. But see
1 H. FARNHAm, supra note 8, § 39b. The decree is reprinted in S. MooRn, supra note
28, at 895-907.
104. 82 Eng. Rep. 887 (K.B. 1646).
105. 82 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1662). "Et in cest case fait soven foiLs affirme &
nient deny que le soil de touts rivers cy haut que la est fluxum & refluxum mars est
in le Roy & nemy 'in les siegneurs des mannors &c. sans prescription." (It was fre-
quently affirmed and never denied that the soil to all rivers as high as the tide ebbs
and flows is in the King, and never in the lords of the manors without grant or prescrip-
tion.) Id.
106. Earl of Salisbury v. Joyn, 84 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B. 1676); Whitaker v. Wife,
84 Eng. Rep. 479 (K.B. 1670); Kirby v. Gibs, 84 Eng. Rep. 183 (K.B. 1666).
107. Duke of Beaufort v. Mayor of Swansea, 154 Eng. Rep. 905 (Ex. 1849); Attor-
ney-General v. Burridge, 147 Eng. Rep. 335, 342 (Ex. 1822); Attorney-General v. Par-
meter, 147 Eng. Rep. 345, 352 (Ex. 1811); Rex v. Smith, 99 Eng. Rep. 283 (K.B.
1780); Warren v. Matthews, 91 Eng. Rep. 312 (K.B. 1704); Le Strange v. Rowe, 176
Eng. Rep. 903 (N.P. 1866).
108. However, it can be argued that this was a rule of evidence rather than a princi-
ple of substantive law. See Fraser, supra note 27, at 321-22.
109. United States v. Property on Pinto Island, 74 F. Supp. 92, 104 (S.D. Ala.
1947); City of Mobile v. Eslava, 9 Port. 577 (Ala. 1839), affd, 41 U.S. 234 (1842).
110. Demmert v. City of Klawock, 199 F.2d 32, 33 (9th Cir. 1952); ALAs A STAT.
§ 38.05.320 (1962).
111. People v. William Kent Estate Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215,
218 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 11 Cal. App. 2d 63,
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Florida,113 Maryland,' 14 Mississippi, 115 New Jersey, 116 New York,"l7
North Carolina, 1 8 Oregon," 9 Rhode Island, 20 South Carolina' 2' and
Washington.12 2  Some states, however, have departed from the com-
mon law position. Massachusetts 23 and Maine,' 24 for example, recog-
nize the low water line in accordance with a colonial ordinance. Dela-
ware,125 Georgia, 28  New Hampshire,2 7 Pennsylvania 28  and Vir-
ginia 29 also use the low water line. Texas recognizes the English posi-
53 P.2d 390 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 6 Cal. 2d 765, 59 P.2d
473 (1936); CAL. Civ. CODE § 670 (West 1954).
112. Bloom v. State Water Resources Comm'n, 157 Conn. 528, 254 A.2d 884
(1969). State v. Knowles-Lombard Co., 122 Conn. 263, 265-66, 188 A. 275, 276
(1936).
113. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Wetstone, 222 So. 2d 10, 14 (Fla.
1969); Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf, Inc., 141 Fla. 452, 458, 193 So. 425, 427 (1940); White
v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 61, 190 So. 446, 449 (1939); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
114. Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Indus. Park, 261 Md. 470, 475, 276 A.2d 61, 64
(1971); Troy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 206, 4 A.2d 757, 762 (1939).
115. Harrison County v. Guice, 244 Miss. 95, 106, 140 So. 2d 838, 842 (1962);
State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 228-31, 184 So. 44, 49-50 (1938), aff'd on
rehearing, 184 Miss. 204, 185 So. 247 (1939); Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166.Miss. 704,
712-13, 146 So. 291, 291-92 (1933); Money v. Wood, 152 Miss. 17, 28-30, 118 So. 357,
359-60 (1928).
116. O'Neil v. State Highway Dep't, 40 NJ. 307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967); Baily v. Dris-
coll, 19 N.J. 363, 367, 117 A.2d 265, 267 (1955).
117. Tiffany v. Oyster Bay, 209 N.Y. 1, 102 N.E. 585 (1913); In re Site for Hunts
Point Sewage Treatment Works, 281 App. Div. 315, 119 N.Y.S.2d 391, 404 (1953);
Gucker v. Town of Huntington, 254 App. Div. 10, 3 N.Y.S.2d 788, 790-91 (1938).
118. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297,
177 S.E.2d 513 (1970).
119. Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 156 Ore. 505, 510, 62 P.2d 7, 9
(1936); Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 51 Ore. 237, 243, 92 P. 1065, 1068 (1907).
120. Attorney General ex rel. Jaekvony v. Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 21 A.2d 554 (1941);
Allen v. Allen, 19 R.I. 114, 32 A. 166 (1895).
121. Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148
S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928). 1.
122. Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966); Harkins v. Del Pozzi,
50 Wash. 2d 237, 310 P.2d 532 (1957); Wilson v. Howard, 5 Wash. App. 169, 486 P.2d
1172 (1971).
123. Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 342 Mass. 251, 253, 173
N.E.2d 273, 275 (1961); Iris v. Town of Hingham, 303 Mass. 401, 403, 22 N.E.2d 13,
15 (1939). The ordinance of 1647 provides that the low water mark shall be used if
it does not extend more than one hundred rods, about 1650 feet, beyond the high water
mark.
124. In re Hadlock, 142 Me. 116, 119, 48 A.2d 628, 630 (1946); Sinford v. Watts,
123 Me. 230, 232, 122 A. 573, 574 (1923); Snow v. Mt. Desert Island Real Estate Co.,
84 Me. 14, 17, 24 A. 429, 430 (1891).
125. State ex rel. Buckson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228 A.2d 587, 601 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1967).
126. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1309 (1970).
127. Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524 (1845).
128. Commonwealth ex rel. Hansel v. Y.M.C.A., 169 Pa. 24, 38, 32 A. 121, 127
(1895); Wall v. Pittsburgh Harbor Co., 152 Pa. 427, 25 A. 647 (1893); Matthews v.
Bagnik, 157 Pa. Super. 115, 119, 41 A.2d 875, 877 (1945).
129. Whealton & Wisherd v. Doughty, 116 Va. 566, 572, 82 S.E. 94, 96 (1914);
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tion with respect to common law grants,130 but uses the line of higher
high tide when Spanish or Mexican grants are involved. 13  Louisiana
has adopted the civil law boundary of the line highest winter tide."8 2
And in Hawaii, the upland owner has title to the upper reaches of the
wash of the waves.1
3 1
(b) The Borax decision
At common law as a general rule the foreshore belonged to -the
sovereign while upland property was privately owned. All lands cov-
ered by the "flux and reflux of 'the sea at ordinary tides" were deemed
to be part of the foreshore.'3 4  Therefore, the "ordinary high-water
mark constituted the landward limit (and the ordinary low-water mark
constituted the seaward limit) of -the foreshore.-3  Moreover, the or-
dinary high water mark also constituted the seaward limit of the up-
land. Its utility as a property boundary was substantially reduced,
however, because of the obscurity associated with the concept of the
"ordinary" tide.
In his treatise De Jure Marls, Lord Hale described three varieties
of tides: (1) the high spring tides which occur at the two equinoctial
periods;' 36 (2) the spring tides which occur twice a month at the full
and change of the moon; 37 and (3) ordinary tides or neap tides, which
Groner v. Foster, 94 Va. 650, 657, 27 S.E. 493, 496 (1897); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-
.2 (1973).
130. Rudder v. Ponder, 156 Tex. 185, 193, 293 S.W.2d 736, 741 (1956); DeMerit
v. Robinson, 102 Tex. 358, 361, 116 S.W. 796, 797 (1909).
131. Luttes v. Texas, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958). The line of mean
higher high tide is the higher of the daily high tides at a particular locality over a nine-
teen year period. Where there are two high tides per day, the line of mean higher high
tide will be above the line of mean high tide, but where there is only one high tide
per day the lines will be identical. See generally City of San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138
U.S. 656 (1891); United States v. Pacheco, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 587 (1864); Apalachicola
Land & Dev. Co. v. McRea, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923); Brickell v. Trammell, 77
Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919).
132. 3 LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 451 (West 1952). In the case of a Spanish land
grant, however, the mean high water line is used. New Orleans Land Co. v. Board of
Levee Comm'rs, 171 La. 718, 132 So. 121 (1930).
133. Application of Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 316-17, 440 P.2d 76, 77-78 (1968).
134. Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1199 (K.B. 1821).
135. 1 A. SHA.owrz, supra note 5, at 90.
136. "The high spring tides, which are the fluxes of the sea at those tides that hap-
pen at the two equinoxials; and certainly this doth not de lure communi belong to the
crown. For such spring tides many times overflow ancient meadows and salt marshes,
which yet unquestionably belong to the subject." S. MOORE, supra note 28, at 393.
137. 'The spring tides which happen twice every month, at full and change of the
moon, and the shore in question, is by some opinion not denominated by these tides
neither, but the land overflowed by these fluxes ordinarily belong to the subject prima
facie, unless the King hath a prescription to the contrary." Id.
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happen between the full and change of the moon. 8 " Only the last
category of tides, according to Hale, should be used to determine the
high water mark. This formulation first received judicial recognition
in Kirby v. Gibs,8 9 a seventeenth century case, in which the reporter
remarked "Note, the high water marks [sic] is as far as is overflowed
by inepe tides or ordinary tides."'140
Unfortunately, it was not altogether clear whether "neap ,tides" to
Hale meant ordinary or usual tides or whether he was referring only
to those tides which occur twice monthly at the moon's quadratures.' 4 '
This uncertainty was not entirely resolved until Attorney General v.
Chambers in the mid-nineteenth century. 42 Chambers involved a dis-
pute between the Crown and a littoral owner over coal deposits under
the foreshore. At issue was the precise location of the boundary be-
tween their respective -tracts. Both parties agreed that this boundary
was the "ordinary high-water mark.' 48  The defendant, however,
argued that -the ordinary high-water mark was comprised of neap -tides
only, while the Crown urged that the "medium line of high water-mark
between neap and spring tides" was the proper standard.
According -to the Chancellor, -the high water mark rule was in-
tended to vest the littoral proprietor with the land which was for the
most part dry and usable, while leaving the Crown only that land which
was incapable of ordinary cultivation. Therefore, only the usual or or-
dinary tides should be considered. Unusually high (spring) and un-
usually low (neap) -tides should be ignored for purposes of determining
the extent of private ownership. The ordinary high-water mark was,
therefore, declared to be "the line of the medium high tide between
the springs and the neaps."' 44
138. "Ordinary tides or neap tides, which happen between the full and change of
the moon; and this is that which properly littus mais .... And touching this kind
of shoar, viz. that which is covered by the ordinary flux of the sea, is the business of
our present enquiry." Id.
139. 84 Eng. Rep. 183 (K.B. 1666).
140. Id.
141. Gay, The High Water Mark: Boundary Between Public and Private Lands, 18
U. FLA. L. Rav. 553, 560 (1966). One commentator, writing in 1830, interpreted the
term "neap tides," as used by Lord Hale, to mean those tides which occur "twice in the
twenty-four hours." Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges of the
Subject in the Sea-Shores of the Realm (1830), reprinted in S. MooRE, supra note 28,
at 667-892.
142. 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (Ch. 1854).
143. Id. at 488.144, Id, 4t 49Q,
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Although some American courts cited the Chambers decision with
approval,'45 and adopted the Chancellor's "medium high tide" formula-
tion,146 most of ihe American cases prior to the Borax decision merely
spoke of the "high water mark' 4  or the "ordinary high water
mark' 48 without attempting a precise definition. While some deci-
sions mentioned Lord Hale's treatise, De Jure Maris,149 no attempt
was made to clarify Hale's ambiguous use of the term "neap tides."' 0
Angelrs treatise, written in 1847, for example, declared that in the
United States private ownership extended "down to the edge of the
high water mark of the ordinary or neap tides."'' This confusion
was reflected in Teschemacher v. Thompson,"52 a leading nineteenth
century case, in which the court defined the "ordinary high water
mark" as "the limit reached by the neap tides; that is, those tides
which happen between the full and change of the moon, twice in ev-
ery twenty-four hours."'518 Although it cited English authority, the
court was apparently unaware of the Chambers case, decided seven
years earlier. Moreover, the language of the Teschemacher decision
itself was unclear and inaccurate. The court apparently believed, as
Hale did, that all -tides are either spring or neap; that spring tides oc-
cur but once a month and that all other tides are neap tides and dif-
fer little among themselves, making them usual or "ordinary" tides.154
The Teschemacher case has been followed in California5 and has
apparently led a court into similar error in at least one other state.'5"
145. Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 15 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 483 (1857); Stevens v.
Patterson & N.R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532, 541 (Ct. Err. & App. 1870).
146. East Boston Co. v. Commonwealth, 203 Mass. 68, 89 N.E. 236 (1909); New
Jersey & Iron Co. v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 398, 401, 15 A. 227,
228 (1888).
147. E.g., Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 439 (1810).
148. E.g., Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382, 394 (1873); Church v. Meeker, 34
Conn. 421, 424 (1867); French v. Bankhead, 51 Va. 65, 73, 11 Gratt. 136, 160 (1854).
149. E.g., Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382, 400 (1873); Church v. Meeker, 34
Conn. 421, 424 (1867); Soier v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 439 (1810); Ex parte Jennings,
6 Cow. 518 (N.Y. 1826).
150. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 483 (1858).
151. J. ANGELL, Tm WAThaS 71 (2d ed. 1847); Gay, supra note 141, at 561.
152. 18 Cal. 11 (1861).
153. Id. at 21-22.
154. 1 A. SHAowrrz, supra note 5, at 93.
155. Otey v. Carmel Sanitation Dist., 219 Cal. 310, 26 P.2d 308 (1933). City of
Oakland v. E.K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16, 292 P. 1076 (1930); Forgeus v. Santa
Cruz County, 24 Cal. 193, 140 P. 1092 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1914). A California court
in People v. William Kent Estate Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1966), held that the term "neap tides" as used in the Teschemacher case
referred to true twice-a-month neap tides rather than ordinary or daily high tides.
156. Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf, Inc., 141 Fla. 452, 193 So. 425 (1940).
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Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles' 57 is the leading
American decision on the methodology of coastal boundary determina-
tion. The case involved the boundary between the upland and the
foreshore of Mormon Island in San Pedro Harbor. The upland prop-
erty was owned by the Borax Company under a patent from the
federal government while the foreshore and adjacent submerged lands
belonged to the City of Los Angeles under a grant from the State of
California.158 The City's suit to quiet title was dismissed by the district
court on the ground that the limits of the federal grant could not be
determined in such a proceeding. 159 On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed, and construed the "ordinary high water mark" as the "mean
high-tide line," rejecting the neap tide standard proposed by the Borax
Company. 60 This decision was affirmed on appeal by the United
States Supreme Court.16
The Supreme Court emphasized that the term "ordinary high
water mark" meant the intersection of a tidal plane with the shore, and
had no particular relation to a physical mark or vegetation line: "The
tideland extends to the high water mark .... This does not mean, as
petitioners contend, a physical mark made upon the ground by the wa-
ters; it means the line of high water as determined by the course of
the tides."'162
After reviewing Lord Hale's definition of the foreshore and the
language of the Chambers case, the Supreme Court declared: "in
determining the limit of the federal grant, we perceived no justification
for taking neap high tides, or the mean of those tides, as the boundary
between upland and tideland, and for thus excluding from the shore
the land which is actually covered by the tide most of the time."'' 63 In-
stead the Court adopted the mean high tide line standard and the sur-
vey methodology described in such Coast Survey publications as
Mariner's Tidal Datum Planes:16 4
In view of the definition of the mean high tide, as given by the
United States Coast and Geodetic Survey that 'mean high water
157. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
158. Ch. 115, [1917] Cal. Laws 159; ch. 656, [19111 Cal. Laws 1256.
159. City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 5 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Cal. 1933).
160. 74 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1935).
161. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
162. Id. at 22. But see Udall v. Oelschlaeger, 389 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 392 U.S. 909 (1968).
163. 296 U.S. at 26-27.
164. Especially H. MAmnrvR, supra note 77.
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at any place is the average height of all the high waters at that
place over a considerable period of time,' and the further observa-
tion that 'from theoretical considerations of an astronomical char-
acter' there should be 'a periodic variation in the rise of water
above sea level having a period of 18.6 years,' the Court of Appeals
directed that in order to ascertain the mean high tideline with req-
uisite certainty in fixing the boundary of valuable tidelands, such
as those here in question appear to be, 'an average of 18.6 years
should be determined as near as possible.' We find no error in
that instruction.
While the question before the Supreme Court in the Borax case was
the interpretation of the phrase "line of mean high tide" as used in a
statutory grant to the City, the Supreme Court equated "mean" with
"ordinary" and clearly considered the term "mean high water line"
equivalent to the common-law "ordinary high-water mark," as defined
by the court in Chambers. This approach is justified because the
spring tides occur with the same frequency as the neap tides, and since
one is as much above a medium plane as the other is below it, these
tides cancel each other. Moreover, it is considerably easier from a
technical point of view to determine a plane of mean high water which
includes all tides than to calculate a plane that excludes spring and
neap tides. 65
The Borax definition of ordinary high tide must be used to deter-
mine the seaward boundary of any federal grant.'00 Arguably, there-
fore, Borax may, for most purposes, overrule contrary state decisions.
Nevertheless, since Borax is limited to federal grants, the case appar-
ently would not be binding in Texas or the original states which have
no federal public domain lands. Moreover, presumably Borax would
not apply to valid French, Spanish or Mexican grants made prior to ac-
quisition of these areas by the United States, 167 thus limiting its applica-
tion in some parts of Florida, the Gulf Coast, and California.
Because Borax is a progressive decision which incorporates the
most accurate methodology for determining tidal boundaries; it has
been followed by a number of state courts' 1 8 and should eventually
displace the older common-law "ordinary high water mark" standard.
165. 1 A. SmLowrz, supra note 5, at 96.
166. 296 U.S. at 22.
167. Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 783-87, 147 P.2d
964, 970-72 (1944).
168. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 NJ. 307, 323-24, 235 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1967);
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303, 177
S.E.2d 514, 516 (1970); Wilson v. Howard, 5 Wash. App. 169, 486 P.2d 1172 (1971).
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(2) Private Property Rights in Tidally Affected Areas
(a) Tests of navigability for title purposes
Since the mean high water line is the intersection of the plane of
mean high water with the shore, in -theory it can be located wherever
a tidal effect can be found. 169  It does not necessarily follow, however,
that the mean high water line should be used to delimit the extent of
private ownership in every instance. Where the coastline is relatively
straight, the mean high water line is generally the proper coastal bound-
dary. Where the coastline is indented, however, as in the case of tidal
basins and rivers, one may: (1) follow the sinuosities of the shore in-
side the coastal indentation as far as the tide ebbs and flows; (2) follow
the sinuosities of the shore inside the coastal indentation as far as the
tidally affected waters are navigable; or (3) draw a straight line across
the mouths of the coastal indentation and treat it as a separate water-
body for title purposes.170 A state's choice of one particular approach
over another seemingly depends on the nature of its test of navigabil-
ity for title purposes.
In England, where ownership of submerged lands was associated
with the ebb and flow of the tides 71 rather than upon actual naviga-
bility, tidally affected rivers and basins were called "arms and creeks
of the sea' and title to their submerged beds was vested prima facie
in the King. 72 In his treatise, De Jure Mars, Lord Hale declared
"[Tihat is called an arm of the sea where the sea flows and reflows,
and so far only as the sea so flows and reflows."'173 However, tidal
waters could be fresh as well as salt, as for example, where fresh water
was backed up because of the action of the salt water. According to
169. But see Part IV C(2) (c) infra.
170. In order to locate exactly where a tributary waterway joins the principal water-
way, one must consider the physical configuration of the tributary waterway at its
terminus. The headland-to-headland approach, which is based on this principle, has
been applied in international law to determine the limits of inland waters. S.
SwtAzaAuBER, THE THmmE-MiLE LImr oF TH TERrroRIAL SEAS 224-25 (1972). The
headland-to-headland approach also may be used in connection with the Submerged
Lands Act. See generally Shalowitz, Boundary Problems Raised by the Submerged
Lands Act, 54 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 1021 (1954).
A headland is the apex of a salient of the coast, the farthest point at which a por-
tion of land extends into the water, or the point on the shore at which there is an appre-
ciable change in direction of the general trend of the coast. In theory, each terminus
of the headland-to-headland line is taken as a point at the outermost extension of the
headland from which it is drawn. 1 A. SnALowrrz, supra note 5, at 63-65.
171. See discussion in Part H B(1) (a) supra.
172. 1 H. FARNHAm, supra note 8, §§ 37-40.
173, 5. M00RE? supra n0tO 28, at 378.
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Lord Hale: 'ut if it seems that' alth6ugh the water be fresh at high
water, yet the denomination of an arm of the sea continues if it flows
and reflows as in Thames.'1 74 ' It remains the rule in England,17 5 as
well as in some American jurisdictions,'76 that where fresh waters are
subject to tidal influence, the land beneath such waters is owned by the
sovereign.
In America, some states at first adopted a test of navigability based
on whether the tide ebbed and flowed in a particular water course.' 77
Eventually, however, the so-called ebb-and-flow test was displaced by
the concept of "navigability in fact.' 78  In the nineteenth century the
United States Supreme Court utilized the navigability-in-fact standard
for purposes of defining the scope of federal regulatory power.' 70 The
Court in The Daniel Ball set forth" the following definition of naviga-
bility in fact:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.'3 0
At the present time it is well settled that the federal test of navigability
for purposes of both admiralty18' and commerce clause ls -2 jurisdiction
is that of navigability in fact.18 3
174. Id.
175. Malcomson v. O'Dea, 11 Eng. Rep. 1155 (1863); Rex v. Smith, 99 Eng. Rep.
283 (K.B. 1780).
176. Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 343 (1833) (admiralty jurisdiction);
Heckman v. Swett, 99 Cal. 303, 307, 33 P. 1099, 1101 (1893); Simmons v. French, 25
Conn. 346, 352 (1856); Stone v. City of Augusta, 46 Me. 127, 137 (1858); Common-
wealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441, 447 (1871); Attorney General v. Woods, 108 Mass.
436, 439 (1871); Gough v. Bell, 21 N.J.L. 156, 160 (Sup. Ct. 1847); People v. Tibbetts,
19 N.Y. 523, 528 (1859); Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 30 (1869); 1 H.
FARNHAm, supra note 8, § 38, at 179; J. GouLD, supra note 30, § 44, at 104-05. But
see Morgan v. Negodich, 40 La. Ann. 246, 3 So. 636 (1887).
177. Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cal. R, 307 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1805).
178. Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130 (1849); Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273 (1831);
Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 30 (1830) .(per curiam); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa.
1810).
179. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall,) 430 (1874); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557 (1870); The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443
(1851).
180. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
181. 1 BEmcmicr oN Ana.tLTY § 141 (7th ed. 1974).
182. See generally Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-
Struggle for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1968); Hanks, Federal-State Rights and
Relations, in 2 WATERs AND WATER RIGHs § 100.1 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
183. The United States Supreme Court in'United States v. Appalachian Elee. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), considered a nonnavigable watercourse to be navigable-in-
fact for regulatory purposes if it could be made navigable by reasonable improvements.
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Although most of the states rejected the ebb-and-flow test for reg-
ulatory purposes in favor of navigability in fact, it is often unclear
which test of navigability applied for purposes of determining title to
submerged lands. 84 In some jurisdictions state ownership extends to
all lands subject to the tide, while in others such rights depend upon
the actual navigability of the watercourse. In some of -these latter
states, however, a finding of tidal effect raises a presumption of navi-
gability and state ownership.
(i) The ebb-and-flow test
In Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Texas state
ownership of the bed extends to all lands affected by the ebb and flow
of the tides.
The Lousiana test for title to tidal watercourses was articulated in
State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co."85 The Lousiana Supreme Court
declared that the State acquired the soil beneath "the waters of inter-
communicating sounds, bayous, creeks, channels, lakes, bays, coves,
and inlets, bordering upon the Gulf of Mexico and within the ebb and
flow of the tide"' 86 upon admission to the Union. The case involved
the State's claim to certain sounds and bayous also claimed by the de-
fendant through a grant of swamp and overflowed land. The Bayou
Johnson case appeared to be a clear statement of the ebb-and-flow for
title test.'8 7 More recently, however, the Louisiana courts have con-
sidered navigability in fact as well as the ebb and flow of the tides.'
In Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Texaco, Inc.,'89 which involved
mineral leases for the beds of Mud Hole Bay and Mud Hole Bayou,
the basic issue was whether either waterbody had been navigable at the
time of Louisiana's admission to the Union. 90 Although evidence was
184. See Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable
Waters, 5 LAND & W&Tm L. REV. 391, 392-93 (1970). Confusion in the use of the
various definitions of "navigability" and "navigable" has been a characteristic of the de-
velopment of water law in this country. See Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and
Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NATuRAL RsouRcs J. 1, 4 (1967).
185. 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912).
186. Id. at 611, 58 So. at 407.
187. Contra, State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421
(1919); see Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906)
wherein navigability in fact is discussed in relation to private ownership of a bayou af-
fected by the ebb and flow of the tide.
188. D'Albora v. Garcia, 144 So. 2d 911 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1962).
189. 178 So. 2d 428 (La. Cir. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 248 La. 465, 179 So. 2d 640
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 950 (1966).
190. Id. at 435.
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presented that the waters of the bay and bayou fluctuated with the tides
the court also considered evidence of use of the waters by commercial
fishermen and moonshine whiskey runners (whose vessels were re-
ported to draw five feet).101 The court found the waters navigable,
stating: "Our Courts have repeatedly held that rivers or bodies of wa-
ter, which are navigable in fact, are navigable in law."'-) 2 Thus the
land beneath tidal watercourses in Lousiana may be sovereignty land
if the tide ebbs and flows; however, the navigability of the watercourse
may also be taken into account.
The Maryland court had called its ebb-and-flow test' 98 and the
federal navigable-in-fact test "functionally complimentary,"'' 4 and a
suggestion of considering the navigability as well as the ebb and flow
of the water has entered Maryland decisions involving title to sub-
merged lands.' 95 However, a federal court has noted that Maryland
has not yet found it necessary to abandon its "ancient" standard,10 6 and
the ebb-and-flow test, since waters which have been considered have
been both subject to the ebb and flow of tides and navigable in fact.
Mississippi courts have consistently held that the state as sovereign
owns all land "in the beds of all its shores, arms and inlets of the sea,
wherever the tide ebbs and flows.' '197  The phrase navigable river is
held in Mississippi to be a technical term of common law. "A river
is navigable in the technical sense, as high up from its mouth as the
tide flows. . . . Above that it may be a common highway, subject to
the use of the public for navigation . . . , but it is not technically a
navigable river."'198 In fact, a riparian owner on the Mississippi
River above where the tide ebbs and flows owns the title to the bed of
the river to the center of the stream. 19 Mississippi courts have also
consistently held that lands under navigable waters cannot be conveyed
191. Id. at 433. Evidence was also admitted by an expert in micro-paleontology
and ecology, by an expert in geology and geomorphology and by an expert geochemist
with experience in the use of Carbon 14 dating methods. Id. at 434.
192. Id. at 436.
193. Wagner v. City of Baltimore, 210 Md. 615, 624, 124 A.2d 815, 819-20 (1956);
Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487, 492, 64 A.2d 547, 549 (1949); Toy v. Atlantic Gulf &
Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 206, 4 A.2d 757, 762 (1939).
194. Owen v. Hubbard, 260 Md. 146, 152 n.1, 271 A.2d 672, 676 n.1 (1970).
195. See Van Ruymbeke v. Patapsco Indus. Park, 261 Md. 470, 276 A.2d 61 (1971);
Green v. Eldridge, 230 Md. 441, 443-47, 187 A.2d 674, 676-77 (1963).
196. United States v. 222.0 Acres of Land, 306 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1969).
197. State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 230, 184 So. 44, 50 (1938); ac-
cord, Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss. 704, 713, 146 So. 291, 291-92 (1933); Money
v. Wood, 152 Miss. 17, 28, 118 So. 357, 359 (1928).
198. State ex reL Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 225, 184 So. 44, 47 (1938).
199, The Steamboat Magnolia v, Marshall, 39 Miss. 109 (1860),
210 [Vol. 53
COASTAL BOUNDARIES
for private purposes, since the land is held by the State in trust for the
public.200 The Mississippi court did uphold the sale of tidelands filled
in by the State for a public park which was to include private building
lots in Treuting v. Bridge & Park Commission.20 1 However, the court
explained in International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway De-
partment202 that such a sale must be for an overall public purpose.
In International Paper the State court affirmed that the state owns all
lands below the high water mark subject only to -the public interest in
navigation and the power of Congress over navigation.20 3
In New Jersey the ebb and flow of the tides in a stream deter-
mines public ownership. The navigability test for public ownership
was specifically rejected in Schultz v. Wilson20 4 as lacking in certainty
or accuracy. 0 5  Moreover, in Yara Engineering Corp. v. New Jersey
Turnpike Authority20 6 the bed of a small tidal creek which was "not
a navigable stream or suitable or used for fishery" was declared to be
state sovereignty land. The creek was entirely within a 12.9 acre tract
of land and at low tide contained no water except fresh water drained
from higher ground, 207 yet the creek did meet the test of ebb and flow
with the tides.20 8 New Jersey's claim to tidally affected creeks and es-
tuaries is consistent with its expressed claim to all "'tide-flowed lands
up to the high-water mark."2 9
The New York rule as to title of tidal waters was set forth in Ful-
ton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State.210  The case, which involved title
to the bed of a fresh water stream, held that "[i]n law, the term 'navi-
gable river' has received a technical application to rivers, or arms of
the sea, in which the tide ebbs and flows. 2 11  At common law the title
to the beds of tidal streams was fixed in the Sovereign. Since New
York had adopted the common law, the Oswego, being nontidal, was
200. State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497 (1972).
201. 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967).
202. 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972).
203. Id. at 397-98.
204. 44 NJ. Super. 591, 131 A.2d 415 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24. NJ. 546, 133
A.2d 395 (1957).
205. "The navigability test could only be made certain by the adoption of arbitrary
standards, such as depth of water, tonnage and the like, which would probably vary from
stream to stream." Id. at 604, 131 A.2d at 423.
206. 49 N.J. Super. 603, 141 A.2d 66 (App. Div. 1958) (per curiam).
207. Id. at 604-05, 141 A.2d at 66-67.
208. Id. at 606, 141 A.2d at 67.
209. O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 NJ. 307, 323, 235 A.2d 1, 9 (1967).
210. 200 N.Y. 400, 94 N.E. 199 (1911).
211. Id. at 412, 94 N.E. at 202.
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nonnavigable for title purposes and subject to private ownership.21 2
Discussions of navigability by New York courts after Fulton center on
the obstruction of particular waters for navigation and the right of the
public to so navigate2 18 There are inconsistencies in New York lower
court decisions, however, as to whether navigability in fact must be con-
sidered to determine the ownership of lands under tidal waters. 214
In Texas water law has been shaped by Spanish civil law as well
as by the English common law. In 1859 in City of Galveston v.
Menard21 5 the Texas Supreme Court determined that ownership of
land beneath Galveston Bay, where the tide ebbed and flowed, was
vested in the state.2 18 More recently in Lorino v. Crawford Packing
Co. 2 .1 7 the court stated: "The bays, inlets, and other waters along the
Gulf Coast which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide of the Gulf
of Mexico are defined as navigable waters. '218  Further, in the opinion
of the court, the lands under such waters were owned by the State and
constituted public property held in trust for the people.2 19 Navigability
of streams for title purposes in Texas has been defined by legislation 220
that has had the effect of perpetuating the Mexican and Spanish civil
law rule that ownership of all streams remains in the sovereign. 22
Thus, though Texas law uses the term navigability when considering
ownership of streams, it appears that the beds of tidal streams in Texas
are state owned, whether navigable in fact or not.
212. Id. at 415-16, 94 N.E. at 203.
213. E.g., Van Cortlandt v. New York Cent. R.R., 265 N.Y. 249, 192 N.E. 401
(1934) (action for nuisance for obstructing a river); People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 N.Y. 9, 159 N.E. 703 (1928) (railroad bridge allegedly ob-
structing navigation on the Oswego River); People v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 N.Y.
194, 107 N.E. 506 (1914) (alleged public nuisance obstructing a navigable-for-title
stream); Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 App. Div. 2d 232, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1960) (right
of public to anchor in a privately owned tidal basin).
214. Compare State v. Bishop, 75 Misc. 2d 787, 348 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
(the state's claim to tidal marshland below the mean high water line depended upon
the navigability in fact of the tidal marsh), with In re Schurz (Harding) Ave., 278 App.
Div. 309, 104 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1951), rev'd per curiam, 2 N.Y.2d 859, 161 N.Y.S.2d 124,
141 N.E.2d 615 (1957) (all land below high water mark was sovereignty land, not
just channel of stream).
215. 23 Tex. 349 (1859).
216. Id. at 396.
217. 142 Tex. 51, 175 S.W.2d 410 (1943).
218. Id. at 55, 175 S.W.2d at 413.
219. Id. at 56, 175 S.W.2d at 413.
220. Tax. Rv. Cv. STAT. art. 5302 (1962). "All streams so far as they retain an
average width of thirty feet from the mouth up shall be considered navigable streams
221. See Heard v. Town of Refugio, 129 Tex. 349, 103 S.W.2d 728 (1937); State
v. Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 50 S.W.2d 1065 (1932).
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(ii) The navigability-in-fact test
Many states have rejected the ebb-and-flow test and substituted
tests of navigability similar to the federal navigability-for-title test. In
California, Connecticut, Florida, North Carolina and Washington these
navigability tests have been applied to tidal watercourses, although not
always in the context of title determination.
Ownership of the beds of tidal watercourses was determined by
the navigability of the creeks or estuaries in early California cases. In
Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick222 and Forestier v. Johnson228 the question
of private ownership was discussed as it related to the public right to
hunt or fish on certain waters. Bolsa involved an estuary and its tribu-
tary tidal sloughs. The estuary, however, had been dammed, thereby
eliminating the tidal effect, and the court permitted the exclusion of
the public, thus recognizing private ownership of the bed of the es-
tuary.224 In Forestier however, the court upheld the public right to fish
and hunt on the waters of a tidally-affected 302-acre bay,225 but also
recognized private ownership of the land beneath the bay.220 The
test for public ownership of a tidal watercourse was not, then, the
ebb-and-flow test.227 One test used by an intermediate court was "[a
stream's] practical utility for navigation during ordinary stages of water
at any particular time."228  Bohn v. Albertson,2 29 also an intermediate
court decision, discussed the federal navigability for title test, 8° con-
cluding that "[n]avigability is largely a question of fact. 231  The court
then examined the "pleasure boat" navigability test28 2 and applied that
test to the waters involved to find them navigable. 233 However, title
to the land remained in the private owner because his land had been
submerged by avulsion.213 To be considered sovereignty land in Cali-
222. 151 Cal. 254, 90 P. 532 (1907).
223. 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912).
224. 151 Cal. at 260, 90 P. at 534.
225. 164 Cal. at 33-34, 127 P. at 160.
226. Id.
227. This test had been rejected earlier in Churchill Co. v. Kingsbury, 178 Cal. 554,
558, 174 P. 329, 330 (1918).
228. City & County of San Francisco v. Maih, 23 Cal. App. 86, 137 P. 281 (1st
Dist. CL App. 1913).
229. 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1st Dist. CL App. 1951).
230. Id. at -, 238 P.2d at 131.
231. Id.
232. Id. at -, 238 P.2d at 132-33. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 184, at 36-
44 for a discussion of the pleasure boat test of navigability for privately owned bodies
of water.
233. 107 Cal. App. 2d at -, 238 P.2d at 135.
234. Id.
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fornia, therefore, lands beneath tidal watercourses must underlie navi-
gable waters, even if they are only navigable for recreational purposes.
Connecticut has also asserted state ownership of the soil between
the high and low-water marks only under navigable waters.236 The
test of navigable waters in Connecticut was stated in Edward Balf Co.
v. Hartford Electric Light Co.,2 36 a case concerning an inland river.
This test is essentially the federal test for title, but as early as 1850
Connecticut had declared a tidal cove that was capable of floating only
a "fish boat or skiff" non-navigable.28 7 One can infer from these cases
that Connecticut considers the test for state ownership in navigable wa-
ters to be navigability, not the ebb and flow of the tides.
In Florida sovereignty lands are defined as those beneath navi-
gable waters, including the shore or the space between the high and
low-water marks.238  Clement v. Watson,23 9 an early Florida case,
involved an assault arising from an alleged trespass in waters affected
by the ebb and flow of ocean tides.240 The court stated that "[w]a-
ters are not under our law regarded as navigable merely because they
are affected by the tides"241' and found the lands beneath the waters of
the Watson cove to be privately owned. 242  The court did not estab-
lish a strict test for navigability, but listed size, depth and "other con-
ditions" as considerations for determining whether waters were navi-
gable "for useful public purpose."243  Although the Florida courts
have not cited United States v. Holt State Bank2 44 for navigability for
title, later cases have linked the determination of navigability to com-
merce, thus appearing to follow the federal test.245  Inferentially,
based on Clement v. Watson, public or private ownership of a tidal
watercourse in Florida depends upon the navigability for commerce
of the watercourse. 246
235. Bloom v. Water Resources Comm'n, 157 Conn. 528, 533, 254 A.2d 884, 887
(1969); Rochester v. Barney, 117 Conn. 462, 169 A. 45 (1933).
236. 106 Conn. 315, 138 A. 122 (1927).
237. Town of Wethersfield v. Humphrey, 20 Conn. 218 (1850).
238. State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 106, 13 So. 640, 648 (1893).
239. 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
240. Id. at 110-11, 58 So. at 26.
241. Id. at 112, 58 So. at 26.
242. Id. at 113, 58 So. at 27.
243. Id. at 112, 58 So. at 26.
244. 270 U.S. 49 (1926). See text accompanying notes 280-82 infra.
245. Baker v. State, 87 So. 2d 497, 498 (Fla. 1956); Lopez v. Smith, 145 So. 2d
509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
246. See Tarpon Springs v. Smith, 81 Fla. 479, 498, 88 So. 613, 619 (1921); Lopez
v. Smith, 109 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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North Carolina rejected the ebb-and-flow test in the nineteenth
century.241  Public waters for title purposes was defined by the courts
at that time as those waters which provided common passage for sea
vessels.' 48  The sea vessels test was replaced in 1952 by the naviga-
bility-in-fact test.249 One federal court interpreted navigability in fact
broadly to include a tidal marsh which could only be crossed by a small
boat at high tide if the northeasterly wind was not steady.250 However,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has since defined navigable waters
as those which in their ordinary state can be used for "water commerce,
trade and travel. '25 1  One commentator argues that North Carolina is
still developing its navigability test and may return to the ebb-and-flow
test to protect the foreshore from private appropriation. 252
Under the Washington Constitution the State owns the beds and
shores of all navigable waters up to the high water mark. 53 In Wilson
v. Pickett,2 54 the Washington Supreme Court determined the ownership
of the bed of a tidal river. The only evidence of navigability of the
river was that various tug boats and other small craft had towed logs
along its banks.25 5  The Washington court declared: "'We do not
believe, however, that the said constitutional provision was intended to
include streams of the character of this one, but only such as are navi-
gable for general commercial purposes.' ",256 The private landowner, in
the opinion of the Court, held title to the bed of the stream subject to
the right of the public to float logs. 257  More recently, in Strand v.
State,258 the Washington court, citing United States v. Utah,25 9 deter-
mined the navigability of a tidal slough by considering the capability
of the creek for carrying commerce. 60 Since the slough could be used
only at high tide and then only for a "boat transporting fish," the slough
247. Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. 30 (1828).
248. Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714
(1938); State v. Glen, 52 N.C. 321 (1859). See Rice, Estaurine Land of North Caro-
lina: Legal Aspect of Ownership, Use and Control, 46 N.C.L. REV. 779, 796-99 (1968).
249. Resort Dev. Co. v. Parmele, 245 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474 (1952).
250. Swan Island Club v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1953).
251. Parmele v. Eaton, 240 N.C. 539, 548, 83 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1954).
252. Note, Defining Navigable Waters and the Application of the Public Trust Doc-
trine in North Carolina: A History and Analysis, 49 N.C.L. REv. 888, 904 (1971).
253. WASH. CoNsT. art. 17, § 1.
254. 79 Wash. 89, 139 P. 754 (1914).
255. Id. at 90, 139 P. at 755.
256. Id. at 91, 139 P. at 755, quoting Watkins v. Dorris, 24 Wash. 636, 644, 64
P. 840, 843 (1901).
257. 79 Wash. at 90, 139 P. at 755.
258. 16 Wash. 2d 107, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943).
259. 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
260. 16 Wash. 2d at 125, 132 P.2d at 1019.
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was found to be nonnavigable. 201
Alabama, Oregon and South Carolina find tidal watercourses
prima facie navigable and thus presume the land beneath the water-
courses to be sovereign land, but this presumption of state ownership
may be rebutted by a finding of non-navigability.
It has been stated by the Alabama Supreme Court that all tidal
navigable streams are prima facie public and navigable. 202 An early
decision, however, stated that the ebb and flow of the tide "only oper-
ates to impress, prima facie, the character of being public and navi-
gable, and to place the onus of proof on the party affirming the con-
trary."2 3  In Alabama, navigability is a question of fact 2 0 4 and navi-
gability has been defined in relationship to commercial uses of the
water.265
Oregon recognizes the federal test for navigable inland waters2 00
but considers streams in which the tide ebbs and flows prima facie navi-
gable.267  In Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club2 s the Oregon court classi-
fied streams and bodies of water into four categories. 2 9 Those in
which the tide ebbed and flowed were "technically denominated navi-
gable, in which class the sovereign is the owner of the soil constituting
the bed of the stream."2 70
South Carolina also considers tidal watercourses prima facie navi-
gable. In 1884 in State v. Pacific Guano Co. 2 71 the South Carolina
court appeared to adopt the tidal test for ownership purposes, but modi-
fied the ebb-and-flow test by allowing the presumption of navigability
and State ownership to be rebutted by showing that "conditions and ob-
jects of navigation do not exist. 217 2  South Carolina continues to use
261. Id. at 125-28, 132 P.2d at 1019-21.
262. Sayre v. Dickerson, 278 Ala. 477, 491, 179 So. 2d 57, 70 (1965).
263. Sullivan v. Spotswood, 82 Ala. 163, 166, 2 So. 716, 717 (1887).
264. United States v. Property on Pinto Island, 74 F. Supp. 92, 104 (S.D. Ala.
1947); see Walker v. Allen, 72 Ala. 456, 458 (1882).
265. Sullivan v. Spotswood, 82 Ala. 163, 2 So. 716 (1887). For a general discus.
sion of Alabama title cases involving water boundaries see Cohen, Water Law in Ala-
bama-A Comparative Survey, 24 A.A. L. REv. 453, 468-72 (1972).
266. See Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936).
267. Id. at 636, 56 P.2d at 1162.
268. 90 Ore. 13, 175 P. 437 (1918).
269. The four categories were (1) those waters in which the tide ebbs and flows;
(2) those waters which are navigable in fact for boats, vessels or lighters; (3) streams
which are not navigable for any purpose; and (4) the larger rivers which were capable
of carrying a great volume of commerce. Id. at 19, 175 P. at 439.
270. Id.
271. 22 S.C. 50 (1884).
272. Id. at 56.
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the term "navigable" in relationship to tidal streams, without defining
the term.273
(iii) The federal test of navigability for title purposes
The various state tests of navigability for title purposes have been
reviewed; however, there remains a question of whether federal, rather
than state law, should control the legal -test of ownership to the beds
of tidally-affected watercourses.
The thirteen original states and Texas hold title to land underlying
navigable streams and tidewaters by virtue of their sovereignty, 27 4 while
other states acquired it with the grant of statehood. 7 5  Uncertainties
caused by the Tidelands Decisions7 6 were resolved by the Submerged
Land Act,277 which reaffirmed state ownership of lands under both in-
land navigable waters and tidewaters.17 1
Whether title to the bed of a particular inland stream passed to
the state on statehood is considered to be a question of federal law.2 79
The test to determine whether a stream is navigable for title purposes
under federal law was announced in United States v. Holt State
Bank,280 in which the Court declared:
[S]treams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded
as navigable in law; ... they are navigable in fact when they are
used or are susceptible of being used, in their natural and ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in customary modes of trade and travel
on water .... 281
273. E.g., State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497 (1972) (lower court's find-
ing of fact as to navigability upheld). See generally Clineburg & Kahmer, The Law
Pertaining to Estuarine Lands in South Carolina, 23 S.C.L. Rlv. 7 (1971).
274. See generally Leighty, supra note 184.
275. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
276. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). Although the hold-
ing in these opinions concerned the state ownership of the marginal sea beyond the low
water mark, the states were apprehensive about their titles to other submerged lands.
Leighty, supra note 184, at 424. See discussion of federal-state coastal boundaries in
Part m C infra.
277. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15, 1331-43 (1970).
278. Tidelands in this sense applies to the foreshore or the land below the high and
low water marks. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790
(1971); People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, -, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334, 341 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 453, 98 So. 505,
525 (1923); Bay City Land Co. v. Craig, 72 Ore. 31, 33, 143 P. 911, 912 (1914).
279. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
280. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
281. Id. at 56.
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In the tidelands the state can claim title to submerged lands as far
shoreward as the mean high water line.2 82 The issue, therefore, is
whether the state owns beds under all tidally affected watercourses, or
whether title depends on the actual navigability of these waters as sug-
gested by the Holt State Bank case. The Holt case, however, involved
a fresh water lake rather than tidally-affected waters; therefore, even
if the federal navigability for title test is deemed binding on the states
generally, it remains unclear whether the Holt case is applicable to tidal
waters.
The only relevant federal authority on this issue appears to be
Knight v. United Land Association.2 13  The case involved title to the
partially filled bed of Mission Creek that emptied into San Francisco
Bay. A government survey that had followed the high water line up
Mission Creek had been set aside by the federal government in favor
of a survey from headland to headland of the creek. It was not clear
from the opinion whether the creek had been navigable in fact before
the filling. In discussing the conclusiveness of the government survey,
Justice Field, in a concurring opinion, stated that the established rule
was to survey from headland to headland a smaller body of water at
its intersection with a larger body of water.28 4 This dictum suggests
that under federal law the states' title to submerged land may depend
on navigability in fact. Nevertheless, the issue remains very much of
an open question at this time.
(b) Obstructed entrances to tidal basins
The existence of a berm or other obstruction cutting off or par-
tially blocking the entrance to a tidal cove or basin may create serious
practical problems with respect to the location of the boundary line be-
tween public and private land. Turning first to berms, a berm of this
type is a ridge, built up by wave action or the force of the tides and
is often located along the outer edge of vegetation. Such berms may
be an inch to a foot higher than the land behind them. They restrict
the flow of normal high water and may act as dams, trapping fresh
water run off or extreme high tides behind them.28 5
The physical characteristics of a berm or other obstruction in rela-
tion to the land behind it may vary in a number of ways. First, the
obstruction may completely block off the entrance to a tidally affected
282. E.g., Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 1015 (1935).
283. 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
284. Id. at 207.
285. Guth, supra note 6, at 7.
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cove or basin. There are a number of other possibilities, however. The
berm may be incomplete, with one or more openings through which
navigation is possible, or it may simply block off direct access to a part
of a cove or basin, navigation behind it being possible. The opening
through the berm may be at the mouth of a tidal watercourse that is
navigable for a distance beyond the berm. The watercourse may run
through a basin or estuary, .the sides of which may be overflowed by
tidally affected but non-navigable waters, navigability being prevented
either by vegetation or -the shallowness of the basin or estuary beyond
the channel of the watercourse. These situations may have different
legal consequences insofar as ownership of the bottom land is con-
cerned.
To begin with, a distinction must be made between jurisdictions
that equate public ownership with the ebb and flow of the tide20  and
those that use "navigability in fact" as the test for title to overflowed
lands.28 7  In the former group, it would seem hat all of the overflowed
land within the range of the tide up to the mean high water line would
be sovereignty land, no matter which of the above fact categories was
involved.2 8  More difficult conceptual problems arise in the naviga-
bility-in-fact jurisdictions. In such a jurisdiction, -the first example
(that of the berm which completely encloses the mouth of a cove or
basin thus making it non-navigable due to lack of access) should result
in title being found to be in the upland owner, even though the water
may be deep enough for navigation inside the berm. Such a result was
indicated by the Florida case of Clement v. Watson.89 The case was
not a title case as such, but rather an action for damages for assault
and battery in which the court upheld the right of the defendant -to evict
as a trespasser one who entered the cove inside the berm line.290  An
286. See Part I B(2)(a)(i) supra.
287. See Part M B(2)(a)(ii) supra.
288. E.g., Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939);
Linthicum v. Shipley, 140 Md. 96, 116 A. 871 (1922); Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super.
591, 131 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1954), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 546, 133 A.2d 395 (1957).
289. 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912). See also Fisher v. Barber, 21 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929) (artificial channel cut in bar blocking tide waters); Guilliams v. Beaver
Lake Club, 90 Ore. 13, 175 P. 437 (1918) (sand thrown up by the ocean had caused
a small stream to become a lagoon). But see Sollers v. Sollers, 77 Md. 148, 26 A. 188
(1893), which involved a fact situation almost identical to Clement v. Watson. In an
action in trespass, private ownership of a tidal cove connected to the ocean by an artifi-
cial channel was claimed. The court determined that the cove was an arm of the sea;
hence title to the soil was vested in the state, and the action for trespass failed. Mary-
land is an "ebb and flow" state, which may explain the contrast between Clement and
Sollers.
29Q. 63 Fla. qt 110-111? 58 $o. ;t 20,
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artificial opening through the berm by the landowner that made naviga-
tion possible did not affect the ownership of the submerged land inside
the berm that remained private property." 1 This result is supported
by the Model Coastal Mapping Act, which provides optional language
codifying this position for navigability-for-title jurisdictions. 202
If there are one or more openings in the berm, making it possible
to navigate inside the berm line, arguably the title of the sovereign
should extend to the mean high water line of the bay or cove even
though this line is considerably inland of the area that can be navi-
gated.293  Conceptually, this situation would seem to parallel that of
an open beach which happens to have a sand bar or offshore islands
partially blocking navigation, since it is possible to navigate inside these
partially obstructing islands or sand bars. In navigability-in-fact juris-
dictions the boundary between sovereignty lands and uplands along the
beach should be the mean high water line even though one cannot navi-
gate all the way to that line. 94
If the area inside the berm is not navigable in fact because the
openings in it are too small or too shallow, it would seem to follow that
the berm would be the boundary line, despite such openings.295
Suppose that an opening in the berm is made by a tidal water-
course that is navigable inside the berm to a point above the shoreline
of the cove or bay. Since it is now possible to navigate inside the berm
line, the mean high water line along the shore of the basin should again
be the boundary.296 In addition, public ownership will probably ex-
291. Id. at 113, 58 So. at 27.
292. Model Coastal Mapping Act § 4(1), included in the appendix to this Article
[hereinafter cited as Model Act].
293. United States v. Turner, 175 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1949) (court held that the
shallows of navigable bodies of water are owned by the state whether or not the shallows
themselves are actually navigable); Alston v. Limehouse, 60 S.C. 559, 39 S.E. 188
(1901), involved a salt marsh intersected by runnels or drainways to the ocean. The
court reasoned that if these drainways were navigable, then the party that claimed own-
ership of the entire marsh could own only to the highwater marks of the marsh; the
land below the high water mark was state.owned. If, however, the drainways were not
navigable, then the claimant owned all of the marsh.
294. See United States v. Turner, 175 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1949); State v. Hardee,
259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497 (1972) (State owned to high water line on creek which
separated Pawleys Island from mainland).
295. Maddox v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 37 Fla. Supp. 73 (Cir. Ct.
Sarasota County 1970). An oyster bar across the opening of a bayou was dry except
at high'tide and thus formed a barrier to navigation into the bayou. The court held
that the bayou, though below mean high tide, was not sovereignty land.
296. Cf. Alston v. Limehouse, 60 S.C. 559, 39 S.E. 188 (1901).
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tend up the watercourse so far as it is navigable in fact,2 9 unless the
jurisdiction is prepared to adopt a "headlands to headlands" rule 98 for
such watercourses in cases in which they are navigable for only a short
distance inland from the foreshore. If the watercourse is navigable in-
side the berm, but not all the way to the foreshore, the claim of the
sovereign should still extend to the mean high water line, but a more
persuasive argument would seem to exist for applying the "headland
to headland" rule to the watercourse and drawing a closing line across
its mouth at the mean high water line along the shore.299
The problem may be further complicated in situations in which
berm plus dense vegetation acts as a friction barrier trapping fresh water
runoff in such a way that the water, while fresh, varies in elevation with
the tide.300  In most ebb-and-flow jurisdictions,30 1 -the boundary line
is apparently located at the innermost point of tidal fluctuation reached
by mean high water even though the water itself is fresh. 2  At least
one jurisdiction however, does not recognize a fresh water tidally af-
fected marsh as part of the sea coast, requiring at the very least a com-
bination of salt and fresh water as a basis for the use of the tidal effect
to establish public ownership.d 3  Whether the same rule would apply
in a navigability-in-fact jurisdiction0 4 may be more questionable. In
such cases the possibility of navigation inside the berm line might be
a critical factor in determining ownership inside that line.305
The mouth of a cove may be blocked or partially blocked by dense
or impenetrable vegetation as well as by berms. If the vegetation is
really impenetrable, it might well be equated with a berm that prevents
navigation, in effect making the cove a separate non-navigable water-
body and perhaps, therefore, subject to private ownership. 0 6 If, on
the other hand, -the vegetation merely obscures entry into the cove, the
297. See discussion of navigability-in-fact jurisdictions in Part III B(2) (a) (ii) su-
pra.
298. See discussion of headland-to-headland rule note 170 supra.
299. Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, 90 F. 680 (6th Cir. 1898)
involving a navigable channel narrowing into a shallow marsh. The court held that the
channel and marsh were subject to private ownership.
300. Guth, supra note 6, at 39.
301. See discussion of ebb and flow jurisdictions in Part MI B(2) (a) (i) supra.
302. See discussion of whether tidally affected fresh water is an arm of the sea in
text accompanying notes 171-76 supra.
303. Morgan v. Negodich, 40 La. Ann. 246, 3 So. 636 (1887). The test of owner-
ship of a sea marsh depended upon whether the marsh was a part of the seashore. This
in turn depended upon whether the water was a combination of salt and fresh water.
304. See Part m B(2) (a) (ii) supra.
305. See text accompanying notes 293-99 supra.
306. See text accompanying notes 239-46 supra.
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situation may be likened to that of the broken berms discussed
above,307 in which the possibility of navigating into the cove beyond
its mouth provides an argument for placing the property line at the
mean high water line along the shore of the basin rather than across
its mouth. Extremely difficult questions of fact may arise in such cases.
One may hazard a guess, however, that the situation of complete block-
age of such coves will arise relatively infrequently, since tidal water
trapped therein tends to keep passageways open for its escape,
normally producing the broken berm-type situation. A similar phenom-
enon may be found with respect to tributary basins on exposed coast-
lines where one set of tidal forces may tend to deposit sand or other
material at the mouth of an inlet, thus reducing it in size or even com-
pletely closing it, while currents through the inlet tend to scour away
these deposits and keep the channel open.308
Finally, there -is the problem of artificial changes in basin regimes.
Artificial improvements to the entrance of a tidal cove or basin may
materially increase the tidal range, resulting in substantial quantities of
what was previously upland being submerged at mean high water. Since
such a change is avulsive in nature, the property line should not
change,30 9 but the location of the original line may present extremely
difficult problems of proof unless adequate tidal observations are made
prior to the improvement. 31 0  Absent such observations, indirect and
less conclusive evidence may have to be relied upon,311 and the results
are likely to be considerably less accurate. 312
All of this raises very serious policy questions with respect to pro-
tection of the environment. The solution of these policy problems,
however, does not justify manipulation of the legal rules respecting ti-
tle to property in coastal areas,313 especially since there are other ef-
fective means of wetland protection. 14
(c) Hummocks
A problem also arises in overflowed areas where small hummocks
or hillocks protrude above -the mean high tide level. If the area is
307. See text accompanying notes 293-99 supra.
308. Patton, Relation of the Tide to Property Boundaries, in 2 A. SHALownrz, supra
note 5, at 667, 673.
309. See text accompanying note 342 infra.
310. Patton, supra note 308, at 679.
311. Cases cited note 221 supra.
312. Patton, supra note 308, at 679.
313. Ausness, supra note 56, at 412-13.
314. See text ,ccompanying notes 393-403 infra,
[Vol. 53222
COASTAL BOUNDARIES
heavily vegetated, as in marsh or mangrove areas where large drain-
age fields meet the coast, the physical problem of determining exactly
what land is above mean high water may become extremely diffi-
cult. 15 Even when that problem is solved, proof as to the character
of the protruding land, whether swamp and overflowed lands 1" or
uplands1 7 may present additional problems.
Such distinctions may be important because, if the land in question
is covered by water at mean high tide, it will normally be classified as
sovereignty land, 18 held in trust by the state for its people. 1 9 If, on
the other hand, it protrudes above mean high water, it will be either
swamp and overflowed lands or uplands. If the former, located other
than in the original states and not already conveyed by the federal
government, it will have passed to the state under the Swamp and Over-
flowed Lands Act of 1850,120 but title will not necessarily have lodged
in the state, since the ministerial act of conveyance to the state by the
Department of the Interior is needed to perfect title in the state. 21
Such conveyances were not automatic, but followed the completion of
federal surveyo locating and characterizing such lands.322  Thus, in
areas as yet unsurveyed, 2 8 or where the original federal surveys in
meandering the shoreline omitted such lands or where located seaward
of this meander line, paper title has remained in the United States, sub-
ject to a requirement to patent such lands to the state to perfect the
315. Guth, supra note 6.
316. Swamp and overflowed lands are defined as "all legal subdivisions, the greater
part whereof is wet and unfit for cultivation. . . ." 43 U.S.C. § 984 (1970). Legal
subdivisions within the meaning of the act are 40-acre tracts. Buena Vista County v.
Iowa Falls & S.C.R.R., 112 U.S. 165 (1884). Swamp lands were distinguished from
overflowed lands in San Francisco Say. Union v. Irwin, 28 F. 708 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886),
affd per curlan, 136 U.S. 578 (1890). The court stated: 'The act of 1850 grants
swamp and overflowed lands. Swamp lands, as distinguished from overflowed lands,
may be considered such as require drainage to fit them for cultivation. Overflowed
lands are those which are subject to such periodical or frequent overflows as to require
levees or embankments to keep out the water, and render them suitable for cultivation."
Id. at 712.
317. "Uplands" as used in this context refers to all land that is above mean high
water and not classified as swamp and overflowed lands. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGE-
mNT, U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, MANUAL OF INSTRUCr ONS FOR THE SURVEY OF Tma
PuBLIc LANDs OF THE UNITED STATES 98 (1973).
318. See discussion of mean high water line at text accompanying notes 509-18
inf ra.
319. See discussion of public trust doctrine in Part 11 B supra.
320. 43 U.S.C. §§ 982-84 (1970).
321. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTEm OR, supra note 317,
at 4.
322. 43 U.S.C. § 983 (1970).
323. BUP Ag OF LAM MANAEWMNT U,$. DEP'T OF m INT O1, supra note 317,
at 4,
1974] 223
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
transfer ordered under -the Swamp Lands Act of 1850.824 If, on the
other hand, a hummock is classified as uplands--"manoriable 312 lands
capable of cultivation without improvement by drainage- 820 and it has
never been conveyed by the United States, title will remain in the
federal government, with no obligation to convey it to the state, since
it is not swamp land and did not pass under the Swamp and Overflowed
Lands Act."32
The initial obligation to classify such lands, assuming they have
not already been classified, falls upon the Bureau of Land Management
of the United States Department of the Interior.12  When requested
by a state, 329 or in its own initiative330 the Bureau may undertake such
classification. In the case of relatively small hummocks surrounded by
state sovereignty land below mean high water in densely vegetated
areas, the Bureau may decide that such classification is not worth the
effort, and refuse to take further action. 31 In the event it does decide
to act, however, it should be governed by the Borax test, 32 and estab-
lish the boundaries of such hummocks at the mean high water line as
defined by the Supreme Court in that case. The Oelschlaeger ap-
proach of using the meander line as a boundary should have no applica-
tion to -this type of problem 33 3 since rights in the land were not de-
rived from administrative action of -the Secretary as in the latter case.
(3) The Ambulatory Nature of Coastal Boundaries
(a) Common law doctrines
In most coastal states, tidal boundaries are considered to be am-
bulatory; that is, the physical location of the mean high (or low) wa-
324. E.g., Rogers Locomotive Mach. Works v. American Emigrant Co., 164 U.S.
559 (1896).
325. Attorney-General v. Chambers, 43 Eng. Rep. 486, 489 (Ch. 1854).
326. The test of fitness for cultivation is whether the land is arable and adapted
to raising crops requiring annual tillage. American Emigrant Co. v. Rogers Locomotive
Mach. Works, 83 Iowa 613, 50 N.W. 52 (1891), rev'd on other grounds, 164 U.S. 559
(1896).
327. 43 U.S.C. §§ 981-86 (1970).
328. BUREAu OF LAND M.A&NMmENT, U.S. DEP'T OF TnE INTERIOR, supra note 317,
at 4.
329. BuREAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, APPLICATION
FOR SURVEY OF ISLANDS OR OHER Omlrm PUBLIC LANDS, 43 C.F.R. § 9185.2 (1970).
330. BRmEAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 317,
at 4.
331. See, e.g., BUREAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'r OF Tim INTERIOR, RE-
PORT ON THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE ALLEGED OmzrmD LANDS IN T. 46S,
R. 24 E., TALLAHASSEE MERIDIAN, FLORIDA SURVEY GROUP 158, at 6 (1974).
332. See Part III B(1)(b) supra.
333. See text accompanying notes 532-35 infra.
[Vol. 53224
COASTAL BOUNDARIES
ter line may shift because of natural or artificial changes in the loca-
tion of the shoreline. Accordingly, littoral owners may gain or lose
land by virtue of accretion, reliction, erosion, or avulsion.
Before discussing the problem of ambulatory versus fi ed bound-
aries, it may be helpful to consider the meaning of a number of terms
commonly used in legal discussions of this problem. Accretions or ac-
creted lands consist of additions to the land resulting from the gradual
deposit by water of sand, sediment or other material.834 The term ap-
plies to such lands produced along both navigable and non-navigable
water.88s Alluvion is that increase of earth on a shore or bank of a
stream or sea, by the force of the water, as by a current or by waves,
which is so gradual that no one can judge how much is added at each
moment of time.336 The term "alluvion" is applied to the deposit itself,
while accretion denotes the act,3 M but the terms are frequently used
synonymously.388
Reliction refers to land which formerly Was covered by water, but
which has become dry land by the imperceptible recession of the
water.8 9 Although there is a distinction between accretion and relic-
tion, one being the gradual building of the land, and the other the
gradual recession of water, the terms are often used interchangeably.
The term "accretion" in particular is often used to cover both processes,
and generally the law relating to both is the same.8 40
Erosion is the gradual and imperceptible wearing away of land
bordering on a body of water by the natural action of the elements.84'
Avulsion is either the sudden and perceptible alteration of the shoreline
by action of the water, or a sudden change of the bed or course of a
334. Municipal Liquidators, Inc. v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 253, 173 N.E.2d
273, 275 (1961); Jones v. Turlington, 243 N.C. 681, 684, 92 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1956); 1
H. FARNHAm, supra note 8, § 69.
335. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
336. St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 66 (1874); Humble Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920
(1952).
337. Katz v. Patterson, 135 Ore. 449, 296 P. 54 (1931).
338. Id. at 453, 296 P. at 55.
339. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 574, 112 So. 274, 287 (1927); McClure v.
Couch, 182 Tenn. 563, 572, 188 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1945); Note, Avulsion and Accre-
tion-Emphasis Oregon, 3 WiL.Amra L.. 345, 346 (1965).
340. R. BoyR, FLOIDA REAL EsTATE TRANSACTIoNS, 206-07 (1959).
341. 3 AM cAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 170; see United States v. 461.42
Acres of Land, 222 F. Supp. 55, 56 (N.D. Ohio 1963); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters §
87a (1966).
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stream forming a boundary whereby it abandons its old bed for a new
one.
3 42
As a general rule, where the shoreline is gradually and imper-
ceptibly changed or shifted by accretion, reliction or erosion, the bound-
ary line is extended or restricted in the same manner. The owner of
the littoral property thus acquires title to all additions arising by accre-
tion or reliction, and loses soil that is worn or washed away by ero-
sion.3 43  However, any change in the shoreline that takes place sud-
denly and perceptibly does not result in a change of boundary or
ownership.344 Normally a landowner may not intentionally increase
his estate through accretion or reliction by artificial means .3 4 How-
ever, ,the littoral owner is usually entitled to additions that result from
artificial conditions created by third persons without his consent.340
The statutory proposal that accompanies 'this article in no way at-
tempts to alter the ambulatory nature of tideland boundaries or to limit
the corresponding legal doctrines with respect to accretion, reliotion,
erosion or avulsion.147  It rejects the notion of the fixed boundary
where waterfront property is concerned. The concept of a fixed bound-
ary means that the physical boundaries of littoral property would be
permanently fixed as of a specific date without regard to subsequent
alteration of the shoreline. Under this approach, therefore, littoral
owners could no longer gain land by accretion or reliction, nor could
they lose it by means of erosion. As the following discussion will show,
342. Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345, 352 (1875); State v. Johnson, 278 N.C. 126,
146, 179 S.E.2d 371, 384 (1971); J. GouLD, supra note 30, § 158; 65 C.J.S. Navigable
Waters § 86 (1966).
343. There are said to be four reasons for this principle: (1) de minimis non curat
lex; (2) he who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity
of waters ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion; (3) it is in
the interest of the community that all land have an owner, and for convenience, the
riparian is the chosen one; (4) it is necessary to preserve the riparian right of access
to water. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach
Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 212-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
344. Municipal Liquidators, Inc. v. Tench, 153 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Ford v. Turner, 142 So. 2d 335, 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Hirt v. Entus,
37 Wash. 2d 418, 224 P.2d 620 (1950); Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 441.42, 205
P. 1062, 1064 (1922).
345. Kansas v. Meriwether, 182 F. 457 (8th Cir. 1910); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 857
(1963). See also United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. 1023 (D. Ore. 1973).
Contra, Davis v. Morgan, 228 N.C. 78, 44 S.E.2d 593 (1947).
346. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); State v. Gill, 259 Ala.
177, 66 So. 2d 141 (1953); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass.
251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961); Harrison County v. Guice, 244 Miss. 95, 140 So. 2d 838
(1962); Annot., 134 A.L.R. 467 (1941); F. MALONEY, S. PLAoER & F. BALDWIN, supra
note 7, § 126.2(b), at 389.
47, Mo9l Act § 4(2); see Appendix,
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the adoption of a fixed boundary in any coastal state would be
extremely difficult since the federal courts have consistently upheld the
concept of the ambulatory boundary in cases of littoral property and,
as will be seen, this federal law is applicable in those states carved from
the federal domain, while state constitutional provisions8 48 and recep-
tion statutes8 49 in the other coastal states would appear to be formidable
obstacles to the fixing of such boundaries."'
(b) Federal cases
As a general rule the question of title and the rights of riparian
and littoral owners to accretion and similar benefits is governed by state
law. In federal question cases, however, the courts have held that
federal rather than state law applies. 35' The landmark case of Borax
Consolidated Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles,3 52 discussed in detail
earlier,38 3 interpreted the term "ordinary high water mark" as the mean
of all high waters over the 18.6-year tidal cycle and held it to be the
tidal boundary where federal law applies. Since -the boundary was
determined by the intersection of the appropriate -tidal datum with the
land, an ambulatory rather than a fixed boundary was implied. Of
equal importance, however, -the Borax case set forth the rule that
federal law would apply to tidal boundaries in cases involving a federal
question. The Court declared:
The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to
the limit of the land conveyed, or the boundary between upland
and the tideland, is necessarily a federal question. It is a question
which concerns the validity and effect of an act done by the United
States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right
asserted under federal law.3 54
348. Most states have a provision prohibiting the taking of private property without
compensation within their own constitutions. E.g., N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 7. This pro-
vision has been interpreted by one New York court to apply to riparian rights, including
the right of access to a stream. Marine Air Ways v. State, 201 Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d
1964 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 280 App. Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1951).
349. The common law has been adopted by all states except Louisiana. 15 AM.
JuR. 2d Common Law § 11 (1964).
350. Fixed boundaries which adversely affect the riparian owner are of doubtful
constitutionality; see Part II B(2) (b) (ii) supra. However, Washington does not recog-
nize the loss by erosion of land abutting lakes, bays or water where granted prior to
Washington statehood.
351. Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); United States
v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). See Shalowitz, Tidal Boundaries-The Borax
Case Revisited, 29 SuRvEyInG & MAPPIrG 501 (Sept. 1969).
352. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
353. See Part III B(2) (b) supra.
354. 296 U.S. at 22.
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This principle was subsequently applied to accretion in the Washington
and Hughes cases.
United States v. Washington355 concerned -the ownership of accre-
tions to littoral land owned by the federal government along the coast
of Washington. The primary issue in the case was whether state or
federal law applied. It was argued that federal law followed the
common-law position and recognized the ambulatory nature of tidal
boundaries. Under state law, however, the boundary was fixed as of
the date of statehood, and subsequent accretions were owned by the
state rather than the littoral owner.
The federal court of appeals, reversing the trial court, held that
the Borax case was controlling and declared that accordingly, federal
law would prevail over state law. The court stated that while Borax
had not been directly concerned with accretion, the principle of that
case is equally applicable because accretion is an attribute of title and
"the determination of the attributes of an underlying federal title, quite
as much as the determination of the boundaries of the land reserved
or acquired under such a title, 'involves the ascertainment of the essen-
tial basis of a right asserted under federal law.' ""50
The rule in the Washington case was upheld several years later
by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Washington.57 The issue involved
whether the plaintiff, successor in title to an original federal grantee,
was entitled to the gradual and imperceptible accretions added to her
land both before and after the admission of Washington to the Union.
The State trial court, relying upon the Borax and Washington decisions,
held that federal law applied and confirmed title to the accreted lands
in the plaintiff. The State supreme court, however, reversed, declaring
that state rather than federal law governed in this instance. Since under
the law of Washington the boundary was fixed as of the date of state-
hood, the court held that all accretions since that time belonged to the
state rather than the littoral owner.
The case was then brought before the United States Supreme
Court. The issue before the Court was whether or not a state could
alter the ambulatory boundary between its -tideland and uplands pat-
ented by the federal government prior to statehood by declaring that
boundary to be permanently fixed at the line of ordinary high tide on
355. 294 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962).
356. Id. at 832.
357. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
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the date of admission to statehood, thereby depriving the uplands
owner of natural accretions occurring since that date. The Supreme
Court held that this question was controlled by federal law, not state
law, and therefore, that the littoral owner was entitled to the accretions.
The Court relied on the Borax case to reach its decision: "While the
issue appears never to have been squarely presented to this Court be-
fore, we think the path to decision is indicated by our holding in Borax,
Ltd. v. Los Angeles .... No subsequent case in -this Court has cast
doubt on the principle announced in Borax."35 8 The Court reached
its decision in spite of the fact that the Borax case did not deal with
accretions. The Court nevertheless declared:
While this is true, the case did involve the question as to what rights
were conveyed by the federal grant and decided that the extent
of ownership under the federal grant is governed by federal law.
This is as true whether doubt as to any boundary is based on a
broad question as to the general definition of the shoreline or on
a particularized problem relating to the ownership of accretion.359
The right asserted by Mrs. Hughes, whose predecessor in title had
acquired -the upland before statehood, was a right asserted under
federal law. Under federal law accretion belonged to the upland
owner. The main policy behind the federal common law was to protect
the riparian owner's access -to the water.3860 Therefore, the accretion
to Mrs. Hughes' property belonged to her, and not to the state. In
a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart recognized Washington's fixed
boundary rule as a change in the state's water law. He argued that
Mrs. Hughes' right to accretion should be based on the principle that
the application of state law was a taking of property without compen-
sation.361
Thus, both the Washington and the Hughes cases have recognized
the ambulatory boundary as a part of federal law and have held that
this principle will prevail over a contrary state rule. The exact scope
of these decisions, however, is not entirely clear. While Hughes in-
volved a federal patent made prior to statehood, both Washington and
Borax involved patents made after statehood. It is -therefore likely that
federal law will govern wherever a federal patent is involved. This
would virtually destroy the efficacy of any state law that attempted to
establish a fixed boundary as far as those states carved out of the
358. Id. at 291-92.
359. Id. at 292.
360. Id. at 293.
361. Id. at 294-98.
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federal domain are concerned, 62 including well over half of the coast-
line of the United States.
Washington and Hughes have changed the law of the State of
Washington since that State had necessarily to abandon its fixed bound-
ary position. 63 Louisiana may also have to reconsider its legal position
in the light of the Hughes decision. Louisiana maintains that the
owner of property abutting the Gulf of Mexico has no right to accretion
formed by the sea.G 4  Both Washington 0 5 and Florida00 have con-
sidered the reasoning of Hughes-that the riparian owner must have
access to the water-to decide cases involving accretion. 07
The extent to which the title to accretion is a federal question was
decided in Hughes only with respect to a grant made prior to state-
hood. 68 However, the court's language in Hughes 69 would indicate
that whenever title has been derived from the federal government,
federal law applies.
A very recent decision by the Supreme Court, Bonelli Cattle Co.
v. Arizona3a70 takes the position that when states are successors in title
to the federal government they are subject to federal common law with
respect to boundaries of land abutting on all navigable waters. Bonelli
involved a dispute between the upland owner and the State of Arizona,
as owner of the bed of the Colorado River, over title to land exposed
362. Note, Florida's Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns
Them and Where is the Boundary?, 1 FLA. Sr. L. REv. 596, 630 (1973).
363. E.g., Harris v. Hylebos Indus., Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 770, 505 P.2d 457 (1973);
Vavrek v. Parks, 6 Wash. App. 684, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972); Wilson v. Howard, 5 Wash.
App. 169, 486 P.2d 1172 (1971). Washington, however, does not recognize loss of title
by erosion of land abutting lakes, bays or waters treated as lakes or bays if the land
was conveyed by federal grant prior to statehood. This rule relies on the theory that
the state may dispose of its land beneath navigable waters if it desires.
364. See Ker & Co. v. Conden, 223 U.S. 268 (1911); State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster
Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405 (1912); Zeller v. Southern Yacht Club, 34 La. Ann. 837
(1882); Note, Alluvion, Islands, and Sand Bars, 47 TEL. L. REV. 367, 374 (1973).
Cautious petroleum companies are reported to be obtaining leases from both the state
and the riparian owners. Id. at 374 n.42.
365. Hudson House, Inc. v. Rozman, 82 Wash. 2d 178, 509 P.2d 992 (1973). The
court found necessary the equitable apportionment of a large, unusually-shaped accretion
to avoid cutting off access to the water for an upland owner.
366. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nom-
inee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Florida Nat'l Properties, Inc. v.
Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund, Case No. 74-5-G (Fla. Cir. Ct. Highlands
County, May 3, 1974).
367. See also United States v. 1,629.6 Acres of Land, 335 F. Supp. 255, 269 (D.
Del. 1971) (Hughes cited as favoring protection of access to water by riparian owner).
368. 389 U.S. at 291.
369. The location of the boundary was too great a national concern to be subject
to state law. Id. at 293.
370. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
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by rechanneling the river. The Arizona Supreme Court considered the
exposed land to be the result of avulsion since a sudden change in -the
character of the land was involved, and held that title to the exposed
land remained in the State.37' The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed. Although urged to apply the Hughes analysis-that a federal
question was involved because the upland owner traced his -title
through a federal grant-the Court rejected this argument37 2 in favor
of a broader rationale. A federal question was involved, the Court
reasoned, because the State acquired its title to the river bed under the
equal-footing doctrine.3 73  Further, the State's title was a limited one
in that it held the beds of navigable waters for the purpose of public
navigation or "related public interests." 374  In cases in which the chan-
neling project enhanced the State's interest in the navigability of the
river, the Court decided that as a matter of public policy the State
should not be permitted to acquire the exposed land in what would
amount to "a windfall, since unnecessary to the State's purpose in
holding title to the beds of the navigable streams within its bor-
ders. '3 75  To avoid -this windfall, which would have resulted from
classifying the drying up of the bottomlands as avulsion, the Court in
effect redefined avulsion and accretion, no longer emphasizing the
speed with which -the change was brought about, but rather finding
accretion because of the lack of "navigational or related public in-
terests. '3 76  Lack of such interests, said the Court, calls for applica-
tion of the "accretion theory,"37 7 which gave the land to Bonelli, the
371. Arizona v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 107 Ariz. 465, 489 P.2d 699 (1971).
372. 414 U.S. at 321 n.1.
373. The states which entered the Union after its formation were admitted with. the
same rights as the original states within their respective borders. Mumford v. Wardwell,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867). Title to lands under navigable waters passed to the new
states under the equal footing doctrine. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845).
374. 414 U.S. at 323.
375. Id. at 328.
376. Id. at 329.
377. The policies behind the doctrine of accretion are, however, fully ap-
plicable. Accretion theory guarantees the riparian character of land by auto-
matically granting to a riparian owner title to lands which form between his
holdings and the river and thus threaten to destroy that valuable feature of his
property. The riparian owner is at the mercy, not only of the natural forces
which create such intervening lands, but also, because of the navigational servi-
tude, of governmental forces which may similarly affect the riparian quality
of his estate. Accordingly, where land cast up in the Federal Government's
exercise of the servitude is not related to furthering the navigational or related
public interests, the accretion doctrine should provide a disposition of the land
as between the riparian owner and the state.
Id. at 327.
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adjoining landowner.378  Since the tidelands were among the lands
granted to those states that joined on an equal footing, along with
land underlying navigable rivers, the principle of Borgelli should be
equally applicable to the tidelands."' 0
The mean high water line is the federal standard for littoral
boundaries, 8 °0 and the federal common law recognizes the ambulatory
boundary.38' This does not solve, however, all the problems remaining
to be faced by the state courts. Two similar cases, one in Florida and
one in California, illustrate one of these problems and how at least two
courts are approaching it.
(c) State approaches to ambulatory shorelines
In People v. William Kent Estate Co.,8 2 a California appeals court
decided a suit to quiet title brought by the lessee of a sandspit. The
sandspit was bounded on one side by the Pacific Ocean, the tideland
being owned by the State. The court found that the United States
Coast and Geodetic Survey could establish the mean high tide line, The
real problem was that the beach itself shifted perhaps as much as eighty
feet between the summer and winter seasons. 8
Kent commented authoritatively on the determination and mean-
ing of the mean high water line, but did not solve the problem. The
seasonal fluctuation could hardly be "gradual and imperceptible" so as
to classify the change in the beach shoreline as accretion or reliction,
declared the court.8 84 Therefore the issue was retried in an attempt
to establish a more definite or certain boundary. Since the proceeding
was eventually dismissed on appeal as moot, the attempt was unsuccess-
ful.885
378. Bonelli solved one problem raised by Hughes. There are no longer two classes
of upland owner, those deriving title from federal government and those deriving title
from other sources. However, Bonelli also sharply focuses another inconsistency.
Those states which were admitted to the Union on an "equal footing" with the original
thirteen states are under federal common law as to water property boundaries. The thir-
teen original states and Texas may presumably apply state law. Id. at 336 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
379. The Court relied on the decisions in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873); Pollard's Lessee
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), all involving tidelands. 414 U.S. at 318.
380. See Part I B(2) (a) (iii) supra.
381. See text accompanying notes 352-54 supra.
382. 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
383. Id. The actual amount of movement of the land was in dispute.
384. Id. at -, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19. On October 10, 1973, the court of appeal,
in an unpublished opinion, dismissed the state's appeal as moot after defendant removed
the fence. 1 Civil No. 31405 (Ist Dist. Ct. App., Oct. 10, 1973).
385. Petition for rehearing was denied on November 9, 1973. Petitions for hearing
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A similar Florida case, Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund
v. Ocean Hotels, Inc.,38 6 was an action to remove a seawall erected by
the lessee hotel owner to prevent a part of its hotel from being under-
mined by the sea. This case also presented the problem of determining
a boundary on a beach "which, through the natural processes of erosion
and accretion, undergoes a predictable, seasonal loss and replenish-
ment of approximately 90 feet of beach sand."387 The trial court ap-
proached the problem directly. It summarily dismissed the fluctuating
boundary concept as being unacceptable as a property law standard.388
The possible solutions, as the court saw them, were to accept either
the seaward mean high water line (summer line), the landward mean
high water line (winter line), or the mean of the two. The mean of
the summer and winter line was rejected as too costly to determine and
an invasion of the public trust concept for at least part of the year. The
summer line would likewise be violative of the public trust, 8 9 Conse-
quently, the trial court accepted the winter line as the boundary. This
solution was found to satisfy the State's interest in allowing the public
the use of the beach. 90 Ocean Hotels is currently on appeal.3 91
In spite of the Kent and Ocean Hotels decisions, the use of a fluc-
tuating boundary in such fact situations seems justified. The mean
high water line is ascertainable. There is usually no great difficulty
in determining the location of the line with respect to the shore at -any
given time. In light of the Hughes and Bonelli decisions, the ambula-
tory shoreline is a more acceptable property boundary than the winter
line used by the Ocean Hotels court. Hughes relied on the supremacy
of federal law over state law when a federal question is involved. The
"winter line" approach is not a part of the federal common law; more-
over, federal law clearly rejects such an argument as that of the trial
court in Ocean Hotels, that water boundaries must be fixed to be cer-
tain. Further, the "winter line" clearly deprives the upland owner of
title to the summer beach which he would hold under common law
accretion principles. This may be an unconstitutional taking of pro-
perty without compensation, as Justice Stewart argued in Hughes. His
in the California Supreme Court were filed by the state and numerous amici curiae.
There petitions were denied on December 19, 1973.
386. 40 Fla. Supp. 26 (Palm Beach County Ct. 1974).
387. Id. at 27.
388. Id. at 32.
389. Id. at 32-33.
390. Id. at 33.
391. Appeal docketed, No. 74-255, Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App., Feb. 27, 1974.
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"taking" argument was specifically recognized by the majority in
Bonelli as defeating the state's claim to the disputed land. 0 2 Thus
the "winter line" may be unconstitutional on the ground that federal
law is supreme when a federal question is involved or on the ground
that the use of that line is a taking of property without compensation.
There are other legal means available to protect public rights to
beaches without doing violence to the ambulatory boundary concept.
Even where title has been confirmed in the upland owner, the public
may have acquired a prescriptive easement in the dry sand area 93 or
a right to use the dry sand area by "custom. '394  Construction on the
disputed area can be limited by set-back requirements established un-
der the police power.3 95 These requirements are much more likely to
be upheld, as are other zoning laws, as not being a taking00 than the
fixed winter line approach of the trial court in Ocean Hotels.
An additional judicial tool for protecting the rights of the public
in the area of seasonal ambulation between summer and winter mean
high water lines is suggested by the recent holding of Wilbour v.
Gallagher.97 That case held that the owner of lands periodically cov-
ered by navigable waters of a fresh water lake may not interfere with
public navigational rights by artificially filling such lands or erecting
permanent structures thereon during a period of low water. In
Wilbour the waters of Lake Chelan were periodically raised and low-
ered artificially in connection with power production. Defendants,
whose lands were partially submerged annually for three months, filled
the submerged parts of their property so that it could be used through-
out the year. The Washington Supreme Court, holding that their fills
constituted an obstruction to navigation, ordered them abated. 98 The
392. 414 U.S. at 331.
393. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
See also Comment, Easements: Judicial and Legislative Protection of the Public's Right
to Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. RPv. 586 (1973).
394. See Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286 (D. Ore. 1972).
395. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 161.052-.053 (1972).
396. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING §§ 116-19 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or
Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Critejia, 44 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1, 13-48 (1971). But see In re Opinion of Justices to House of Representatives,
Mass. _, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974).
397. 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969).
398. In its decision, the court took the position that the same test is applicable to
artificially raised and lowered navigable waters as is followed in cases involving natu-
rally fluctuating water levels. It went on to state:
[Wlhere the level of a navigable body of water fluctuates due to natural causes
so that a riparian owner's property is submerged part of the year, the public
has the right to use all the waters of the navigable lake or stream whether it
be at the high water line, the low water line, or in between. . . . When the
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rationale of the case seems equally applicable to lands periodically
covered by the seasonal ambulation of tidally affected waters.
In addition to the possible state recognition and enforcement of
a navigational easement of the Wilbour type, recent federal cases indi-
cate a strong possibility of federal recognition of a similar federal ease-
ment. In United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc.,99 the Federal District
Court for the District of Oregon seemingly extended the jurisdiction
of the Corps of Engineers to include dry sand areas within the limits
of migration of a meandering navigable coastal river. By analogy this
principle can arguably be extended to the ambulation of a sand beach
between its summer and winter limits, thus giving the Corps authority
to require permits under the Rivers and Harbors Act.400 Federal regu-
latory power has been also extended under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act40 1 in United States v. Holland,40 2 which involved a dredge
and fill operation on land "periodically inundated [by the tides but]
above the mean high water line .... ,"403 The land held to be under
federal jurisdiction was mangrove wetland, but the federal pollution
control authority could well be extended to the beaches as far as the
waves wash to restrain construction or development on an ambulatory
shoreline.
Another problem is artificial accretion. As a general proposition,
the law with respect to accretion or reliction applies whether they result
from natural or artificial causes. 404 This is not to say, however, that
an artificial accretion caused by the littoral owner will be vested in
him.405 But, if the artificial accretion is not caused by him, in general
land is submerged, the owner has only a qualified fee subject to the right of
the public to use the water over the lands consistent with navigational rights,
primary and corollary...
Thus, in the situation of a naturally varying water level, the respective rights
of the public and of the owners of the periodically submerged lands are depend-
ent upon the level of the water. As the level rises, the rights of the public
to use the water increase since the area of water increases; correspondingly,
the rights of the landowners decrease since they cannot use their property in
such a manner as to interfere with the expanded public rights.
14 at 314, 462 P.2d at 238.
399. 5 E.R.C. 1023 (D. Ore. 1973). This case is currently on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
400. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
401. Id. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II, 1972).
402. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
403. Id. at 675.
404. 56 AM. JTr. Waters § 486 (1947).
405. E.g., McDowell v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 90 So. 21 715 (FI,
1956); Davis v. Morgan, 288 N.C. 78, 44 S.E.2d 593 (1947),
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it will be awarded to him.4 16
Suppose, however, the accretion results from a legislatively au-
thorized beach nourishment project. Arguably such projects may be
legally justified under the police and general welfare powers to protect
endangered lands.40 7 Does this fact provide a valid legal basis for fix-
ing the boundary on the landward side of the accreted land? Under
such legislation in Florida,4 s once an erosion control line is established
in connection with a beach nourishment project, title to all lands sea-
ward of the line vests in the State. The common law of accretion no
longer applies, although the person who owned to the mean high water
mark before the line was established retains his riparian right of ac-
cess, 40 9 and, if the agency responsible for maintaining the restored
beach allows it to recede to the landward side of the erosion control
line, the common law of erosion takes effect as to such land.41 0  The
line can be established only where severe beach erosion has occurred.
The constitutionality of the legislation with respect to the title to the
accreted land has been questioned,4 ' but no square holding on the is-
sue has yet been forthcoming in Florida. However, a Massachusetts
beach nourishment project, which included no provision for access by
riparian farmers over the accreted land was held not to vest title in the
state despite the public benefit that resulted.412 Perhaps an argument
in favor of the Florida-type legislation can be constructed from the lan-
guage of Justice Marshall in the Bonelli case concerning protection of
"navigational or related public interests, ' 413 which, the Court con-
tinued, "should not be narrowly construed because it is denominated
406. See Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d
273 (1961).
407. Cf. Colberg, Inc. v. State ex reL Dep't of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432
P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,
40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
408. FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-.211, 161.25-.45 (1972).
409. Id. § 161.201.
410. Id. §§ 161.211(2)-(3).
411. Trustees of nternal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc.,
36 Fla. Supp. 26 (Cir. Ct. Pinellas County 1971), af'd, 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973). See also F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWiN, supra note 7, § 126.7,
raising similar doubts but suggesting that if the legislation preserves the riparian right
of access of the upland owner, this might tip the balance in favor of the legislation.
The Florida statute contains such a provision. FLA. STAT. § 161.201 (1972).
412. Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d
273 (1961).
413. 414 U.S. at 329.
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a navigational purpose."4" 4  Arguably one such public purpose could
be the prevention of beach erosion and the restoration of public
beaches on land formerly beneath navigable waters. 415 A more clearly
acceptable approach to the beach erosion problem, however, might be
to allow the law of accretion to apply and the littoral owner to gain
title to the accreted beach lands, but legislatively to impose a public
easement of access on the accreted lands along with imposing building
restrictions on such land to guarantee that easement on the publicly fi-
nanced additions.
In summary, the federal common law of water boundaries is
rapidly supplanting state water boundary law governing much of the
nation's coastline. This federal common law uses the ambulatory
boundary, and -the line of this ambulatory boundary is the mean high
water line. A change at this time would raise serious constitutional
questions because it arguably constitutes a deprivation of the land-
owner's accreted property without just compensation. 416  For these
reasons the proposed model legislation retains the common law of the
states regarding the legal effects of accretion, reliction, erosion and
avulsion.417 This common law, at least in those states subject to the
federal common law, will necessarily include the ambulatory coastal
boundary concept.
C. Federal-State Conflicts in the Marginal Sea
Although this article is primarily concerned with property rights
along the shoreline, a brief examination of jurisdictional and property
rights in the sea bed itself is appropriate. The discussion, however,
will not deal with the international aspects of exploitation of sea bed
resources, but will concentrate on the current dispute between the
states and the federal government over the extent of their respective
interests in offshore areas.
International law recognizes three categories of navigable waters:
(1) the high seas, which are outside the jurisdiction of any particular
nation;418 (2) the marginal or territorial sea, which is a band of water
414. Id. at 323 n.15.
415. But see Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira
Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
416. This argument is spelled out in Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund
v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 36 Fla. Supp. 26, 34-35 (Cir. Ct. Pinellas County
1971), a! 'd, 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
417. Model Act § 4(2).
418. Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 Mica. L. REV. 639 (1966).
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along the coast over which the nation exercises exclusive jurisdiction 41
except for a right of innocent passage afforded foreign vessels; 420 and
(3) inland waters, which are located between the marginal sea and
mean low water line.421  In the United States, inland waters are
generally state owned, but both federal and state governments have an
interest in the marginal sea.
Prior to World War 1 the United States Supreme Court had uni-
formly upheld state ownership of ,tidelands,422 and it was generally be-
lieved that the same rule applied to the submerged lands of the
marginal sea.423 In the 1930's however, the federal government began
to assert a claim to submerged lands seaward of the mean low water
line,424 and the dispute was finally resolved in a series of Supreme
Court cases known as the Tidelands Decisions.425 In the first of these
cases, United States v. California,426 the Court held that California was
not the owner of the marginal sea along its coast and that the federal
government rather than the states had paramount rights427 and powers
over such waters. Moreover, according to the Court, this power in-
cluded full dominion over the resources under the seabed, including
419. 1 A. SuLowrrz, supra note 5, at 239.
420. For a discussion of the problems of national control over territorial waters and
the right of innocent passage see M. McDouGrAL & W. BuRKE, ThB PuBLIC ORDEt OF
TmE OcEANs 196-282 (1962). See also The Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 8; C.
FEN icK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 468-69 (4th ed. 1965).
421. See generally 1 A. SmLowrrz, supra note 5, at 31-65; Gross, supra note 418,
at 646-69.
422. E.g., Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15 (1935); Ap-
pleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 381 (1926); Port of Seattle v. Oregon &
W.R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 8 (1906); Hardin
v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1894);
Knight v. United States Lands Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); McCready v. Virginia,
94 U.S. 391, 394 (1876); Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57,
66 (1873); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845); Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366, 410 (1842).
423. Hanna, The Submerged Lands Cases, 3 BAYLOR L. Rv. 201, 209 (1951); Met-
calfe, The Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal Prob-
lem, 4 SmAcusE L. REv. 39, 41 (1952).
424. S.J. Res. 208, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); E. BARTLEY, TIu TIDELANDS OIL
CoNTRovERsY, 95-158 (1953); Metcalfe, supra note 423, at 40-59; Note, 29 U. C-lr.
L. Rav. 510, 511-12 (1960); see Comment, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Ti-
tle in Submerged Lands of the Continental Shelf, 56 YA.LE L.J. 356 (1947).
425. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
426. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). For an analysis of the California case see E. BARTLEY,
supra note 424, at 59-78; 1 A. SHALowrrz, supra note 5, at 3-10; Hanna, The Submerged
Land Cases, 3 STAN. L. Rv. 193, 196-209 (1951); Comment, United States v. Califor-
nia: Paramount Rights of the Federal Government in Submerged Coastal Lands, 26
TEXAS L. REv. 304 (1948).
427, See E. BARTLEY, supra note 424, at 247-73,
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oil.428 The Court reasoned that the constitutional responsibilities of
the federal government over foreign affairs required that its paramount
powers in the marginal sea be recognized.429 The claims of Louisi-
ana 430 and Texas41 to adjacent submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico
were rejected for similar reasons.
As a result of pressure from the affected coastal states,4 32 Con-
gress in 1953 passed the Submerged Lands Act4 3 that relinquished to
certain states the federal government's interest in all submerged lands
in the marginal sea within state boundaries. 3 4 Under the provisions
of the statute, state boundaries were to be those existing at the time
of admission into the union.435  However, state boundaries approved
by Congress prior to the Act were also confirmed. Moreover, any state
was allowed to extend its seaward boundary to three miles.43 6  The
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act4 " provided for the administration
of submerged lands, seaward of state boundaries, that remained under
the control of the federal government.38
The constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act was upheld in
1954, 4 9 but the Supreme Court did not interpret the legislation until
it decided United States v. Louisiana4 0 in 1960. In this case the fed-
eral government claimed all submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico
428. 322 U.S. at 38-39.
429. Hanna, supra note 426, at 204. The Court suggested that jurisdiction over the
marginal sea had been created solely as an aspect of federal sovereignty and reflected
an assertion of national rather than local interests. Since this extension had taken place
after the formation of the Union, the original states derived no rights in the marginal
sea as an attribute of their sovereignty. 332 U.S. at 32-35. The equal footing doctrine
required that subsequently admitted states relinquish any claims to the marginal sea
based on their pre-admission boundaries. Gross, supra note 418, at 640-41.
430. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); E. BARTLEY, supra note 424,
at 195-212.
431. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); Hanna, supra note 426, at 209-
18.
432. Metcalfe, supra note 423, at 64-89.
433. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
434. See generally 1 A. SuALowrrz, supra note 5, at 115-80.
435. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970).
436. Id.; Gross, supra note 418, at 644.
437. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970); 1 A. SIL4JowlTz, supra note 5, at 181-99;
Christopher, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L.
Rnv. 23 (1953).
438. The claims of federal government vis-k-vis other nations with respect to
development of the resources of the outer continental shelf are outside the scope of this
article. See 1 A. SHALowrrz, supra note 5, at 371-77.
439. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). The Court stated that "[the power
of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States 'is vested
in Congress without limitation."' Id.
440. 363 U.S, 1 (1960). Svv 1 A. SsAIow=rz, supra note 5, at 10-43,
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more than three geographical miles441 from the coast of the respective
Gulf Coast states. The states claimed coastal boundaries of three
marine leagues or more. The Court declared that a state's claim must
be based on "'its constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State
became a member of the Union' "442 and that such a claim must also
be recognized by Congress in admitting the state to the Union. Thus
the Court declined to rule that preadmission boundaries, by themselves,
met the requirements of the Submerged Lands Act.448 Accordingly,
the Court held that the coastal boundaries of Louisiana, Alabama and
Mississippi extended only three geographical miles beyond the mean
low water line.444  However, the Court did recognize the claims of
Texas44 5 and Florida440 to coastal boundaries of three marine leagues
in the Gulf of Mexico.
While the major coastal boundary questions have apparently been
settled with respect to the Pacific and Gulf coastal states, the states
along the Atlantic coast recently have laid claim to vast areas of the
seabed on the basis of their colonial charters. 4417  The coastal states
have asserted that the three mile limit provisions of the Submerged
Land Act were not applicable to them. As successors in title to Eng-
land or its grantees, they have exercised dominion and control over the
marginal sea along their coastlines since the colonial period and never
surrendered this authority to the federal government. The federal
441. One English statute or land mile equals about 0.87 marine, nautical or geo-
graphical mile. The "three-mile limit" of international law refers to three marine miles,
or approximately 3.45 land miles. 363 U.S. at 17 n.15. A marine league is cqual to
three geographical miles. 2 A. SHA.owrrz, supra note 5, at 580.
442. 363 U.S. at 29, quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970).
443. Henri, The Atlantic States' Claim to Offshore Oil Rights: United States v.
Maine, 2 ENVIRON. AFFms 827, 831 (1972).
444. The act of admission with respect to Louisiana had described the boundaries
of the state as "including all islands within three leagues of the coast." 2 Stat. 702
(1812). Similar clauses in their respective acts of admission described the boundaries
of Alabama and Mississippi as "including all islands within six leagues of shore." 3
Stat. 490 (1819) (Alabama); 3 Stat. 348 (1817) (Mississippi). The states had argued
that this language implied that all waters between such islands and the mainland were
included within their coastal boundaries. The Court, however, held that the states were
only entitled to a three-mile belt around the mainland and the islands. 363 U.S. at 66-
83; Gross, supra note 418, at 644.
445. 363 U.S. at 36-65; 1 A. SHA.owrrz, supra note 5, at 136-40. The Court deter-
mined that the annexation resolution of 1845, 5 Stat. 797 (1845), had recoguized a mar-
itime boundary of three leagues for Texas. See Gross, supra note 418, at 642 n.21;
Henri, supra note 443, at 836 n.29.
446. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). The Court found that upon
Florida's readmission to the Union after the Civil War, 15 Stat. 73 (1868), Congress
had approved a new state constitution which included a coastal boundary of three
marine leagues.
447. See generally Henri, supra note 443; Flaherty, supra note 45.
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government, on the other hand, has maintained that the 1947 Califor-
nia decision controls. At stake are oil and natural gas deposits esti-
mated to be as large as those in the Gulf.4 In 1969 the federal govern-
ment invoked -the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve
the dispute.44 19  The case has not yet been decided although a special
master, appointed by the Court, recommended in August 1974 that the
claims of the states be disallowed.
The Submerged Lands Act provides that the three mile limit be-
gins at the "coastline," defined as "the line of ordinary low water along
that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea
and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters .... ,,450
Accordingly, the proposals discussed subsequently in the article are rel-
evant to federal-state coastal boundaries, as well as those of private
landowners.49 1
IV. A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO SHORELINE BOUNDARIES
A. A Proposed Model Act
Two years ago, at the request of the Florida Department of
Natural Resources, the authors commenced work on proposed legisla-
tion to authorize a permanent program of coastal mapping in that
State.452 With the assistance of personnel from NOAA and NOS,45
a bill was produced, which was subsequently enacted into law as the
"Florida Coastal Mapping Act of 1974."4154 From the very beginning,
448. One commentator estimates that the Atlantic seabed contains 5.5 billion bar-
rels of oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of gas, and 1.1 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.
Henri, supra note 443, at 828.
449. United States v. Maine, 395 U.S. 955 (1969).
450. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1970).
451. There are many complex problems associated with demarcation of coastal
boundaries under the Submerged Lands Act as well as under international law, particu-
larly in the case of bays, rivers and inlets. See generally United States v. California,
381 U.S. 139 (1965). Since these problems involve a federal question, they were not
treated in the Model Act, which operates only at the state level. Shalowitz, Boundary
Problems Raised by the Submerged Lands Act, 54 CoLUm. L. Ruv. 1021 (1954).
452. The history of the present NOS-Florida coastal mapping program is discussed
in text accompanying notes 584-85 infra.
453. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Hugh Dolan, Chairman,
Board of Appeals, Department of Commerce; Commander Wesley Hull, Chief, Coastal
Mapping Division, NOS; Cal Thurlow, Chief, Tides Division, NOS; Carl Johnson, Gen-
eral Counsel's Office, NOAA; Captain Jack Guth, Coastal Mapping Coordinator,
Florida Department of Natural Resources; Colonel Jervey Kelly, Administrative Assist-
ant, Florida Department of Natural Resources; and Fred Waldinger, Assistant to Coastal
Mapping Coordinator, Florida Department of Natural Resources, for their comments
and suggestions regarding the content of the Model Act.
454. Ch. 74-56, [1974] Fla. Laws 34. -
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however, it was felt that the proposed act might serve as a model for
use in other coastal states.455
The proposed statute contains three major elements. First, it
provides a precise definition of the "mean high water line" and declares
it to be the boundary between privately-owned upland and state-owned
sovereignty submerged lands in coastal areas. Secondly, it sets forth
the required procedures for the determination of tidal datums including
mean high water and regulates the methods by which surveyors can
locate the mean high water line on the ground. Finally the proposed
act authorizes the implementation of a continuing program of coastal
boundary mapping.
The Act is to be administered by an existing state agency with
jurisdiction in natural resources, coastal zone management or related
areas.456 The agency is authorized to coordinate the efforts of all pub-
lic and private organizations engaged in tidal survey or coastal mapping
activities. 45 It may also assist courts, legislative bodies and administra-
tive agencies and provide them with information regarding tidal surveys
or coastal boundary determinations.45 8 Moreover, the agency is em-
powered to compile permanent records of tidal surveys and maps of
the state's coastal areas,459 to collect and preserve appropriate sur-
vey data from coastal areas,4 0 and to act as a public repository for
copies of coastal maps.461
In addition to these record keeping and research functions, the
agency is vested with considerable regulatory authority under the pro-
visions of the Model Act. The agency's regulatory powers will be dis-
cussed below. 462
455. The Model Act is unique. No comparable statute or administrative regulation
was discovered although the laws of twenty-eight states were researched and the appro-
priate administrative agencies in all of these states were contacted for assistance. More-
over, the laws of eleven coastal European nations were checked without obtaining any
significant help. This research is reproduced in F. Maloney & R. Ausness, The Proposed
Florida Coastal Mapping Act and Its Relationship to Coastal Boundary Determination
and Coastal Management in Florida 77-83 (1973) (unpublished report to Legislature
of Florida on file with Florida Department of Natural Resources).
456. Model Act § 5(1). The Florida act is administered by the Department of
Natural Resources. Ch. 74-56, § 5(1), [1974] Fla. Laws 36. Specific references to
Florida or to the Department of Natural Resources have been omitted. All significant
differences between the Florida statute and the Model Act will be mentioned or discuS-
sed in the footnotes.
457. Model Act § 5(2) (a).
458. Id. § 5(2)(c).
459. Id. § 5(2)(e).
460. Id. § 5(2)(g).
461. Id. § 5(2)(h).
462, Yep wxt accompanying notes 577-79 infra,
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Finally, the Model Act contains thirty-one definitions,46 3 either
taken verbatim from NOS publications" 4 or reviewed for technical
accuracy by NOS personnel. Twenty-one of these definitions are em-
ployed in the statute itself,465 while the remainder are included for pos-
sible use by the agency in its rules and regulations.4 66
B. Legislative Recognition of the Mean High Water Line
One of the primary objectives of the Model Act is to define public
and private property boundaries as precisely as possible. Accordingly,
section 4 declares the mean high water line to be the usual limit of
private ownership in coastal areas. The proposed act defines "mean
high water" as "the average height of the high water over a nineteen-
year period; or for a shorter period of observations, the average height
of the high waters after corrections are applied to eliminate known
variations and to reduce the result to the equivalent of a mean nine-
teen-year value."4 7  The "mean high water line" is "the intersection
of the tidal plane of mean high water with the shore.1466
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Borax
Consolidated Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles,4"9 discussed earlier, provides
the legal justification for the use of a "mean high water line" as a prop-
erty line in the Model Act. While the older common-law standard
is vague and uncertain, the mean high water line standard utilized in
the Act has an accepted scientific meaning. In addition, since it is used
by NOS, both governmental agencies and private property owners can
make use of NOS survey data in locating their own boundaries.
States which recognize the low water mark as the boundary be-
tween upland and submerged land470 may substitute for section 4 a pro-
463. Model Act § 3.
464. These publications include H. MARmnn, supra note 77; P. ScHURBmAN, supra
note 76; 2 A. SHALOWIrZ, supra note 5.
465. These include "agency," "apparent shoreline," "approved coastal zone map,"
"comparison of simultaneous observations," "control tide station," "datum," "datum
plan," "foreshore," "geodetic bench mark," "local tidal datum," "mean high water,"
"mean high-water line," "mean low water," "mean low-water line," "mean range differ-
ence," "national map accuracy standards," "tidal bench mark," "tidal datum," "tide,"
"tide station," and "time difference."
466. These include "demarcation" "diurnal tides," "interpolated water elevation,"
"leveling," "mixed tide," "nineteen-year tidal cycle," "nonperiodic forces," "photogram-
metry," "semidiumal tides," and "tidal day."
467. Model Act § 3(15).
468. Id. § 3(16).
469. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
470. E.g., Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania
and Virginia.
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vision declaring the mean low water line to be the correct standard.
Both "mean low water" 4 1 and "mean low water line"4 7 are defined
in the statute. Moreover, because of their significance in the demarca-
tion of federal-state boundaries under the Submerged Lands Act,478
mean low water datums are routinely determined by NOS and can,
therefore, conveniently be represented on approved coastal zone
maps.474
As previously discussed, even in high water jurisdictions, the mean
high water line does not always constitute the boundary between public
and private lands. These also include, for example, grants of sub-
merged lands by the state as well as grants by foreign powers or the
federal government prior to statehood. Accordingly, such exceptions
to this general rule must be taken into account by any legislation which
purports to establish coastal boundaries.
Therefore, language in section 4 recognizes that some states have
made valid grants of submerged land to private landowners under
various reclamation and improvement statutes.475 The Model Act de-
clares that no provision "shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of state
ownership of sovereignty submerged lands, nor shall any provision of
this act be deemed to impair the title to privately-owned submerged
lands validly alienated by the state or its legal predecessors. '47 0  This
language avoids any questions concerning the validity of land grants
prior to statehood. Grants of submerged lands below the mean high
water line by foreign powers477 or the federal government478 have been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court and could not, therefore,
be invalidated unilaterally by state legislation.
Another exception to the general rule may occur for tidal flats,
inlets and bays. In some states all tidal waters are considered navi-
471. "Mean low water" is "the average height of the low waters over a nineteen-
year period; or for shorter periods of observations, the average height of low waters after
corrections are applied to eliminate known variations and to reduce the result to the
equivalent of a mean nineteen-year value." Model Act § 3 (17).
472. The "mean low water line" is defined as "the intersection of the tidal plane
of mean low water with the shore." Id. § 3(18).
473. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
474. Both the mean low water line and the mean high water line appear on maps
produced in connection with the NOS-Florida coastal mapping program.
475. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 253.121 (1967); see F. MALoNBY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDwIN,
supra note 7, §§ 120-28.
476. Model Act § 4(1).
477. Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); City of San Fran.
cisco v. LeRoy, 138 U.S. 656 (1891).
478. Shively v. Bowiby, 152 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1894). See also United States v.
Alaska, 423 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1970) (fresh water lake).
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gable, while other states treat tidal waters as navigable only if they are
navigable in fact.479 The qualifying phase "along the shores of land im-
mediately bordering on navigable waters" is recommended for use in
such states.48 °
Finally, the Model Act fully recognizes the ambulatory nature of
coastal boundaries. 48' Section 4(2) states that nothing in the Act is
intended to modify the common law with respect to the legal effects
of accretion, reliction, erosion or avulsion. The mean high water line
as mapped must of necessity represent the boundary at a given point
in time. Where shoreline alteration occurs, although the elevation of
mean high water remains constant and determinable by survey, the
physical boundary will shift, and will no longer correspond to the line
represented on the map. Thus, the Act does not attempt to "freeze"
property lines as of the date of the map.
C. Coastal Surveys
In most jurisdictions the mean high water line is the recognized
boundary between state-owned submerged lands and privately-owned
upland property in coastal areas.48 1  Until recently, however, deter-
mining the exact location of the mean high water line was not consid-
ered important by the public and was consequently neglected by the
engineering and surveying professions.4 8 In the absence of a scientifi-
cally accurate delineation, a number of methods were utilized to ap-
proximate the actual location of the mean high water line. While these
procedures were perhaps adequate for some purposes, the results ob-
tained were often arbitrary and inaccurate. 4 4  Recent demands, how-
ever, for coastal property have accentuated the need for more precise
demarcation of coastal boundaries.48 5 In addition, public recognition
of the ecological value of the coastal zone and the need for the con-
479. See Part 111 B(2) (b) (ii) supra.
480. Model Act § 4(1) would then read: "The mean-high water line along the
shores of land immediately bordering on navigable waters is recognized and declared to
be the boundary between the foreshore owned by the state in its sovereign capacity and
upland subject to private ownership...." (emphasis added).
481. See Part III B(3) supra.
482. 3 AMERtCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.27 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952); Comment,
Fluctuating Shorelines and Tidal Boundaries: An Unresolved Problem, 6 SAN DIno L.
Ruv. 447, 455 (1969).
483. Guth, supra note 6, at 33.
484. The use of geodetic levels in determining tidal elevations is an example.
485. Presentation of Rear Admiral Allen Powell, Director NOS, to Congressman
Bob Sikes, May 3, 1974 [hereinafter cited as A. Powell].
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servation of the nation's marine resources486 has reinforced the need
for a more reliable methodology for coastal surveys.4 s7 In response
to this need, the Model Act requires the agency to "develop uniform
specifications and regulations for tidal surveying and mapping in coastal
areas of the state. 488
(1) Determination of Tidal Datums
(a) Local tidal datums
A significant aspect of a tidal datum as a marine boundary is the
accuracy and consistency of its recoverability.489 A well-established
tidal datum, when referenced to permanent monuments such as tidal
bench marks, is readily available for the surveyor to use for demarcat-
ing the shoreline. Even when these marks are destroyed, it is possible
to recover the same datum with remarkable accuracy from a short series
of tidal observations. 490
In the past, however, surveyors assumed that mean sea level was
a uniform elevation along the entire coast line of the United States.49'
Therefore, once a vertical datum for the mean high tide was established
by a control 'tide station, this value was taken inland and leveled 92 by
conventional methods along a road or other suitable surface until the
property in question was reached. Then the mean high water value
would be located on the shore.498
A mean high tide level, however, is not actually a uniform level.
Instead it is an undulating line that varies from point to point. As a
result, the intersection of a mean high tide with the land connects points
of differing elevation and forms a vertically undulating line. A mean
high tide line must not, therefore, be regarded as a contour line.40 4 It
486. See generally D. Hoon, I PINGEumNT OF MAN ON Tm OcEAxqs (1971); W.
MATr-EWs, F. SMrrH & E. GOLDBERG, MAN's IMPACT ON TERRERiuAL AND OCFANIC
ECOSYSTEMS (1971); B. KETCHum, supra note 1.
487. Guth, supra note 6, at 33-34.
488. Model Act § 5(2) (f).
489. Recovery is the process of finding local tidal datums by reference to permanent
tidal benchmarks. This process also insures that the datum can be verified. See H.
MARMER, supra note 77, at 24-25.
490. A. Powell, supra note 485, at 4.
491. 2 A. SHALowrz, supra note 5, at 62-63 n.49.
492. For a description of leveling see H. RAPPLEYE, MANUAL OF GEODIMC LEVEL-
ING (U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey Spec. Pub. No. 239, 1948).
493. See 2 A. SHALowiz, supra note 5, at 48-49, 62-63, 173-75.
494. Guth, supra note 6, at 35; Ordnance Survey, High and Low Water Marks as
shown on Ordnance Survey Maps, Leaflet No. 5 (OS 705), 1 3, July 1970 (Great Brit-
ain). "Contour" is defined as "an imaginary line on the ground all points of which
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follows that a method for accurately determining coastal boundaries
must be based on local tidal datums. Moreover, because of the un-
dulating nature of tidal elevations, -the survey must proceed from the
water side to the land instead of vice versa. Consequently, the land
based method described above is not acceptable to NOS nor allowed
under the Model Act.495
Because of the inadequacies of a mean high water line established
by leveling methods, NOS has developed a more accurate procedure
which utilizes local tidal datums.49 6 First, a tidal benchmark is placed
in the area where a long-term control tide is to be located. The tidal
benchmark 4 7 is a fixed point to which the tidal datum from the station
can be referred. Next, a nineteen-year tide station is set up in the vi-
cinity of the tidal benchmark and tide levels are referenced -to it for this
period. A nineteen-year period of tidal observations is required to
cover all of the tidal cycles. 498  The Model Act, however, would not
require nineteen-year observations by private persons. This responsi-
bility has been assumed by NOS. At the present time there are 130
control tide stations located along the entire American coastline.4 99
These stations comprise the "National Tide Observation Network."500
However, it has been estimated that an additional seventy stations are
needed in order to obtain sufficient data for the accurate mapping of
coastal boundaries. 501
are at the same elevation above a specified datum surface." 2 A. SHALOWnZ, supra
note 5, at 556.
495. Section 15 of the Model Act states that geodetic bench marks shall not be used
unless approved by the agency. Geodetic bench marks are based on a transcontinental
leveling based on the Mean Sea Level Datum of 1929 (redesignated in 1973 as NGVD-
National Geodetic Vertical Datum) and do not necessarily reflect the local mean high
water elevation. Guth, supra note 6, at 35. Therefore, they may be used only when
NOS or the agency supplies a correction factor so that they may be related to the local
tidal datum.
496. A. Powell, supra note 485, at 3-4; NOS, Federal-State Mapping Series, Map
No. TP-00143 (Fla.-NOAA Coastal Boundary Mapping Program 1973) [hereinafter
cited as NOS Map].
497. Information on local tidal elevations is preserved by brass disks which may be
sunk into concrete monuments. H. MARmMin, supra note 77, at 24; see Model Act §
3(26).
498. For description of tide gauges used to record observations over a period of
months see H. MAxRmR, supra note 77, at 26-28.
499. A. Powell, supra note 485, at 3.
500. Id. at 3.
501. Id. at 3-5. The information provided by these control tide stations enables
NOS to calculate the following vertical datums: (1) mean high water; (2) mean low
water; and( 3) mean water level. From these vertical datums the following horizontal
components can be located: (1) mean high water line; (2) mean low water line; and
(3) mean water level line.
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In areas, such as bays and estuaries, where topographic and hydro-
graphic conditions affect the tidal pattern, additional tide stations must
be established. Tidal observations must be taken at these stations for
at least twelve months in order to average out seasonal variations and
short-term meteorological effects."' -  The information obtained from
these twelve-month tide stations is then compared with the nearest
control tide station data and corrected to an appropriate nineteen-year
value.50 3 As a general rule, twelve-month stations are maintained by
governmental agencies, such as NOS, rather than by private individuals.
The elevation of mean high water in areas between long-term tide
stations may be obtained by installation and observation of tide gauges
for thirty day periods at such locations. The data obtained from these
stations must be referred back through the twelve-month tide stations
to the control tide station data and corrected to the appropriate nine-
teen-year values. In addition, tidal datums obtained from all types of
tide stations should be referenced to permanent monuments to assure
accurate and consistent recovery by field surveyors. 0 4
NOS and other governmental agencies utilize thirty-day tide sta-
tions as part of their coastal mapping activities; the Model Act would
require private parties to employ these procedures also in order to
determine local tidal elevations. This procedure is described and
authorize in section 14 of the Act.505  While this method may be
somewhat expensive, it is generally the only way to establish the correct
local tidal datum and thus insure an accurate determination of the
coastal boundary.
In some cases, however, a cheaper and less time-consuming proce-
dure can be utilized without breaching acceptable standards of ac-
curacy. This approach, known as "interpolated water elevation" or
IWE method, is also allowed with the consent of the agency. 00 An
interpolated water elevation (1WE) point is a local mean high water
elevation determined by interpolation from established datums at two
adjacent tide stations. 50 7  IWE points can be established by transfer,
502. Id. at 4.
503. There are two methods utilized to correct tidal datum obtained from short-time
observation to nineteen-year tidal datum: (1) comparison of simultaneous observations;
(2) correction by tabular values. The first method is generally more satisfactory. Both
methods are described in detail in H. MARmER, supra note 77, at 87-95.
504. Tidal bench marks provide the means for recovering datums determined from
tidal observation. Id. at 24.
505. ModelAct §§ 14(1)-(2).
506. Id. §§ 14(3)-(6).
507. Id. § 3(12).
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provided that the shoreline characteristics between the adjacent 'tide
stations are similar and uninterrupted. In addition, time and range dif-
ferences must be within acceptable limits.5"'
(b) Mean high and mean higher *high water datums
While the mean high water datum normally reflects an average
of all daily high tides, problems may arise where certain tidal character-
istics are encountered. There are three types of tide: daily, semidaily
and mixed.510  A tide is considered to be daily or diurnal when only
one high and one low water occur within a single tidal day.510 In a
semidaily or semidiurnal tide, two complete tidal cycles take place so
that there are two high and two low waters each tidal day.5'1 There
is little diurnal inequality, however, associated with a semidaily tide.
Diurnal inequality refers to differences in height between correspond-
ing morning and afternoon tides.512  In a mixed tide, two high and two
low waters occur within a single tidal day, but there is also significant
diurnal inequality. 513  This inequality may arise with respect to the
high waters, low waters, or both.514
Since "mean high water" is the average height of the high waters
over a nineteen-year period, there is no difficulty in calculating the
mean high water elevation when only one high water occurs during a
particular day. However, when -two high waters occur, as in the case
of semidaily and mixed tides, a determination must be made whether
508. Until experience establishes better guidelines, the time difference between adja-
cent tide datums should not exceed ten minutes, and the range difference between adja-
cent tide datums should not exceed ten percent. See Guth, supra note 6, at 5.
509. See Part UI A supra.
510. The Model Act § 3(9) defines "diurnal tides" as "tides having a period or
cycle of approximately one tidal day." A "tidal day" is "the time of the rotation of
the earth with respect to the moon, or the interval betwern two successive upper transits
of the moon over the meridian of a place." Id. § 3(28). The usual tidal day is 24
hours and 50 minutes. See H. MARmER, supra note 77, at 9.
511. "Semidiurnal tides" are defined in the Model Act as "tides having a period of
approximately one-half of a tidal day." Model Act § 3(25).
512. See H. MAUMER, supra note 77, at 10.
513. The term "mixed tide" is defined as "the type of tide in which the presence
of a wave is conspicuous by a large inequality in either high or low water heights with
two high waters and two low waters usually occurring each tidal day. The name is usu-
ally applied to the tides intermediate to those predominantly diurnal and those predom-
inantly semidiurnal." Model Act § 3(20). Strictly speaking, all tides contain both
daily and semidaily constituents. In the semidaily type, however, the daily element is
insignificant, while in the daily type, the semidaily influence is minimal, Where the
two constituents are nearly equal, a mixed tide results. H. MAnMER, supra note 77, at
17. NOS has devised mathematical formulas to determine whether a particular tidal
pattern should be classified as daily, semidaily or mixed. Id. at 21-22.
514. H. MAmMER, supra note 77, at 17.
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to include both of the high water levels in the calculation of mean high
water. If only -the higher of the two highs is used, the resulting tidal
datum is "mean higher high." Since this tidal elevation is higher than
one -that would include the lower highs as well, its use in coastal bound-
ary determinations would result in a loss to the upland owner and a
gain to the owner of the submerged bed, usually the state.rls;
Normally it would seem that both high waters should be consid-
ered in determining the mean high water elevation."O An exception
to this principle of using both high waters may be warranted in areas
where one daily tide is predominant, but where mixed tides occur at
certain periods each month. These secondary tides, because of their
small range, are often difficult to measure. Therefore, it has been sug-
gested -that these occasional secondary high waters be ignored when
mean high water is determined.51 7
In some areas where mixed tides occur, predominant diurnal or
semidiurnal tide may not be obvious. The selection of a specific datum
plane in such mixed -tide areas may have to be deferred until adequate
tide data is collected and analyzed. Until such data is established, the
mean higher high water can provide a reliable datum for engineering
and surveying purposes. Although this mean higher high water datum
may not be the boundary between state and private ownership, its use
will protect public lands and prevent possible irreparable encroachment
by private development. For this reason the Florida Coastal Mapping
Coordinator has tentatively decided to map the mean higher high water
line in such areas pending development of sufficient data so that when
appropriate, both high waters can be utilized for purposes of calculating
mean high water.118
(2) Demarcation of the Shoreline
Once the proper tidal elevation is determined, ,the surveyor must
then ascertain the horizontal component. Section 15 states that "the
location of the mean high water line or the mean low water line shall
be determined by methods which are approved by the agency for the
515. The Texas courts have used the mean higher high water line to delimit the
boundaries of Spanish and Mexican land grants made prior to 1836. Luttes v. Texas,
159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958). See also Roberts, supra note 79.
516. H. MARMER, supra note 77, at 86.
517. Id. at 86-87.
518. Telephone conversation between Jack Guth, Coastal Mapping Coordinator,
State of Florida, and F. Maloney, Sept. 6, 1974.
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area concerned." 519 The agency, therefore, must issue detailed regula-
tions to describe acceptable procedures. These will depend on the de-
gree of accuracy required and the shoreline conditions involved.
(a) Survey methodology
There are several methods which can be used to determine coastal
boundaries once the proper tidal datums have been established. For
large-scale coastal mapping infra-red photography is the most appro-
priate method. 520  This approach will be used by NOS to prepare the
approved coastal zone maps authorized by the Model Act. After tidal
datums are established, an airplane is flown over the area to be mapped
at precisely the time when the water is at the level corresponding to the
desired tidal datum. This is accomplished through radio communica-
tion between the aircraft crew and ground personnel at the appropriate
tide station.5 2'
Coastal boundary maps can be produced from these photographs.
The accuracy of these maps depends on both the map scale and -the
photographic scale. Where greater accuracy is required, a field survey
on the ground will be required. Where this method is used, local tidal
datums must be determined, as always, by tidal observations from a
thirty-day tide station or by means of the IWE procedure. After ade-
quate tide datums are established for the specific area, the horizontal
location of mean high water -at specific points on the shore may be ac-
complished by leveling from the -tide stations to points of land in the
immediate area, or preferably by observing the intersection of the
water with the land at mean high tide at these points.52 2  If -the shore
is gently sloping or the bottom uneven, it is particularly important that
the observation of the intersection of the water with the shore be as
close as possible to the tide stations. Once a sufficient number of -these
points are located, they may be joined by appropriate techniques, in-
519. Model Act § 15.
520. Aerial photographic coverage of a mapped area includes both black and white
infrared film exposure and natural color film exposure. The infrared film captures the
land/water interface. W. HULL, supra note 4, at 4.
521. For a detailed description of the actual process of insuring the accuracy of the
aerial photography see id. at 4-6.
522. "At that precise time [mean high tide] when the high water reaches that exact
mark on the staffs on either side you mark the line where the water is-actually where
the water is. So the water does the survey, nothing else." Testimony of J. Guth, In
re Committee Meeting Estero Bay Land Transactions, Committee ou Ntwtral Resources,
at 23$ (Lee County, Fla., Nov. 15, 1973).
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cluding, in suitable cases, aerial photography123 or the use of botanical
data,-5 24 or a combination of both. Leveling over extensive distances
is not an appropriate method of joining such points. 25
(b) Surveys in vegetated areas
Since 'the National Ocean Survey is primarily concerned with navi-
gational charts, it maps only the apparent shoreline 525 in areas where
the mean high water line is obscured by vegetation. The apparent
shoreline is defined as the intersection of the mean high water datum
with the outer limits of vegetation that present to the navigator the ap-
pearance of the shoreline.5 21 Since the mean high water line may
actually be considerably landward of the apparent shoreline 28 in most
areas, the apparent shoreline cannot be used as a property boundary
line.
Recommended NOS survey procedure 29 for establishing the
actual mean high water line in vegetated areas is, when possible, to
physically trace a line on the ground, even though this may involve
wading and staking.580 The density and resistance of marsh and man-
grove stands -to penetration limits the use of line of sight surveying and
also adds to the difficulty of accurately establishing the mean high
water line in heavily vegetated areas.
These difficulties have led to the use of other approaches to estab-
lishing boundary lines in such areas. The least satisfactory has been
the substitution of a fixed line, the meander line, for the actual bound-
ary. The second approach, proposed by some biological scientists, is
to use the vegetation itself to locate the mean high water line.53 1
The meander line has occasionally been used when it is imprac-
tical to locate the actual mean high water line. Meander lines are sur-
veyed lines that run along the edge and usually slightly shoreward of
a body of navigable water to determine the general land area. The
523. See notes 520-21 and accompanying text supra. See also Guth, supra note 6,
at 36.
524. See also Guth, supra note 6, at 36.
525. Telephone conversation, supra note 518.
626. 2 A. SHALowrrz, supra note 5, at 177-82. See also NOS Map, supra note 496.
527. Model Act § 3(2).
528. 2 A. SHALowrrz, supra note 5, at 177.
529. NOS Map, supra note 496.
530. Id. E.g., Guss, Tidelands Management Mapping for the Coastal Plains Re-
gion, 1972 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. Soc'y oF PHOTOoRAMMMY 251, 256 (Fall Con-
vention).
531. 2 A. SHAt.owrrz, supra note 5, at 450.
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meander line of a particular piece of land will be a straight line or
a series of straight lines connecting points or monuments on the
shore. 32 Generally, unless a clear intent to make the meander line
the boundary is shown, the water's edge is the actual boundary of
meandered property. 3 3 However, there are situations, as exemplified
by Udall v. Oelschlaeger,"3 ' in which boundaries of federal public do-
main lands are defined by reference to the meander line rather than
by reference to tidal datums.
The Oelschlaeger decision involved federal lands located near the
Alaskan seacoast. The case arose out of the government's refusal to
approve the plaintiff's application for a patent under the federal home-
stead legislation. According to the government, the land in question
had been previously withdrawn from entry by Department of Interior
Public Land Order 576 that purported to withdraw from appropriation
an area "parallel to and one mile distant from the line of mean high
tide of Turnagain Arm," a tidal inlet. The Interior Department con-
strued "the line of mean high tide' in the Order to mean the meander
line, while the plaintiff maintained that the term referred to the mean
high water line as defined by the Supreme Court in Borax Consolidated
Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles.535
The lower court remanded the matter to the Department of the In-
terior with directions to utilize the Borax standard. On appeal, however,
the court of appeals reversed, holding that the Interior Department's
use of the line of "mean high tide" intended to refer to the meander
line.530 According to the court, the Department's interpretation was
controlling for purposes of identifying the lands affected by its with-
532. Den v. Spalding, 39 Cal. App. 2d 623, 625, 104 P.2d 81, 83 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1940). See also 2 A. SuHALowrrz, supra note 5, at 450.
533. Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 414 (1891); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,
380 (1891). The general statement of the rule is that "a meander line may constitute
a boundary where so intended or where the discrepancies between the meander line and
the ordinary high water line leave an excess of unsurveyed land so great as clearly and
palpably to indicate fraud or mistake." Lopez v. Smith, 145 So. 2d 509, 515 (Fla.
1962).
534. 389 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
535. 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
536. The land involved had not been surveyed. The area just to the north, however,
had been surveyed and the points on that survey were used to define the area to be with.
drawn. Public Land Order 576 described one of the boundaries of the withdrawn area
as "Northwesterly, 11 miles along line of mean high tide of Turnagain Arm to meander
corner on south boundary of section 32, T.12 N, P. 3W." According to the court,
"Since the area to the north had been surveyed by the running of a meander line on
its seaward side, the use of the base point of the 'meander corner' suggests that with-
drawal order contemplated a continuance of the meander line down the coast'to the
south." 389 F.2d at 976.
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Courts have on occasion declared the meander line to be the prop-
erty boundary where the water line was obscured by mangrove in
cases in which the state presented no evidence as to the location of the
mean high water line. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v.
Wetstone53 8 involved an island meandered under the original govern-
ment patent. The Florida Supreme Court, reasoning that it is the
State's duty to establish the boundary between private and sovereignty
lands, accepted the meander line as the boundary.5 39 Decisions such
as this should encourage the state -to develop an accurate coastal map-
ping system, to avoid jeopardizing large areas of state-owned tide-
land.540
In Alaska, in a trespass case, the meander line was presumed sub-
stantially to indicate an obscured mean high water line.64 1 It is
interesting to note that the court did not hold that the meander line
would be presumed the boundary for title purposes; there was no
implication that the State would relinquish its claim to the tideland be-
537. The court held that it must defer to the Secretary of the Interior's interpreta-
tion of his own regulations so long as that interpretation was not plainly unreasonable
or unauthorized:
The question for us, therefore, as it was for the District Court, is not whether
plausible grounds can be advanced for each of the contending constructions,
but whether the one espoused by the Secretary is beyond the bounds of reason-
ableness. If it is not, his view prevails, even though appellee's arguments are
not without substance. This precedence derives from the rights which appropri-
ately go with the great official responsibilities inherent in the administration
of the public lands. We recognize them here.
389 F.2d at 976.
538. 222 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1969).
539. The State, in fact, offered no evidence as to the boundary line. Id. at 11.
Pointing out that the meander line was in places several hundred feet offshore in navi-
gable waters, the dissent argued that the state had no authority to convey sovereignty
lands except in the public interest. Id. at 14-19.
540. This decision gives the owner of property abutting tidelands two choices of a
boundary line. If his meander line is shoreward of the mean high water line he can
claim the mean high water line as the boundary. If, conversely, the meander line lies
seaward of the mean high water line, he might be able to show that, owing to the lack
of survey data, tide gauging stations and tidal bench marks, the old meander line should
be the boundary of his property. See Florida First Nat'l Bank v. Trustees of Internal
Improvement Fund, 36 Fla. Supp. 42 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County 1971); Maddox v. Trus-
tees of Internal Improvement Fund, 37 Fla. Supp. 73 (Cir. Ct. Sarasota County 1970).
For a criticism of the Wetstone decision see Note, 1 FLA. ST. L. REv., supra note 362,
at 634-38.
541. Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc., 410 P.2d 992 (Alas. 1966). The pur.
pose of the presumption was to determine whether a trespass had occurred in fact on
certain private property. Since the trespass consisted of fill and road construction that
had obliterated the actual water line, the court felt that it was unfair to require the prop-
erty owner to produce evidence of the actual boundary.
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low the mean high water line because of the difficulty of locating the
actual boundary.2 2
Use of the meander line as an alternative to the mean high water
line presents both practical and legal problems. The meander line may
be highly inaccurate, reflecting errors in surveying or failing to reflect
changes in the shoreline since the original survey. 4 3 If the meander
line is seaward of the mean high water line the state may lose owner-
ship and control of a valuable resource, while if the line is significantly
shoreward of the mean high water line -the riparian owner may lose
some of his valuable riparian rights. 44
Legally the meander line may be unacceptable as a standard
boundary line because the private owner may not be deprived of his
riparian rights to accretion without due process. Since meander lines
do not fluctuate with changes in water levels or land contours, they are
analogous to the type of fixed boundary attempted to be established
by the State of Washington before such boundaries were declared un-
constitutional in the Hughes and Washington decisions. 45 It is con-
stitutionally questionable whether a fixed boundary along a coast could
be established by a state, at least insofar as the boundary adversely af-
fects the riparian owner.5 46
A meander line seaward of the mean high water line, however,
may constitute a legal boundary. Washington has consistently recog-
542. Id.
543. A dramatic demonstration of the consequences of such an error is a series of
legal events involving lands abutting Estero Bay, Florida. Following the Wetstone de-
cision a complaint was filed to determine the boundary line and to quiet title to large
quantities of mangrove-covered land in the Bay. Windsor v. Trustees of Internal Im-
provement Fund, No. 69-649 (Cir. Ct. Lee County, Fla., filed June 18, 1969). Claim-
ing that the property consisted of mangrove swamp areas and that the mean high tide
line could not be located with any real precision, the claimant offered two alternatives:
(1) that the original federal government surveyed meander line be accepted as the
boundary; (2) that the vegetation line be accepted as the boundary. The original
meander line was obviously in error, crossing as it did stretches of navigable water and
purporting to include large areas of sovereignty land in the original grant. Rather than
risk the issue in court, the State settled with the landowner by conveying to him substan-
tial amounts of sovereignty land in exchange for land under the open water of the bay.
Settlement Agreement, Windsor v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, No. 69-649
(Cir. Ct. Lee County, Dec. 8, 1970). A lawsuit has recently been filed by the Florida
Secretary of Agriculture joined by a local conservation organization to attempt to set
aside a deed from the State to Windsor based on the Settlement Agreement. Lee
County Conservation Ass'n v. State, No. 74-1476 (Cir. Ct. Leon County, Fla., Aug. 19,
1974).
544. See Part Il A supra.
545. See text accompanying notes 355-69 supra.
546. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973). Bonelli would appear
to establish that the boundary of any property abutting on lands involved in the Sub-
pnerged Lands Act is a federal questign, Se( text .ccompanyin notes 379-81 suprm,
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nized meander lines seaward of the mean high water line as the bound-
ary line of upland property conveyed by government grant prior to
statehood. 54 7  Washington's rule relies upon the theory that the State
is free to convey its sovereignty land as it wishes.5 8 The validity of
this approach in other states, however, would depend upon their
concept of the public trust doctrine. Since that doctrine is regarded
as a judicial restraint on the power of the legislature to alienate tide-
lands except in the public interest,5 49 the courts should be much less
likely to recognize meander line boundaries which in effect give away
sovereignty submerged lands.
Thus, the meander line does not appear to be a reasonable substi-
tute for the mean high water line as a general rule. There is far too
much at stake, given the contemporary value of the tidelands, to allow
the desire for a simple solution to outweigh the need for a state to pre-
serve its control over its natural resources.
A more promising approach may be to locate the mean high water
line by the use of botanical data. In some areas the distribution of the
types of vegetation makes it possible to establish a line approximating
the mean high water line. With respect to fresh water boundaries, the
line devoid of vegetation has been used as a test for the line of ordi-
nary water.550 A similar test, establishing a line below which terrestrial
vegetation does not grow, has occasionally been used to establish the
tidal boundary.551 The problem in the marshes and mangrove stands
is more complicated, however, since the vegetation involved grows in
salt water and does not leave a clean bare line at the water's edge. Pro-
posed tests for determining the mean high water line in these areas
547. See, e.g., Mercer Island Beach Club v. Pugh, 53 Wash. 2d 450, 334 P.2d 534
(1959).
548. Washington interprets the "disclaimer" clause of its Constitution, WASH.
CoNsr. art. 17, § 2, as relinquishing all interest in tidelands patented before statehood.
Cogswell v. Forrest, 14 Wash. 1, 43 P. 1098 (1896); Scurry v. Jones, 4 Wash. 468, 30
P. 726 (1892). This rule has been applied only in cases involving Puget Sound, bays,
lakes and waters treated as bays. Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia-Pacific Towing
Corp., 78 Wash. 2d 975, 482 P.2d 769, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971) and cases
cited therein.
549. Note, Maryland's Wetlands: The Legal Quagmire, 30 MD. L. Rnv. 240, 261
(1970). See Sax, supra note 20, at 557-65.
550. Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 380 (1851); United States v.
Claridge, 279 F. Supp. 87 (D. Ariz. 1967); Willis v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 99 (s.
D.W. Va. 1943); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890);
Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720 (1959); Diana Shooting Club v.
Hursting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
551. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Hawaii 1973); Harkins v. Del
Pozzi, 50 Wash. 2d 237, 310 P.2d 532 (1957); cf. Begnaud v. Grubb & Hawkins, 209
La. 826, 25 So. 2d 606 (1946) (using cypress growth to determine navigable waters).
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are based on the salt-water tolerances of varieties of marsh grasses 552
and mangroves.553 Some claim that mapping of a marsh by aerial
photography, delineating the limits of the various grasses, will show the
mean high water line with greater accuracy than a field survey.5
There has been no similar claim that the varieties of mangrove can be
distinguished by aerial photography.
Such vegetation tests have not been fully accepted as evidence by
the courts. One New York court has used marsh grass growths to
determine the general area in which the average high water line could
be found.ess However, the court noted -that the grasses react to a
change in tidal patterns over a period of several growing seasons. 550 If
this is true, the vegetation obviously cannot mark a stable line over a
period of 18.6 years.557 In a later case in the same New York court,
evidence by a state biologist as to the location of the mean high water
line by vegetation maps was viewed as inconclusive.ss The court ap-
parently assumed that vegetation does not provide an exact location but
can only show the general location of the mean high water line.
Despite questions as to their long-range reliability, vegetation tests
may be usefully combined with mean high water line point locations
established by field surveys to provide a physical interpolation of the
line between the points. If the vegetation of a particular area has been
well studied, and the bottom configuration is uniform, perhaps as few
points as one per one-half mile of marshland or mangrove will need
552. In a South Carolina project the mean high water line was found to be brack-
eted by the high marsh grass species and one of two salt water species, spartina alterni-
flora or annual salicornia sp. Guss, supra note 530, at 251.
553. See J. DAvis, THE ECOLOGY AND GEOLOGICAL ROLE Or MANGROVES IN FLoRmA
303-417 (Carnegie Institution of Washington Pub. No. 517, 1940).
554. Guss, supra note 530, at 256.
555. Dolphin Lane Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 72 Misc. 2d 868, 339
N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1971). The court considered the grasses sparlina alterniflora
and spartine patents to indicate the area in which daily tide flow occurs. The strip of
land where both types grew was held to be the general area of the mean high water
line. No greater accuracy was attempted by the court since the parties had agreed to
accept a metes and bounds description once the general boundary was established.
556. Id. at -, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 985. This distrust of the vegetation boundary has
been challenged. See Guss, supra note 530, at 256.
557. The 18.6-year period is required to incorporate all astronomic effects on the
tides. If the grasses are shifting as the tide shifts through its patterns with perhaps a
lag of a few growing seasons, the vegetation is no more accurate than high tide obser-
vation during the growing cycle of the grass.
558. State v. Bishop, 75 Misc. 2d 787, 348 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The case
involved a state claim to the marshland up to the mean high tide line as sovereignty
land. The court ruled that the evidence as to the mean high tide line was irrelevant
since the New York test for the boundary between public and private tidelands is the
navigability of the water overlying the land.
1974] 257
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to be established.559 The method would obviously more accurately
mark the actual mean high water line than straight lines drawn between
surveyed points-the method used in establishing a meander line.
Moreover, even if the vegetation were not acceptable as evidence of
the aotual line, it might be a useful tool to prevent gross errors in locat-
ing the mean high water line.
The problem of determining the mean high water line where the
shore has been filled deserves some mention. Neither conventional
survey techniques nor observation of vegetation can help in this situa-
tion. Use of -the meander line is one approach that has already been
discussed. 560 Another approach that has been favorably mentioned by
the courts is drilling through the fill, extracting core samples, and from
these samples obtaining a geologist's opinion as to the location of the
mean high water line before the fill activity occurred.56 1 However, no
court has established the mean high water line on this basis alone. In
a case which required determining the ordinary high water mark as of
an earlier date on a fresh water river, an Iowa court considered a geol-
ogist's evidence together with evidence from botanists and data
gathered from a river gauge.56 No one method was considered con-
clusive. Recently a Delaware court seemed willing to accept geologist's
core samples as evidence of the mean low water line; however, a
request to conduct the necessary drillings was denied for reasons of
estoppel.56 3  The core sample method, if proven accurate, could be a
useful supplement to other coastal mapping techniques in artificially
filled areas.
Such techniques include aerial photography. Federal, state, and
private firms have conducted aerial surveys, particularly in coastal
regions, for about 50 years. Research of such courses will frequently
produce high-quality photographs that in themselves or when compared
to current tidal controlled aerial photography will indicate the extent
of artificial fill. Survey records, including those used in the preparation
of NOS nautical charts and geological survey quadrangles, as well as
those prepared by local surveyors, county land records, records of
historical societies, newspapers and recollections of local residents have
559. Testimony of J. Guth, In re Committee Meeting Estero Bay Land Transac-
tions, Committee on Natural Resources, at 241 (Lee County, Fla., Nov. 15, 1973).
560. See notes 532-49 and accompanying text supra.
561. Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc., 410 P.2d 992 (Alas. 1966).
562. City of Cedar Rapids v. Marshall, 199 Iowa 1262, 203 N.W. 932 (1925).
563. Smti gx rdt. Btwkson v, Pennsylvania R,R., 273 A.2d 268 (Del. 1971).
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on occasion been effectively utilized to reconstruct the natural land con-
figuration.564
(c) Surveys in areas of diminished tidal influence
When the bed of a tidally-affected waterbody is owned by the
state, privately-owned upland property may extend to: (1) the mean
high water line; (2) the mean water level line; or (3) the ordinary
high water mark. Selection of the appropriate boundary line, however,
may present both serious practical and legal problems.
(i) The mean high water line
In theory, the mean high water line is normally utilized for bound-
ary purposes in tidal waters where the bed is publicly owned.
Because tidal phenomena reflect cyclical astronomic conditions, 565 ele-
vations based solely on tidal data are usually permanent and recover-
able.566 The introduction of nontidal constituents into the calculation
process, however, may compromise the reliability of the vertical datum.
The masking of the tidal effect by nontidal forces such as seiche
is an example of this condition. Seiche, which occurs in bays and har-
bors, is the oscillation of water due to barometric pressure, earthquakes,
and other nonastronomic forces.5"6 Arguably, seiche should be ignored
in determining mean high water,5 8 and there is some legal support for
this position.569
(ii) The mean water level line
In those areas where the range of the tide is small or where tidal
effects are masked by meteorological conditions or fresh-water runoff,
NOS computes the mean water level instead of the mean high water
564. See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 603 (3d Cir.
1974); United States v. Keevan & Son, Inc., Civil No. 74-69 (S.D. Fla., June 27, 1974).
565. There is, however, evidence in many areas of a rise in mean sea level due to
subsidence of the ocean floor and other causes. Levin & Cronan, The Impending Sub-
mergence of the Coastal Zone, 1973 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF PHOTOGRAM-
umTRY 57, 57-58 (Fall Convention). This may affect the long-term accuracy of the
vertical elevation. H. MARwmE, supra note 77, at 87.
566. A. SaMLowrrz, supra note 5, at 89.
567. See Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, and to What Extent is This a Fed-
eral Question, 42 WASH. L. Rav. 33, 64 (1966); H. MAam, supra note 77, at 39.
568. H. MAsmER, supra note 77, at 41-42.
569. City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 20 F. Supp 6 (S.D. Cal. 1937),
affd 102 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1939). On appeal, the court of appeals decided the case
on other grounds. 102 F.2d at 57-58.
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datum.5 70  This elevation is determined by averaging the height of the
water level at hourly intervals over an appropriate period of time.57 1
The intersection of this datum with the shore is known as the mean
water level line. Since the mean water level line may appear on NOS
maps produced in conjunction with state coastal mapping programs,
some discussion of the legal validity of its use as a property boundary
is necessary.
In some bays and lagoons, where the range of the tide does not
exceed a tenth of a foot, the daily or semidaily high and low waters
cannot be distinguished with sufficient accuracy to meet NOS standards.
In such situations, the mean water level is much easier to obtain and,
as a practical matter, does not differ significantly from either the mean
high or mean low water datums. Since the vertical elevations of mean
high water and mean water level are virtually identical, it follows that
the mean water level line could serve as the legal equivalent of the
mean high water line.
However, where the tidal influence in a tidal river or stream is
masked by interference from fresh water runoff, a mean water level
elevation should not be used for boundary purposes. Fresh water run-
off, even where it results from seasonal flooding, is not a cyclical or
recurrent condition in any regular sense. More importantly, it is not
offset by other phenomena in the same way as are the purely tidal con-
stituents that make up mean high water. Consequently, the inclusion
of elevations caused primarily by fresh water runoff in the mean water
level datum would create the same forms of inaccuracy in the vertical
datum as the presence of seiche in the mean high water elevation.
Therefore, if the mean water level is to be used as the equivalent of
mean high water, water levels caused by runoff should be eliminated
from the computation of this datum. If it is not practical to do so, ar-
guably, the watercourse should be treated as fresh water. This would
require the use of the ordinary high water mark concept for boundary
determination purposes.
(iii) The ordinary high water mark
The ordinary high water mark is -the usual boundary between the
bed of a navigable watercourse and the adjacent upland.572  According
570. W. HULL, supra note 4, at 3.
571. P. ScHuREA N, supra note 76, at 36.
572. In the absence of special circumstances, the title of landowners along non-
navigable streams extends to the thread of the stream. Maloney & Plager, Florda's
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to the weight of authority, the ordinary high water mark is the line that
the water impresses upon the soil by covering it for sufficient periods
to deprive it of vegetation and to destroy its value for agriculture. 573
Unlike the mean high water line or the mean water level line, the ordi-
nary high water mark does not represent the intersection of a particular
vertical datum with the shore. Instead, it is a physical mark caused
by the action of the water on the land, and refers to a point at which
the character of the soil and vegetation, if any, differs from that of the
upland.5 74
Moreover, the ordinary high water mark refers to the usual or
ordinary water level and does not extend to lands tempoarily sub-
merged by flood waters.5 5 The federal courts have also rejected
claims that the ordinary high water mark of a river is the level of annual
flooding.5 l6 Thus, it seems clear that the mean water level line cannot
be used in lieu of the ordinary high water mark for boundary determi-
nation purposes in fresh waters. For example, if flood levels are in-
cluded along with usual water levels in the calculation of the mean
water level, the resulting mean water level line may be located a con-
siderable distance landward of the ordinary high water mark. It
follows, therefore, that the freshwater boundary cannot be determined
by means of a mathematical average of the daily water levels.
(3) Other Statutory Provisions
The Model Act requires that surveys be made only by licensed
surveyors or by approved federal employees. 577  It also requires that
copies of all private coastal surveys be sent to the agency within ninety
days after completion if they are to be recorded or used in any judicial
Streams-Water Rights in a Water Wonderland, 10 U. FIA. L. REv. 294, 295 (1957);
Annot., 74 A.L.R. 597 (1931). 'The 'thread of the stream! when called for as a bound-
ary line for private estates, 'is the middle line between shores, irrespective of the depth
of the channel, taking them in the natural and ordinary stage of the water, at medium
height, neither swollen by freshets nor shrunk by droughts."' State v. Muncie Pulp Co.,
119 Tenn. 47, 78, 104 S.W. 437, 445 (1907), quoting Branham v. Bledsoe Creek Turn-
pike Co., 69 Tenn. 704, 706 (1878).
573. Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 380, 415 (1851).
574. Borough of Ford City v. United States, 345 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965).
575. Paine Lumber Co. v. United States, 55 F. 854, 864 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1893).
576. United States v. Claridge, 279 F. Supp. 87, 91 (D. Ariz. 1967), aff'd per
curiam, 416 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 961 (1970); Willis v.
United States, 50 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.W. Va. 1943), affd, 141 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1944);
Kelley's Creek & N.R.R. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 396 (1943).
577. Model Act § 12.
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or administrative proceeding.51 8 This will enable the agency to obtain
and preserve this type of useful data.
There are no criminal sanctions in the Model Act. The Act's suc-
cess substantially depends on the cooperation of the professional sur-
veyors. A powerful enforcement tool, however, is a provision which
declares that no map or survey concerned with coastal boundaries and
made after the adoption of the Act shall be admissible as evidence in
any judicial or administrative proceeding unless it complies with the
Act's requirements. 579
D. The Coastal Mapping Program
Section 6 of the Model Act directs the agency to conduct a com-
prehensive program of coastal boundary mapping. 80 The program will
involve the determination of local tidal datums, such as mean high
water, at appropriate intervals along the entire coastline of the state.
In addition, the agency will publish a series of photogrammetic maps
of the state's coastline, of suitable scale, on which the mean high water
line will be represented. 581
In connection with the mapping program, the agency may serve
as the coordinating state agency for any program of tidal surveying or
coastal mapping conducted by the federal government.58 2  Moreover,
the agency may contract with any federal, state or local agency or with
private parties for the performance of surveys, studies, investigations,
mapping or related activities associated with the program. 83 The Act
contemplates, but does not specifically require, a joint federal-state pro-
gram in which most of the actual surveying and mapping activities
would be be performed by NOS.58 4
The program authorized by the Model Act was inspired by a joint
coastal mapping program currently sponsored by NOS and the State of
Florida. The program originated in a 1969 agreement between the
State of Florida and the NOS for establishing tidal datum planes and
578. Id. § 13.
579. Id. § 16.
580. "The [agency] is authorized and directed to conduct a comprehensive program
of coastal boundary mapping with the object of providing accurate surveys of the coast-
line of the state at the earliest possible date." Id. § 6.
581. Maps produced under the NOS-Florida coastal mapping program are published
at a 1:10,000 scale. A. Powell, supra note 485, at 5.
582. Model Act § 5(b).
583. Id. at § 5(d).
584. A. Powell, supra note 485, at 8.
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mapping the Florida coastal zone. Under this program NOS assumed
responsibility for establishing tide stations, determining tidal datums,
and producing, printing, and distributing a series of maps which ac-
curately portray the mean low-water line and, insofar as practical, the
mean high-water line.
The tidal datums and maps are to be used by Florida as source
data for selecting baseline points to establish coastal boundaries in-
cluding seaward boundaries and boundaries between sovereignty land
and upland subject to private ownership. For NOS, the survey will fur-
nish base maps and related data for its marine charting program.58 5
Since public acceptance is largely dependent on the accuracy,
availability and official status of the maps, the proposed act has dealt
with each of these matters. The question of accuracy has been men-
tioned before in connection with survey methodology. The procedure
by which tidal elevations are determined in connection with the map-
ping program is the most accurate practicable method available, 58 6 and
the maps themselves conform to national map accuracy standards. 587
Moreover, in order to insure the continuing reliability of the maps, the
agency must review its data at least every twenty-five years, and where
necessary, publish updated and revised maps.5 s8 In addition, when
natural processes or human activities cause sudden shoreline alteration,
the agency is authorized to investigate and issue revised maps. 589
To insure that the maps will be readily available -to the general
public, the Act provides for their publication and requires that they be
filed among the public land records of each affected county. 9 '
The proposed act also gives official sanction to coastal maps pro-
duced under the program. Upon formal adoption and publication by
585. W. HULL, supra note 4, at 2.
586. NOS has undertaken to compute the vertical datum within a tolerance of
0.1 foot. Id. at 3.
587. Model Act § 7. "'National map accuracy standards' means a set of guidelines
published by the office of management and budget of the United States to which maps
produced by the United States government usually adhere." Id. § 3(21). See L. SWAN-
SON, TOpOGRAPmC MANuAL, Part II (U.S. Coast & Geodetic Survey Spec. Pub. No. 249,
1949).
588. Model Act § 9(1).
589. Id. § 9(2). The agency may also publish supplemental maps of a larger scale.
Id. § 9(3). Revised or large-scale supplemental maps may be designated "approved
coastal zone maps" following action by the agency in accordance with the procedures
established in section 8. Id. § 9(4).
590. Id. § 8. About 400 copies of each map are published by NOS in connection
with the NOS-Florida coastal mapping program. Maps may be purchased from NOS
for $2.50 apiece.
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the agency, the maps are designated "approved coastal zone maps."5 "1
Section 10(1) expressly provides for the admissibility of approved
coastal zone maps as evidence in all judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings throughout the state.5 92  This provision avoids the possible re-
quirement that a cartographer from NOS attend each trial or adminis-
trative proceeding to lay the foundation for the admission of a map or
maps.5 93 Since the mean high water line, as depicted on the maps,
may vary as much as sixteen feet from the actual mean high water
line,594 landowners who wish to ascertain their coastal boundaries with
greater precision should make a field survey. When performed in
accordance with the provisions of section 14 of the Model Act, the re-
sults of such a survey may be introduced as evidence to contest the ac-
curacy of an approved coastal zone map.5 95
591. Id. § 8. The Florida Coastal Mapping Act of 1974, ch. 74-56, § 8, [1974]
Fla. Laws 37, provides for a public hearing prior to formal approval by the agency.(1) Upon completion of a map or series of maps, the department shall trans-
mit a copy of the map or maps to the clerk of the circuit court for the county
in which the land shown on the map is located. In addition, the department
shall publish in a newspaper of general circulation in the affected area at least
once a week for four consecutive weeks a notice that a copy of the proposed
map or maps is on file in the said clerk's office, and that a public hearing shallbe held at a specified time and place as provided in subsection (2).(2) Before a proposed map shall become effective, the department shall hold
a public hearing in the county or counties in which the land shown on the map
is located.(3) After such public hearing the department may approve the proposed map
with or without amendments or may withdraw it for further study.(4) The decision of the department shall be subject to judicial review as pro-
vided in chapter 120, Florida Statutes.(5) Upon approval by the department these maps shall be known as "approved
coastal zone maps" and copies thereof shall be filed among the public land rec-
ords of all affected counties.
592. "Approved coastal zone maps shall be admissible as evidence in proceedings
before any court, tribunal or agency of state or local government. The location of the
mean-high or mean-low water lines represented on such maps may be more precisely
identified by the introduction of field surveys made in accordance with the standards
and procedures set forth in sections 13 through 15 of this act." Model Act § 10(1).
This provision was not included in the Florida Coastal Mapping Act as a result of objec-
tions at the legislative hearings, but the authors feel its inclusion is desirable and fullyjustified.
593. Statutes which provide for exceptions to the hearsay rule for official records
may eliminate the requirement for an in-court appearance by a cartographer in federal
courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 44. See also FLA. STAT. § 92.32(1973). But see Florida S. Ry. v. Parsons, 33 Fla. 631, 15 So. 338 (1894); AM. Jur.,
PROOF OF FACTs 602 (1960); 13 FLA. JUR. Evidence § 298 (1957).
594. National Map Accuracy Standards require maps of a scale of 1:10,000 to be
accurate to within 25 feet. NOS vouches map accuracy of this scale of within 16 feet.
NOS map, supra note 496. Field surveys by NOS to check the accuracy of the maps
in Florida have so far revealed a maximum error of within 9 feet. Testimony of Com-
mander Wesley V. Hull, NOAA, Chief, Coastal Mapping Division, Nation Ocean Sur-
vey, Governor's Coastal Mapping Conf., Tallahassee, Florida (Dec. 15, 1973).
595. See Model Act § 10(1).
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Where the location of the mean high water line is obscured by
vegetation, as in the case of marshland or mangroves, NOS normally
maps only the apparent shoreline.596 The apparent shoreline rep-
resents "the intersection of the mean high-water datum with the outer
limits of vegetation and appears to the navigator as the shoreline.r97
Where vegetation is quite extensive, the actual mean high water line
may be considerably landward of the apparent shoreline.5 98 There-
fore, the apparent shoreline, as depicted on the maps, has no legal sig-
nificance and is not treated as a property line under the Model Act.599
V. CONCLUSION
The period of uncoordinated and wasteful use of coastal resources
appears to be ending. Government at all levels is responding to public
concern over the coastal environment by assuming a greater role in the
process of coastal zone management. A viable regulatory effort, how-
ever, requires a rational administrative structure, a framework for plan-
ning and policy making, and an effective implementation scheme. 6'0
An essential prerequisite to the development of such a program
is the determination of the respeotive legal interests of both private
landowners and the public in coastal areas. This involves a considera-
tion of both the rights and limitations inherent in the nature of coastal
property and -the physical delimitation of private and public ownership.
The former subject is embraced within the notion of riparian rights in
the case of private property and within the concept of the public trust
doctrine in the case of state-owned submerged lands. This article has
concerned itself primarily with the latter topic-the problem of coastal
boundaries-and will conclude with a brief discussion of the relation-
ship between coastal mapping and an overall management program.
The accurate determination and representation of coastal boundaries is
an important aspect of both the planning and implementation phases
of coastal zone management. 601 In the planning process, the maps are
necessary to represent existing or proposed land use patterns. They
596. 2 A. SHAjowrrz, supra note 5, at 177-82.
597. Model Act § 3(2).
598. See 2. A. SHALOWiTZ, supra note 5, at 176-77.
599. "Where approved coastal zone maps do not designate the mean high-water line
but instead depict an apparent shoreline, the apparent shoreline is not intended to repre-
sent the mean high-water line. In such cases the mean high-water line may be located
by field surveys of the type referred to in subsection (1) above." Model Act § 10(2).
600. Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1,
23-30 (1972).
601. W. HuLT, supra note 4.
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may also be used to depict biological and mineral resources, and to lo-
cate problem areas. This information is also required for planning in
connection with beach nourishment and land acquisition activities.
Maps and survey data is also required for regulatory purposes. At
the federal level, for example, the administration of the dredge and fill
permit programs under the Rivers and Harbors Act 0 2 generates a great
demand for such information. About 17,000 permit applications will
be processed this year,60 3 and in each, the limit of the Corps of
Engineers' jurisdiction, the mean high water line, must be ascertained
and depicted. 60 4  Similar data may be utilized by the Environmental
Protection Agency for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.""5 The administration of com-
parable programs at the state level also requires accurate coastal bound-
dary data, as does the implementation of coastal construction set-back
line requirements, shoreline zoning, and wetland protection provisions.
This article has examined some of the difficulties associated with
the ascertainment of coastal boundaries. It is hoped that the proposed
Model Act will provide solutions to some of these problems. The
authors recommend that the states: (1) define coastal boundaries for
purposes of private ownership in terms of the mean high or mean low
water line which has a scientifically recognized meaning; (2) require
the development and use of a coastal survey methodology which will
insure that property boundaries are determined with all possible ac-
curacy; and (3) provide for a comprehensive program of coastal zone
mapping. The implementation of these proposals, coupled with an ef-
fective coastal zone management program, cannot fail to contribute to
a better utilization of the nation's coastal resources.
602. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-66 (1970).
603. H. Dolan, Coastal Problems Related to Water Levels (presentation to Seventh
GEOP Research Conf., Ohio State Univ. June 6-7, 1974).
604. While the Corps utilizes every available source of information in checking the
accuracy of permit applications, actual tidal observations are necessary for proper deci-
sion making. While the use of the Sea Level Datum (National Geodetic Datum) eleva-
tion in near shore areas is inadequate for these purposes, if no other data are available,
the Corps uses it. Id. at 4-5.
605. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1974). But see United States v. Holland, 373
F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974). The Environmental Protection Agency in the rHolland
case argued that filling operations in the waters of Papy's Bayou near St. Petersburg,
Florida, violated the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. In that
legislation "navigable waters" were defined as "waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. 1974). The court held that the dis-
charging of sand, dirt and dredge spoil on land which was periodically inundated with
the waters of Papy's Bayou violated the Act even though the land was located above
the mean high-water line.
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VI APPENDIX
MODEL COASTAL MAPPING ACT
An act relating to coastal mapping; providing definitions; providing
powers and duties of the [agency], providing a comprehensive and
continuous program of coastal boundary mapping which will permit ac-
curate surveys; providing standards for establishment of local tidal
datums and methods of determining mean high-water and mean low-
water lines; providing for admissibility as evidence; providing for sever-
ability; providing an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of -the State of
Section 1. Short title.-This act shall be cited as the "[Name
of state] coastal mapping act of [year]."
Section 2. Declaration of policy.-The legislature hereby de-
clares that accurate maps of coastal areas are required for many public
purposes, including, but not limited to, the promotion of marine naviga-
tion, the enhancement of recreation, the determination of coastal bound-
aries, and the implementation of coastal zone planning and manage-
ment programs by state and local governmental agencies. Accordingly,
a state coastal mapping program is declared to be in the public interest.
The legislature further recognizes the necessity of uniform standards
and procedures with respect to the establishment of local tidal datums
and the determination of the mean high-water and mean low-water
lines, and therefore directs that such uniform standards and procedures
be developed.
Section 3. Definitions.-The following words, phrases or terms
used herein, unless the context otherwise indicates, shall have the fol-
lowing meanings:
(1) "Agency" means [Specify agency which will administer the
act].
(2) "Apparent shoreline' means the line drawn on a map or
chart in lieu of the mean high-water line in areas where the mean high-
water line may be obscured by marine vegetation. This line represents
the intersection of the mean high-water datum with the outer limits of
vegetation and appears to the navigator as the shoreline.
(3) "Approved coastal zone map" means a map approved by the
[agency].
(4) "Comparison of simultaneous observations" means a method
Qf determining mean wiues by comparison of short-period observatious
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at a station with simultaneous observations made at a station for which
mean values, based on long-period observations, are available.
(5) "Control -tide station" means a place so designated by the
[agency] or the national ocean survey at which continuous tidal obser-
vations have been taken or are to be taken over a minimum of nineteen
years to obtain basic tidal data for the locality.
(6) "Datum" means a reference point, line, or plane used as a
basis for measurements.
(7) "Datum plane" means a surface used as reference from
which heights or depths are reckoned. The plane is called a tidal
datum when defined by a phase of the tide, for example, high water
or low water.
(8) "Demarcation" means the act of setting and marking limits
or boundaries on the ground.
(9) "Diurnal tides" means tides having a period or cycle of ap-
proximately one tidal day.
(10) "Foreshore" means the strip of land between the mean
high-water and mean low-water lines that is alternately covered and un-
covered by the flow of the tide.
(11) "Geodetic bench mark" means a permanently monumented
and precisely referenced and described mark, usually a bronze -tablet
or copper or bronze bolt, leaded or cemented into a masonry structure,
which is established to give a definite high point on the monument to
which geodetic elevations are referred.
(12) "Interpolated water elevation" means a point between two
adjacent tide stations where the water elevation has been determined
by interpolation from established datums at the two tide stations.
(13) "Leveling" means the operation of determining differences
of elevation between points on the surface of the earth; the determina-
tion of the elevations of points relative to some arbitrary or natural level
surface called a datum.
(14) "Local tidal datum" means -the datum established for a
specific tide station through use of tidal observations made at that sta-
tion.
15) "Mean-high water" means the average height of the high
waters over a nineteen-year period; or for shorter periods of observa-
tions, the average height of the high waters after corrections are applied
to eliminate known variations and to reduce the result to the equivalent
of a mean nineteen-year value.
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(16) "Mean high water line" means the intersection of -the tidal
plane of mean high water with the shore.
(17) "Mean low-water" means the average height of the low
waters over a nineteen-year period; or for shorter periods of observa-
tions, the average height of low waters after corrections are applied to
eliminate known variations and to reduce the result to the equivalent
of a mean nineteen-year value.
(18) "Mean low-water line' means -the intersection of the tidal
plane of mean low water with the shore.
(19) "Mean range difference!' means the variation of the mean
range of the tide at two different tide stations.
(20) "Mixed tide" means the type of tide in which the presence
of a diurnal wave is conspicuous by a large inequality in either the high
or low water heights with two high waters and two low waters usually
occurring each tidal day. The name is usually applied to the tides in-
termediate to those predominantly diurnal and those predominantly
semidiurnal.
(21) "National map accuracy standards" means a set of guide-
lines published by the office of management and budget of the United
States to which maps produced by the United States government usually
adhere.
(22) "Nineteen-year tidal cycle" means the period of time
generally reckoned as constituting a full tidal cycle.
(23) "Nonperiodic forces" means -those forces that occur without
regard to a fixed cycle.
(24) "Photogrammetry" means the science of making precise
measurements from photographs.
(25) "Semidiurnal tides" means tides having a period of approxi-
mately one-half a tidal day.
(26) "Tidal bench mark" means a standard disk or other accept-
able fixed point in the general vicinity of a tide station used for the
purpose of preserving tidal information, to which the tide staff at the
tide station and the tidal datums determined from observations at the
tide station are originally referred.
(27) "Tidal datum" means a plane of reference for elevations
determined from the rise and fall of the tides.
(28) "Tidal day" means the time of the rotation of the earth with
respect to the moon, or the interval between two successive upper
transits of the moon over the meridian of a place.
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(29) "Tide" means the periodic rising and falling of the waters
of the earth that result from the gravitational attraction of the moon
and the sun acting upon the rotating earth.
(30) "Tide station" means a place at which continuous tide
observations have been taken or are to be taken to obtain tidal data
for the locality.
(31) "Time difference" means the variation in time between the
occurrences of the same phase of the tide at two tide stations.
Section 4. Legal significance of the mean high-water line.-
(1) The mean-high water line [along the shore of land immedi-
ately bordering on navigable waters] is recognized and declared to be
the boundary between the foreshore owned by the state in its sovereign
capacity and upland subject to private ownership, provided, however,
that no provision of this act shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of
state ownership of sovereignty submerged lands, nor shall any provision
of this act be deemed to impair the title to privately-owned submerged
lands validly alienated by the state or its legal predecessors.
(2) No provision of this act shall be deemed to modify the com-
mon law of this state with respect to the legal effects of accretion, relic-
tion, erosion or avulsion.
Section 5. Powers and duties of the [agency].-
(1) The provision of this act shall be administered by the [agency]
(2) In addition to such powers as may be specifically delegated
to it under the provisions of this act, the [agency] is authorized to per-
form the following functions:
(a) To coordinate the efforts of all public and private
agencies and organizations engaged in the making of tidal surveys and
maps of the coastal areas of -this state with the object of avoiding un-
necessary duplication and overlapping;
(b) To serve as a coordinating state agency for any program
of tidal surveying and mapping conducted by the federal government;
(c) To assist any court, tribunal, administrative agency, or
political subdivision, and to make available to -them, information regard-
ing tidal surveying and coastal boundary determinations;
(d) To contract with federal, state or local agencies or with
private parties for the performance of any surveys, studies, investiga-
tions or mapping activities, for preparation and publication of the results
thereof, or for other authorized functions related to the objectives of
this act;
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(e) To develop permanent records of tidal surveys and maps
of the state's coastal areas;
(f) To develop uniform specifications and regulations for
tidal surveying and mapping coastal areas of the state;
(g) To collect and preserve appropriate survey data from
coastal areas; and
(h) To act as a public repository for copies of coastal area
maps and to establish a library of such maps and charts.
Section 6. Authorization of coastal mapping program.-The
[agency] is authorized and directed to conduct a comprehensive
program of coastal boundary mapping with the object of providing ac-
curate surveys of the coastline of the state at the earliest possible date.
Section 7. Mapping standards.-Al maps produced under the
provisions of this act shall conform at least to minimal national map ac-
curacy standards.
Section 8. Approval of maps by the [agency].-Maps produced
under the provisions of this act shall be designated as "approved coastal
zone maps" upon adoption and publication by the [agency] and copies
of such maps shall be filed among the public land records of each
affected county.
Section 9. Revised and supplemental maps.-
(1) The [agency] shall endeavor to maintain the accuracy of its
mapping program by reviewing its data at least every twenty-five years,
and where necessary, issuing revised approved coastal zone maps.
(2) Any private person or government official may advise the
[agency] in writing of any instance in which significant shoreline
alteration has occurred as the result of natural conditions or human ac-
tivities. Upon notification thereof, or on its own initiative, the [agency]
may investigate such cases and, where appropriate, authorize the pro-
duction of a revised approved coastal zone map of the affected area.
(3) Where appropriate and when needed or desirable for par-
ticular areas, the [agency] may publish supplemental maps of a scale
larger than the standard scale.
(4) Revised or larger scale maps shall become approved coastal
zone maps following approval by the [agency] in accordance with the
provisions of section eight.
Section 10. Evidentiary effect of approved coastal zone maps.-
(1) Approved coastal zone maps shall be admissible as evidence
in proceedings before any court, tribuia4 or agenc of state or 1ocl
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government. The location of the mean-high or mean-low water lines
represented on such maps may be more precisely identified by the in-
troduction of field surveys made in accordance with the standards and
procedures set forth in sections 13 through 15 of this act.
(2) Where approved coastal zone maps do not designate the
mean high-water line but instead depict an apparent shoreline, the
apparent shoreline is not intended to represent the mean high-water
line. In such cases the mean high-water line may be located by field
surveys of the type referred to in sub-section (1) above.
Section 11. Standards and procedures; applicability.-The es-
tablishment of local tidal datums and the determination of the location
of the mean high-water line or the mean low-water line, whether by
federal, state or local agencies or private parties, shall be made in ac-
cordance with the standards and procedures set forth in sections 13
through 15 of this act and in accordance with supplementary regulations
promulgated by the agency.
Section 12. Work to be performed only by authorized personnel.
-The establishment of local tidal datums and the determination of the
location of the mean high-water line or the mean low-water line shall
be performed by qualified personnel licensed by -the state or by repre-
sentatives of the United States Government when approved by the
[agency].
Section 13. Notification to [agency].-Any surveyor undertak-
ing to establish a local tidal datum and to determine the location of the
mean high-water line or the mean low-water line shall submit a copy
of the results thereof to the [agency] within ninety days after the com-
pletion of such work if the same is to be recorded or submitted to any
court or agency of state or local government.
Section 14. Standards for establishment of local tidal datums.-
(1) Unless otherwise allowed by this act or regulations promul-
gated hereunder, a local tidal datum shall be established from a series
of tide observations taken at a tide station established in accordance
with procedures approved by the [agency]. In establishing such pro-
cedures full consideration will be given to the national standards and
procedures established by the National Ocean Survey.
(2) Records acquired at control tide stations, which are based on
mean nineteen-year values, comprise the basic data from which tidal
datums shall be determined.
(3) Observations at a -tide station other than a control tide station
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shall be reduced to mean nineteen-year values through comparison
with simultaneous observations at the appropriate control tide station.
The observations shall be made continuously and shall extend over such
period as shall be provided for in [agency] regulations.
(4) When a local tidal datum has been established, it shall be
preserved by referring it to tidal bench marks in the manner prescribed
by the [agency].
(5) A local tidal datum may be established between two tide sta-
tions by interpolation where the time and mean range differences of
the tide between the two tide stations are within acceptable standards
as determined by the [agency]. The methods for establishing the local
tidal datum by interpolation shall be prescribed by regulations of the
[agency]. Local tidal datums established in this manner shall be re-
corded with the [agency].
(6) A local tidal datum property established through the use of
continuous tide observations meeting the standards described in this
section shall be presumptively correct when it differs from a local tidal
datum established by interpolation.
(7) The [agency] may approve the use of tide observations
made prior -to the effective date of this act for use in establishing local
tidal datums.
Section 15. Determination of mean high-water line or mean low-
water line.-The location of the mean high-water line or the mean low-
water line shall be determined by methods which are approved by the
[agency] for the area concerned. Geodetic bench marks shall not be
used unless approved by the [agency].
Section 16. Admissibility of maps and surveys.-No map or sur-
vey prepared after the effective date of this act and purporting to
establish local tidal datums or to determine the location of the mean
high-water line or the mean low-water line shall be admissible as evi-
dence in any court, administrative agency, political subdivision, or tri-
bunal in this state unless made in accordance with the provisions of -this
act by persons described in section 12 hereof.
Section 17. Severablity.-If any provision of this act or the ap-
plication thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the in-
validity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to
this end -the provisions of this act are declared severable.
Section 18. Effective date-This act shall take effect on [appro-
priate date].
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